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INDIA  AND  PAKISTAN - A Cautionary Tale for Israel and Palestine

by Jeffrey Weiss



With the Oslo process in collapse and its troops re-occupying major Palestinian cities, Israel stands at a historic crossroads. It must decide between two major policy options as it strives for a formula to counter Palestinian terrorism. As an adjunct to military measures, Israel can revive political negotiations despite the violence. One goal of this strategy would be to resolve the dispute with the Palestinians through the creation of an Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[1] This policy is the preference of Israel's ruling Likud and opposition Labor parties, subject to differences regarding timing, the nature of the new state, and the suitable Palestinian negotiating partner.

There is a dissenting view within Israel, however, which is most prominently expressed by Binyamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's main political rival within his own Likud party. Netanyahu's policy opinion rejects Palestinian statehood. According to this view, Israel should re-occupy the autonomous areas, dismantle the Palestinian Authority, and exile Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat.[2] While Netanyahu contemplates future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations toward an accommodation that will allow Palestinians to run their own affairs, he rules out the creation of a Palestinian state as a feature of a political solution.[3]

Outside of Israel, the momentum favoring creation of a Palestinian state seems to be irresistible. The Bush administration supports Palestinian statehood,[4] something the Europeans have long advocated. With unanimous Arab support for such an outcome, [5] a PLO-controlled state appears to be the universally-accepted key to a comprehensive Middle East peace.

On the other hand, nine years of post-Oslo terrorism legitimately raises the question of whether such a policy can bring peace. Palestinian autonomy has coincided with a dramatic increase in terrorism.[6]  That the further step of conferring statehood will reverse the course of recent events requires a leap of faith that is difficult to reconcile with the violence of the past nine years. In evaluating the alternatives, it is important to place Oslo's failure in the proper historical context. The object would be to determine whether, based on experience, the political process should have been expected to fail, or whether there is still room for optimism that a process like Oslo can work. In other words, analysts need to ask if there is a historical basis for the supposition that the partition of post-1967 Israel into Jewish and Arab states is likely to yield peace.

It is often said in political matters that 'past is prologue.'[7] Critics of the peace process argue that withdrawal from the 1967 territories will not lead to peace.[8] They point to the Arabs' rejection of partition in 1947, the three wars fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors before the Jewish state ever occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to pre-1967 Palestinian terror attacks.[9] Yet this review of history, while clearly relevant and indeed persuasive, is not broad enough. It is necessary to place pre-1967 (and indeed post-Oslo) conduct into broader perspective by considering the success of other two-state solutions to ethnic conflict, particularly where the demands of a Muslim aspirant to statehood were involved. The purpose would be to determine if a solution of this type has worked before. If it has, perhaps the conduct outlined by Oslo's critics could be considered anomalous. If not, Arab rejectionism should be seen as consistent with a more fundamental problem with a two-state solution to address Muslim grievances.


There is an ideal case study, in light of which it is possible to judge the benefits, if any, that a Palestinian state can be expected to bring. It is the 1947 partition of British India into two states, India and Pakistan, that occurred on the eve of Britain's departure from the Indian subcontinent after nearly three and one-half centuries.[10] It has been said that "[f]ew political decisions in the twentieth century have altered the course of history in more dramatic fashion than the partition of India in 1947."[11] This makes the India experience a particularly important one for further study.

The background of the Indian partition was Britain's post-World War II decision to depart the Asian subcontinent.[12] Prospects for a peaceful transition to independent rule were complicated by a militant Muslim minority that demanded partition of Hindu-dominated India into two countries, one Muslim and the other Hindu.[13] Communal violence[14] was rampant at that time. In one day of horrific rioting alone, a Direct Action Day called by the Muslim League to punctuate its demand for independence, some 5,000 people were slaughtered.[15] Unwilling to abandon the country to chaos, the British sought a political settlement of Hindu/Muslim grievances.[16]

Proponents of partition argued that only an independent Islamic state could ward off bloodshed between these religious communities. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the man who later became Pakistan's first ruler and the force behind Direct Action Day, predicted that once the two states existed, Hindus and Muslims would live as neighbors "in complete harmony."[17] He also asserted that without an independent Muslim state, the Hindu majority would politically overwhelm the minority Muslim population.[18] Full political rights for India's Muslims, therefore, could also come only with partition.

Because India's Muslims were concentrated in two geographically separate regions of the subcontinent, the proposed Muslim state would consist of Western and Eastern portions on either side of the Hindu state, separated by about 900 miles.[19] The new state would be called "Pakistan," meaning "Land of the Pure."[20] The name "Pakistan," like the country it would designate, was a sum of distinct parts. It was formed of the names of the Indian provinces that would make up its western portion: Punjab, Afgania (the NorthWest Frontier), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan.[21] The happenstance of where Muslims were physically concentrated in British India in 1947 primarily dictated the contours of Pakistan's boundaries.[22] Because Pakistan had not existed previously, there were no historic borders to consider in drawing the line between it and neighboring India. Also, because partition was expected to end all violence between Hindus and Muslims, security considerations were not a primary factor in placing the new border.[23]

In contrast to Jinnah's image of the peace that would follow Pakistan's creation, Mohandas Ghandi insisted that the creation of an Islamic State would only divide India into "possibly warring groups," and would not "bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned."[24] Ghandi challenged the logic of carving out of India a state that might later become its adversary. He said, "If a Muslim state implied freedom to make unfriendly treaties with the foreign Powers to the detriment of the country as a whole, then obviously it cannot be a matter of agreement. No one can be asked to sign an agreement granting freedom to launch hostilities against himself; it would be a suicidal policy."[25] Gandhi predicted that generations of Indians would pay the price for India's ill-advised "vivisection."[26]

Jawarhalal Nehru, India's first prime minister, also initially resisted Pakistan's creation.[27] He and other Indian leaders (though not Gandhi) ultimately acceded, in the hope that India would emerge strengthened once it satisfied Muslim political demands with partition. Nehru observed wryly that "[by] cutting off the head we will get rid of the headache."[28]

Those who believed that partition would create peace between the two religious communities were proven wrong the very day India and Pakistan simultaneously achieved independence. Communal violence that had continued more or less unabated since Direct Action day a year earlier mushroomed into an orgy of violence with few parallels in the 20th Century.[29] Muslims slaughtered Hindus trapped in areas designated for Pakistan. On the Indian side of the new border, Hindu and Sikh militants set upon Muslims. The violence claimed one million lives over the next several months,[30] making the pre-independence ethnic conflict look like child's play by comparison.[31] It also produced 12 million refugees, "the greatest movement of population known to history," as entire communities crossed borders to escape the killing.[32]

History's judgment of India's partition, in light of the consequences it immediately produced, has been harsh. It has been called, variously, "an unmitigated evil for all concerned,"[33] "a disastrous affair,"[34] and a "monumental folly."[35] Yet the upheaval did not end with the consolidation of power in India and Pakistan in the months following independence. The conflict has continued for some five decades. On at least two other occasions since 1947, that conflict again mushroomed into war.[36] In between, a state of hostility short of open warfare has prevailed, punctuated since 1989 by regularly occurring incidents of violence in the disputed Kashmir region, which India largely controls and Pakistan covets.[37] Often the shooting is between the opposing armies, though in recent years terror groups operating out of Pakistan have launched raids against Indian targets.[38] The fact that the continuing conflict has fueled an arms race that has led both countries to develop nuclear weapons is most disturbing to the rest of the world.

Partition not only failed to bring peace to Hindu and Muslim residents of British India, it also did not succeed on the promise of political rights for the Muslims. Pakistan is, today, a military dictatorship.[39] Except for brief periods in its history, it has always been so.[40] In contrast to Pakistan's propensity for military rulers, India has remained a democratic country, and one in which Muslim citizens are full participants.[41] Ironically, then, the very act calculated to give political rights to Muslims has had precisely the opposite effect for those in Pakistan.

The creation of Pakistan also did not lead to anything approaching a full separation between Hindu and Muslim residents of British India, for whatever benefit that might have brought. After the upheaval following independence, India still retained a minority Muslim population of 42 million.[42] Even Dina Jinnah, Pakistani leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah's only child, chose India over her father's new country.[43] Today, India has the world's third largest Muslim population, after Indonesia and Pakistan.[44]


There is much in this history that is cautionary for Israel. The partition of India into two nations, using religion as the basis for such division, is the closest historical parallel to the proposed resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by fashioning a new Arab Muslim state alongside Jewish Israel. The creation of Pakistan, judged by reference to the human misery that followed its birth and the continuing specter of nuclear conflict, did not achieve anything like the peace its advocates promised. Striking similarities between the India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine experiences indicate that religion-driven partition will not be any more successful in bringing peace to the Middle East than it was in solving the problem of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in the Asian subcontinent.

The India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine situations differ in at least one critical respect, however. This difference, though, only makes the comparison more compelling. India and Pakistan came into existence on the same day, and there was no opportunity to juxtapose the lofty promises of partition against experience with a one-country solution. There was also no trial period, during which the likely future course of post-partition history could be determined. Israel, on the other hand, was formed 54 years ago, while Palestine still remains a topic of discussion. Moreover, the period of autonomy the Palestinians have enjoyed since 1993 has shown what they have done with partial independence. These circumstances make possible a fuller comparison with India/Pakistan, and a more informed prediction of what the Palestinians might do if given a fully independent state.

The fact that partition is not yet fully realized between Israel and the Palestinians makes this analysis essential. The pause in the peace process created by the latest Intifada and Israel's re-occupation of most West Bank cities has provided an opportunity to reevaluate whether partition is a worthwhile idea. The events of September 11, 2001 should also be cause to look anew at the current process and to consider the extent to which an agreement might actually increase rather than diminish world terrorism. If Israel and the Palestine have embarked on the very path taken by India and Pakistan, they will encounter a future filled with increasing bloodshed and war rather than peace. If indeed it has taken a wrong turn, Israel has the ability, now, to choose a new approach, and to avoid repeating the tragedy that continues to play out in the Asian subcontinent.

A.  The Promise of Peace

The similarities between the two partition experiences begin with the promise of peace. Just as advocates of India's partition prophesied that peace would be the central benefit from creating Hindu and Muslim-dominated states, so too comes the same promise from Jewish and Arab states west of the Jordan River.[45]

While Hindu-Muslim communal violence led directly to the adoption of a partition solution for the Asian subcontinent, the impetus for the Oslo process was the pre-1993 Intifada.[46] That fighting claimed 2,000 Palestinian and 100 Israeli lives.[47] The Palestinians asserted, and Israel apparently believed, that Palestinian autonomy presumably leading to Palestinian statehood[48] would end the violence.[49] As one Palestinian negotiator expressed it, Arafat's entry into Gaza would create "shock waves" among the local population, causing the public to turn against Hamas.[50]

Public statements surrounding the execution of the Israel-PLO agreement expressed this theme. At the signing ceremony on the White House lawn, then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared: "[W]e will begin a new reckoning in the relations between peoples, between parents tired of war, between children who will not know war."[51] On the Palestinian side, Yasir Arafat was unequivocal in his assurance that the Oslo process would end bloodshed. In a letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Arafat stated that: "The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability."[52] Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres predicted that prosperity, as well as peace, would follow the signing of the historic agreement. He said, "We shall convert the bitter triangle of Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis into a triangle of political triumph and economic prosperity. We shall lower our barriers and widen our roads, so goods and guests will be able to move freely to all places holy and other."[53] And, as Oslo's star fades, advocates of partition based on a new political process assert that this formula will end the bloodshed.[54]

B.  The Bifurcated Muslim State

To create two states along religious lines in India, the British had to form a new nation out of whole cloth: Pakistan. In the Middle East too, whether through negotiation or unilateral Israeli withdrawal, the idea is to invent a West Bank/Gaza Strip-based "Palestine" with no history of independence. (It is for this reason that Golda Meir famously declared that there was no such thing as a Palestinian people.)[55] As with India/Pakistan, Muslim population concentration in the territory in question (here the West Bank and Gaza Strip) is the determining factor in establishing the contours of the new state, with security considerations playing little or no role in setting the border between Israel and Palestine.

At independence, Pakistan consisted of geographically remote halves separated by nearly a thousand miles of Indian territory, with a long, porous, and difficult-to-defend border between the two states. In the Middle East as well, there is to be a Muslim-dominated state composed of two separated areas: the West Bank and Gaza. That state will share a border with Israel that runs for hundreds of miles and that, as recent events have shown, cannot be sealed against infiltration or other acts of violence such as mortar and rocket attacks.

The truncated Pakistan created by partition proved unstable, with the central government in the West unable to exercise effective control over the ethnically distinct Eastern portion. In 1971, following years of agitation for autonomy, East Pakistan rebelled against the central government in Karachi.[56] The Pakistani army initially suppressed the rebellion in extremely brutal fashion. According to one historian, Pakistan's civil war "was fought with the greatest human-made atrocities the subcontinent has known since the invasion of India at the end of the fourteenth century" by Tammerlane.[57] Ten million new refugees poured across the border to India,[58] and, by one count, there were three million killed.[59] Concerned by the instability, and seeing an opportunity to weaken Pakistan, India gave military support to groups seeking an independent state. In retaliation, the Pakistanis launched attacks against Indian air bases. The Indian forces quickly gained the upper hand, capturing Dacca, East Pakistan's largest city.[60] At the end of the war, the separatists proclaimed the independent nation of Bangladesh out of what had been East Pakistan.[61] The civil war that produced Bangladesh has been called "a direct result of partition."[62]

There is ample reason to doubt that the two portions of Palestine, like those of Pakistan, will be able to maintain their unity. Hamas, with a particularly large base of power in Gaza, has emerged as a credible rival to Arafat's Palestinian Authority.[63] Furthermore, even within the Authority, there are competing strongmen with their own sources of support. These include Marwan Barghouti, the Fatah chief in the West Bank (who is, for the time at least, in Israeli custody); Muhammad Dahlan, the head of Preventative Security in the Gaza Strip; and Jibril Rajoub, the former head of Preventative Security in the West Bank.[64] It is possible, for example, that an Islamic-dominated Gaza Strip will draw away from a more secular West Bank, or that rival warlords will establish separate bases of strength in the two territories, leaving Israel with yet another hostile Arab neighbor with which to contend.

The presence of a long and indefensible border is a further destabilizing factor common to both the Asian and Middle Eastern examples. The Pakistanis have taken advantage of the border situation to permit militant groups to launch raids against India. Today, there are more than a dozen guerilla groups fighting Indian control over Kashmir.[65] These attacks, which have claimed 60,000 lives in the last 12 years have strained India/Pakistan relations to the breaking point. Indeed, it was an attack on the Indian parliament building by the Lashkar-e-Tayyab, one such Pakistan-based group, following closely on the heels of a devastating attack on the Kashmir state legislature by another, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, that brought the two nations to the brink of war in early 2002.[67] The Palestinians, for their part, have harbored numerous terror groups implicated in attacks against Israel, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, the Tanzim, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.[68] The terror operations (including more than 70 suicide bombings) attributed to them have inflamed Palestinian/Israeli relations.[69] Their actions led directly to Operation Defensive Shield, Israel's invasion of major West Bank cities in March and April of 2002[70] and Israel's re-occupation of those cities a short while later.[71] Moreover, Palestinian terror operations promise future instability and conflict.

C.  Political Upheaval

Post-partition conflict has had a damaging effect on the stability of India's political system, a result that can be seen in Israel as well. While India has remained a democracy, assassination and the resulting disruption have been a regular feature on its political scene from the beginning. In 1948, Indian militants opposed to Ghandi's efforts to reach out to Muslims and the newly-independent Pakistan murdered the man most-identified with India's struggle for independence.[72] In a startling parallel, a Jewish militant opposed to Yitzhak Rabin's concessions to the Palestinians gunned down the Israeli leader following a peace rally in 1995.[73]

Assassinations have been commonplace in India since the slaying of Ghandi. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son, former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, each fell victim to political murder.[74] (Rajiv's assassin was a female suicide bomber, showing that this phenomenon as well is not new to Israel/Palestine.[75]) In Israel, violence related to partition claimed a second political leader when, in late 2000, Palestinians murdered Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavem Ze'evi at a hotel in Jerusalem.[77] Ze'evi had been one of the most fervent critics of the Oslo accords, and had been on the verge of taking his political faction out of Prime Minister Sharon's national unity government.[78] The post-Oslo political violence can only have a destabilizing effect on Israel's democracy, and may well breed future such acts and further instability.

The form of government in the Palestinian territories provides yet another similarity between the India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine experiences. Like Pakistan, the Palestinian areas are controlled by a military dictatorship. Prior to the Bush speech, Yasir Arafat was recognized as the Palestinian ruler for life, with no plans for democratic elections to consider a successor. While the West is now pushing for the replacement of Arafat and for democratic changes to the Palestinian Authority,[79] there is no indication that either event is forthcoming. Put simply, the Palestinians have never considered adopting a true, multi-party democracy.[80]

D.  Militarization

Like the Pakistanis before them, the Palestinians have made the development of a military capability to continue the conflict with their neighbor a top priority. While the Oslo and subsequent accords limit the Palestinians to an 8,000 member "police" force,[81] the fatigue-clad units armed with automatic weapons the Palestinian Authority created, bear no resemblance to such a body. Officially, it is comprised of numerous individual security agencies, including the Palestinian Public Security Force, the Palestinian Civil Police, the Preventitive Security Force, the General Intelligence Service, the Palestinian Presidential Security Force, and the Palestinian Coastal Police.[82] The utter failure of the Palestinian Authority to control acts of terror issuing from its territory[83] makes it abundantly clear that whatever the purpose of these units, they have not been effectively engaged in police work of any meaningful kind.

Rather, the Palestinian Authority has made strenuous efforts to arm these fighters with weapons more like those used to terrorize northern Israeli cities from Lebanon during the 1970's and 1980's, than with side-arms of a type that traditional police officers carry. In January of 2002, Israel intercepted a ship bound for the Gaza Strip that was transporting Katyusha rockets and other heavy weapons prohibited under Oslo, as well as sophisticated plastic explosives of a type ideally suited for terror operations.[84] With no interference from Arafat's "police," Hamas has developed a rocket, the Kassam 2, with a range of five miles.[85] (In February of 2002, Hamas fired the first Kassam 2's from the Gaza Strip,[86] and Kassam launchings are now a regular occurrence.) The Palestinians have also made their first primitive foray into the area of chemical warfare.[87] In short, the Palestinians have given every indication that they will use independence, like the Pakistanis have, to further bolster their fighting capacity. Swords and not ploughshares are the priority of the day in the areas that the Palestinians control.

Shimon Peres' prosperity dividend from the agreement with the Palestinians has also not been realized. Israel's economy is now reeling from the impact of sustained terror attacks. Since September 2000, Israel has been forced to spend $5 to $6 billion to fight Palestinian terror.[88] Tourism, upon which Israel is heavily dependent, is almost non-existent.[89] And Israeli military actions in response to Palestinian terror also triggered threats of economic retaliation from Israel's trading partners,[90] calling to mind the U.S. decision to end military assistance to India and Pakistan after their second war.[91] While Israel's economy, led by a burgeoning high-tech sector, soared in the mid-1990's,[92] Israel is now "mired in recession"[93] and is suffering its "worst economic performance in nearly half a century."[94] This also correlates with the India/Pakistan experience, where decades of conflict have held back both nations' economies and left the people of the Asian subcontinent trapped in hopeless poverty.[95]

The supporters of the Oslo process had argued that it would end the Intifada.[96] Yet it was precisely the concern over street violence between Muslim and Hindu that caused adoption of the two-nation solution in British India. Rather than reducing the violence, however, the partition of India grossly exacerbated it. The killings of hundreds was followed by the killing of hundreds of thousands, with no end in sight more than half a century later. And, indeed, since Oslo, more than 1,000 Israelis have been killed in terror attacks (including more than 700 since September 2000 alone), ten times the total number killed during the Intifada.[97] The current political process has served only to replace the rocks of the pre-Oslo Intifada with the suicide bombings and mortar and rocket attacks of the post-Oslo version.

E.  A Muslim Minority in the Non-Muslim State

The arguments for the creation of Palestine also ignore Israel's pre-1967 Arab population. They have lived as citizens in Jewish-dominated Israel for more than 50 years, and their involvement in the post-DOP violence, though increasing, has been minimal.[98] Moreover, since the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993, there has been no movement on the part of Israeli Arab communities to relocate to Palestinian-controlled areas in the West Bank or Gaza. While Oslo's advocates argue that two states are needed for there to be peace and self-determination for Arab and Jew alike, Israel's Arabs have not embraced this concept. Instead, they have voted their preference in the most demonstrative way possible by staying put in Israel. Indeed, and perhaps somewhat incredibly given the logic of the Palestine argument, the Palestinian Authority has demanded the right of Palestinians to "return" to live in Israel.[99] It was, in significant part, on this issue that the Camp David summit between Arafat, Ehud Barak, and Bill Clinton foundered.[100] Yet the "return" of Palestinians to Israel's territory runs counter to the logic of partition. If peace requires Jews and Arabs to live in separate countries, there can be no logic to settling additional Arabs in Israel. (If, on the other hand, the demand reflects Palestinian aspirations to use the political process to destroy Israel, the Palestinian position is entirely consistent.) And, on the other side of the proposed border, the Palestinians have been adamant that every last Jewish settler leave all territory transferred to Palestinian rule.[101 The behavior of Israel's Arab community is like that of the 42 million Muslims who, after 1947, remained in India. By its conduct, each minority community has rejected the notion that only partition along religious lines can bring peace.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear why the partition of India increased the level of violence. During the campaign for partition, Jinnah's Muslim League unleashed religious passions in an attempt to garner Muslim support and to demonstrate the impossibility of Hindu-Muslim coexistence in a single state.[102] The League incorporated Islamic rhetoric into its appeal, claiming that Muslims faced a choice between Pakistan, Land of the Pure, and Kafiristan, Land of the Unbeliever.[103] Once aroused, such passions are not easily quieted. To complicate matters, Muslims were dissatisfied with the amount of land allocated them by the British. Jinnah complained that he was being given a "moth-eaten" Pakistan.[104] Following partition, Muslim territorial frustrations were translated into efforts to seize control of the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir, in order to ensure Pakistan's "completeness."[105]

In the independent state of Pakistan, Muslims' religious passions had been inflamed. They had demonstrated their murderous rage toward Hindus and dissatisfaction with the amount of territory allotted to them. Further, the Muslims in Pakistan now had the powers that come with statehood to give fuller expression to this hostility. A state can build a conventional army, and to do so may import sophisticated war materiel with little or no restriction. Dissident elements within a country do not have the same powers. Thus, their enmity rewarded by partition, and lacking the stability that a history of independence and established borders might have provided, the Pakistanis invested in the development of a powerful military to press their grievances against Hindu India.

The Pakistanis have not been satisfied with a conventional armed force. Undoubtedly spurred by India's pursuit of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has tested its own atomic devices.[106] These two countries' nuclear arsenals have increased the intensity level of any future war. In May 2002, a former official in the Clinton administration disclosed publicly that Pakistan appeared to be on the verge of initiating a nuclear attack in 1999.[107] In response to U.S. pressure, the Pakistanis took steps to defuse the crisis that led to their nuclear deployment.[108] Nevertheless, the fact that Pakistan was apparently willing to start a nuclear war for tactical gain, and not to counter an existential threat, is sobering. It is no doubt for this reason that former President Bill Clinton called South Asia "the most dangerous place on earth."[109]

The consequences of an all-out war between India and Pakistan in the post-nuclear era would be devastating. According to a recently completed assessment by the U.S. government, a nuclear war between Pakistan and India could result in as many as 12 million killed and 7 million injured in just the initial minutes.[110] Millions of additional casualties could result from related firestorms and longer term consequences, such as starvation and radiation poisoning.[111] Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear program has implications that extend well beyond the India-Pakistan theater. Several of Pakistan's nuclear scientists traveled to Afghanistan in recent years, offering their expertise to al Qaeda.[112] In 1999, Pakistan considered transferring some of its nuclear weapons to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, to protect them from Indian attack.[113] It is no exaggeration to state, then, that the Indian partition has decreased security for the entire world.

Had there not been a partition of British India, violent ethnic conflict between Hindu and Muslim communities would have continued, at least for a time, as Muslim aspirations for statehood went unrealized.[114] But compared to the horrible bloodshed of 1947 alone, the casualties would have been minor. The conflict also would have been domestic, with little or no potential for triggering a war between sovereign states. Most importantly, an aggrieved Muslim minority in India would have had no ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, nor would Hindu-India have been motivated to pursue such technology.

Another aspect of independence, when considering the creation of a majority Muslim state, is the government's ability to dismantle the barrier between religion and state, so that Jihad can become national policy. Since independence, Pakistan has moved steadily toward the Islamization of its laws and political institutions.[115] In 1979, it instituted the Islamic penal code.[116] Non-Islamic banking was abolished in 1985 and, that same year, Pakistan declared that its economy conformed with Islamic principles.[117] Pakistan was one of the only countries in the world to recognize Afghanistan's Taliban government,[118] and the move toward fundamentalist Islam led hundreds of Pakistanis to fight the U.S. alongside the Taliban.[119] It remains an open question whether Pakistan's current military ruler can put this genie back into its bottle.

In the Palestinian areas, a similar process is underway. The Palestinian Authority has incorporated Islamic rhetoric into appeals to the masses for martyrs in the cause for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.[120] Islamist groups have steadily accumulated power, with Hamas taking a prominent role in running schools and offering other social services in the autonomous areas.[121] These activities have given Hamas the ideal platform for recruiting new suicide bombers. All of this has had a demonstrably corrosive effect on the young. Between 1967 and Israel's cession of territory to the Palestinians in 1993, there were virtually no suicide attacks. Since September 2000, these have been near weekly occurrences, as a seemingly limitless reservoir of would be "martyrs" has sprung up under Yasir Arafat's gaze.[122] This would not have happened had Israel kept control.

There is another critical area of similarity that tends to support the analogy between India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine. Jinnah had demanded far more territory for the Muslims than they ultimately received through partition.[123] Following partition, Muslim territorial frustrations centered on control over the former princely state of Kashmir. That issue has contributed to the continuing conflict between these two countries, and Pakistan-based terror groups have continually struck at India for control over Kashmir. Here too, partition is beginning in the shadow of continuing political disagreements. The Palestinian Authority claims the right to East Jerusalem, a Palestinian state in virtually all of the West Bank and Gaza, and the right of Palestinians to return to pre-1967 Israeli territory.[124] And, whatever one thinks of the sincerity of the Authority's recognition of Israel's right to exist, Hamas represents a powerful force within the Palestinian areas that remains overtly committed to Israel's destruction.[125] Israel, for its part, opposes a return to the pre-1967 borders, rejects the uprooting of all Jewish settlements, and will not agree to a wholesale Palestinian return to pre-1967 Israel.[126]

Because partition, whether negotiated or Israeli-imposed, will not solve all issues, it will prevent rather than bring peace. Such a policy will give the Palestinians the "freedom" to further militarize the conflict, to foster unofficial military groups involved in attacks against Israel, and to continue to indoctrinate the masses for war - all in an effort to pursue unresolved claims. Partition in the Middle East could only be logical if it genuinely settled all issues separating the parties, including militant groups operating within Palestinian areas. The idea of granting autonomy/independence first and addressing important issues later, which has been the hallmark of Oslo and subsequent Israeli/Palestinian agreements, is contrary to historical experience. Far from minimizing the chance for future conflict, it guarantees it.

F.  External Considerations Favoring Partition

Of course, the creation of a Palestinian state has not only been the wish of those with animus toward Israel. Many argue that only partition can preserve the country's Jewish character. Without two states west of the Jordan river, they posit, the Arab minority will overwhelm Jewish Israel.[127] However, the current political process will not affect Israel's pre-1967 Arab population, and indeed may even supplement it if some form of a Palestinian right of return is granted. At best, then, the creation of Palestine offers only a partial solution to the demographic problem.[128] And, guided by India/Pakistan and post-Oslo events, a solution of this type is as likely to destroy Israel as it is to save it. Solving the demographic problem through partition is, as Nehru pointed out, like cutting off the head to get rid of the headache.

While Israel may have allowed demography to color its perception of the advisability of entering into the Oslo process, U.S. policy is also influenced by external factors. Historically, the U.S. has sought to balance its support for Israel with friendly relations with Arab regimes in an effort to ensure a secure and reasonably- priced supply of oil.[129] More recently, the Bush administration has sought to build Arab support for the war on terrorism, including a strike against Iraq. Support for a Palestinian state is seen as supportive of these external goals.[130]

The India/Pakistan experience, however, counsels against allowing external considerations to promote an unwise partition. In 1940, India's Muslims pledged support for Britain's fight against the Axis powers.[131] The mostly-Hindu Congress party, by contrast, continued the struggle for independence during World War II and maintained a policy of confrontation with India's colonial ruler.[132] Anxious to shore up Muslim support for the war effort, Britain pledged that the Muslims would not be coerced into any system of Indian government of which they disapproved.[133] Partition was the fruit of this earlier pledge, which essentially gave Muslims a veto on any political resolution that they disapproved.[134] World War II has now been over for more than 50 years and there can be no credible claim that India's Muslims somehow played a significant role in its outcome. Nevertheless, the effects of that wartime political calculation are still being felt today, some three generations later.


Based on the India/Pakistan and post-Oslo histories, we can predict several things with a high degree of certainty. A Palestinian state will be a dictatorship and will become increasingly Islamicized. It will be unstable and prone to revolution as competing strongmen vie for power. It will be militaristic and will continue to pursue avenues for increasing its ability to wage war with Israel. It will develop unconventional as well as conventional means for doing so. It will precipitate violence on a scale that dwarfs pre-Oslo levels, including the use of terror groups as surrogate fighters. It will have a limited ability to maintain control over both the West Bank and Gaza, paving the way for a possible second Palestinian state. Israel's economy will suffer, as it struggles to confront the continuing threat of violence issuing from Palestinian areas. These things will happen. Indeed most are already well underway.

The more attractive alternatives to partition are those that have fewer of the attributes of a two-state solution. A red-line that cannot be crossed is that of creating a Palestinian state with control over its borders, whether through negotiation or Israeli-imposed separation. Such control will only lead to a further build up of Arab armed forces and will precipitate increasingly intense conflict. Assuming the Palestinians, like the Pakistanis before them, pursue unconventional weapons, a Palestinian state will be a threat not only to Israel but to other countries as well, including the United States.

Preserving the status quo and allowing the Palestinians to retain autonomy within areas they now control while continuing Israeli supervision over the borders, eliminates some of the vices of partition but not all of them. Since 1993, Israel has witnessed the enormous harm an autonomous Palestinian entity can inflict. It can educate its citizens for war and it can engage in a weapons build-up sufficient to constitute a powerful terrorist threat to Israel's civilian population, with devastating impact on Israel's economy and morale. To address these problems, Israel should re-assert full, permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza. It should de-militarize formerly autonomous areas by disarming all official and unofficial armed Palestinian groups, and preferably remove their leaders from the scene. Israel needs to reassert supervision over the educational system and media, to end the brainwashing of the young to commit suicide attacks. This would be a difficult, costly, and long-term process, and in the short term would exact significant casualties. Israel's public standing also would no doubt suffer. Over the long term, however, the costs of alternatives to re-asserted Israeli control are far greater.

An essential basis of the Oslo process has been Israel's assumption of risks for peace. Israel has been asked to make tangible concessions in land and control in exchange for intangibles, such as the promise of future peaceful behavior. Despite the continuing violence, the prevailing wisdom is that a new political process leading to formation of a Palestinian state can succeed in Oslo's place. A review of the strikingly similar India/Pakistan experience is an important vehicle for judging the worth of this approach. It can inform an assessment of the likelihood that Israeli risks will produce the desired result. The aftermath of the partition of British India, particularly in the light of post-Oslo experience, indicates strongly that they will not.

The Oslo process represented a conscious effort to disregard historical experience as a predictor of future events. As Shimon Peres wrote in the immediate afterglow of the signing ceremony at the White House:

"We must study history to learn its critical lessons, but we must also know when to ignore history. We cannot allow the past to shape immutable concepts that negate our ability to build new roads. Like the river, we are part of the process of perpetual change: landscapes shift, knowledge widens, and technology expands our horizons. Those of us active in the political arena today differ from our predecessors in the burden we carry, in our hopes and in our expectations. A person who hails historical precedent as a formula for controlling future events is headed for disappointment and failure. Knowing when to depart from the past brings a distinct advantage: the element of surprise. Sometimes, in fact, what comes by surprise generates much less opposition than what was expected."[135]

Yet the contrast between the pre-Oslo vision of peace and prosperity and the post-Oslo reality could not be more striking. Indeed, "disappointment and failure" describe, in a particularly apt manner, that agreement's aftermath.

Had history's lessons been considered thoughtfully before Israel empowered the PLO and opened the door to a Palestinian state, this need not have occurred. If the bloodletting of the past nine years serves to focus policymakers on the need to confront partition's abysmal record and help Israel avoid India/Pakistan's fate, that loss will not have been in vain. For those who still favor partition and are tempted to again ignore history, there can be no greater counsel than Santayana's: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."[136]


[1]. Israel has begun construction of a high tech security fence that will separate the West Bank from pre-1967 Israel. John Ward Anderson, Israel Starts West Bank Fence Work; Palestinian Interim State is Rejected by Sharon, Wash. Post, June 17, 2002, at A1. The fence is to include a 71-mile section running from Sale Junction in the north to an area outside of Tel Aviv, and an eight-mile section near Jerusalem. Id. The erection of the security fence is seen by some as the de facto creation of a border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. Id. ("[S]ome Israeli critics say the proposed fence would effectively formalize - and possibly finalize - Israel's borders, giving up the country's claim to parts of the West Bank . . ."). Id.

[2]. Binyamin Netanyahu, Speech Before the Likud Central Committee (May 12, 2002) (English version), at (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). In his speech, Netanyahu called on the Israeli government to take three steps: (1) complete the removal of all Palestinian fighters, weapons and ammunition from the area; (2) establish security buffer zones opposite the main Palestinian population centers in order to seal off the free passage of Palestinians into [Israel’s] cities and towns; and (3) completely and totally eradicate Arafat’s regime and remove him from the vicinity. Netanyahu addressed at some length the issue of creating a Palestinian state:

In any future agreement, if and when we get that far, I see self-rule in which the Palestinians will have the freedom to rule themselves. But to establish a state, with everything that that concept entails, with all the powers I have enumerated [control over borders, control over air space, right to make military alliances with other counties, control over underground water sources], which would endanger Israel's existence - that no. Not under Arafat or under any other leadership. Not today, not tomorrow, not ever. Id.

[3]. Id.

[4]. Before September 11, the administration had been on the verge of announcing a diplomatic initiative that was to include support for the creation of a Palestinian state. Jane Perlez & Patrick E. Taylor, Before Attacks, U.S. Was Ready To Say It Backed Palestinian State, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2001, at A1. It then did so on October 2, 2001. Ken Fireman, Goal Is Palestinian State: Bush Backs Eventual Creation of an Independent Nation, Newsday, Oct. 3, 2001, at A8 ("The Bush administration yesterday formally endorsed the goal of creating an independent Palestinian state, saying that was part of its 'vision' for an eventual political settlement of the Middle East conflict."). In June of 2002, President Bush again expressed his "vision of "two states, living side by side, in peace and security." Text of President Bush's Address on the Middle East, Wash. Post, June 25, 2002, at A12. Over time, U.S. support for Palestinian statehood has become more qualified, now demanding Palestinian reform as a condition for American support for a "provisional" Palestinian state. Id. ("If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine."). Id.

[5]. On March 28, 2002, the Arab League formally approved a plan calling for recognition of Israel in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from all land occupied in 1967, creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and a 'just solution' for Palestinian refugees. Mohammed Bazzi, Arabs at Summit in Agreement; Approve Saudi Peace Proposal, Voice Their Support for Iraqis, Newsday, Mar. 29, 2002, at A7. See also Arab Summit Adopts Saudi Peace Initiative,, at (Mar. 28, 2002); See also Michael Slackman, Arab League Approves Saudi Peace Initiative at Beirut Summit, L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 2002, at A1. According to a declaration accompanying the plan, the 'just solution' means a 'right of return' for the refugees. Id.

[6]. This can be seen, in particular, with suicide bombings, discussed infra Part II D. While there were two Israeli deaths from such attacks in 1993, the year Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, there were more than 20 in 1994 and 1995, more than 60 in 1996 and, after a precipitous drop from 1998 to 2000, 315 Israeli deaths from suicide bombings since September 2000. Molly Moore & John Ward Anderson, Suicide Bombers Change Mideast's Military Balance, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2002, at A1; Molly Moore & John Ward Anderson, Suicide Bomber Kills 15 on Bus in Northern Israel, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 2003, at A12.

[7]. John F. Manley, Presidential Power and White House Lobbying, 93 Pol. Sci. Q. 255, 274 (1978) ("Historians are found of saying the past is prologue."). See also Stuart Rothenberg, For George W. Bush, the Past is Prologue,, at (Jan. 20, 2001).

[8]. See, e.g., George F. Will, Unhelpful Amnesia, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 2002, at A19.

[9]. Id. ("It has been 37 years since [Arafat's] Fatah launched its first attack on Israel, which then (as when attempts were made to crush Israel in 1948, 1956 and in 1967) was within the 1967 borders that amnesiacs believe are the key to appeasing Arafat.").

[10]. The beginning of Britain's subjugation of India can be traced to 1608, when three ships of the English East India Company arrived at Surat. Stanley Wolpert, New History of India 142 (6th ed. 2000). By 1850, the British controlled nearly all of the subcontinent. Id. at 224. In 1858, the British government formally took over responsibility for India from the East India Company. This followed the suppression of an uprising by Hindu and Muslim conscripts in the Indian army. Id. at 234-39.

[11]. Patrick French, Liberty or Death: India's Journey to Independence and Division 365 (1997). See also Introduction to The Partition of India: Causes and Responsibilities, at viii (T. Walter Wallbank ed., 1966) [hereinafter Partition] ("The Partition of the political unit created under British rule is one of the most significant events in twentieth century Asian history.").

[12]. Partition, supra note 11, at xi (T. Walter Wallbank, ed., 1966).

[13]. For a detailed discussion of Britain's decision to depart India and its efforts to bridge Hindu/Muslim differences, see H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan 189-247 (1969).

[14]. The term communal "refers to groups that are set apart by reason mainly of language, religion, occupation, and historical origin." Partition, supra note 11, at viii. In the Indian context, it typically refers to Hindu-Muslim rivalry. Id.

[15]. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 344.

[16]. The British were adamant that the transfer of power to Indian (or Indian and Pakistani) hands be the subject of agreement. However, because the Muslim League refused to accept anything less than partition as part of an agreed settlement, this decision had the effect of ensuring partition. See, e.g., French, supra note 11, at 238.

[17]. Allen Hayes Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah: The Debate Over the Partition of India 68 (1980). Recounting a conversation with Jinnah, British official Lord Ismay wrote: "Mr. Jinnah said with the greatest earnestness that, once partition had been decided upon . . . all troubles would cease, and they would live happily ever after." Hodson, supra note 13, at 229. Jinnah's sister and confidante Fatima made a similar assertion, telling the wife of the Viceroy that "the problems involved would be quite easy once Muslim demands had been agreed to." Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan 322 (1984).

[18]. As Jinnah once put it: "[B]rother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one vote." Wolpert, supra note 17, at 181.

[19]. William Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh 2, 147 (1972); Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight 120 (1975).

[20]. French, supra note 11, at 224; Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 41. The translation is from Persian. Brown, supra note 19, at 145.

[21]. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 41.

[22]. To establish the border between Pakistan and India, the parties agreed to form a five member boundary commission. The commission had two Muslims and two Hindus, and was chaired by British barrister Sir Cyrill Radcliffe. Because the Hindus and Muslims deadlocked on all of the difficult issues, Radcliffe was forced to decide all the contested issues alone. He was guided by the commission's official terms of reference, which stated that a decision should be made on the basis of "contiguous majority areas of Moslems and non-Moslems," while taking into account "other factors." French, supra note 11, at 323-24; Hodson, supra note 13, at 346-47. According to Hodson, the "other factors" were not specified, but could include "material considerations such as administrative viability, natural boundaries, communications, or water and irrigation systems. Id. at 347. However, the commission's "prime duty was to delimit contiguous communal-majority areas, and no wide variation from that criterion would have been within the spirit of their terms of reference.' Id.

[23]. Id. at 355.

[24]. Merriam, supra note 17, at 107, 122.

[25]. Id. at 124.

[26]. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 33.

[27]. See, e.g., Hodson, supra note 13, at 71-72.

[28]. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 347.

[29]. For a detailed and moving description of the post-independence violence, see Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 340-400.

[30]. This figure comes from historian Stanley Wolpert, who has provided a relatively recent estimate of the number killed in the post-independence upheaval. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 348. However, the actual number of persons killed has been a matter of some dispute, with estimates ranging from 200,000 to 2,000,000. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 399. British commentators have tended to cite lower numbers, with Hodson asserting the 200,000 figure. Hodson, supra note 13, at 418.

[31]. See Penderel Moon, The Cabinet Mission, Doomed from the Outset, in Partition, supra note 11, at 82. Regarding the Direct Action Day killing of 5,000, which occurred before partition, Moon observed: "Compared with what was to follow this holocaust was nothing extraordinary, but it made a deep impression at the time." Id.

[32]. Brown, supra note 19, at 161. Here as well Hodson offers a lower total, asserting that "some five million" people crossed the new border following independence. Hodson, supra note 13, at 418. According to Wolpert, there were ten million refugees. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 348. There have been higher figures as well. According to Brown, if Indian and Pakistani government claims are added, the total comes to about seventeen million. Brown, supra note 19, at 161.

[33]. S. K. Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhi: Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom, at xvii (1966).

[34]. Brown, supra note 19, at 2.

[35]. Edward D'Cruz, India: The Quest for Nationhood 114 (1967).

[36]. Post-independence wars were fought in 1965 and 1971. In 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating thousands of armed insurgents into Indian-controlled Kashmir. These soldiers were supposed to link up with the local population and foment a rebellion. Indian forces retaliated, Pakistan counter-attacked, and the fighting spread to the Punjab. A cease-fire was declared in September of that same year. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, 43-45 (2001). The next war was fought in 1971, and led to the secession of East Pakistan and the formation of the independent nation of Bangladesh. Id. at 51-74. In 1999, the two nations engaged in sustained battle in Kashmir, along the line of control that separates Indian and Pakistani forces. Id. at 114-120. Because there were more than one thousand battlefield deaths during this fighting, Ganguly characterizes Kargil as a third post-independence war between these two rivals. Id. at 11; see also Jasjit Singh, Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, at i (1999).

[37]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 43-45.

[38]. See infra notes 65-77.

[39]. Its current ruler, General Pervez Musharaff, seized control in 1999. Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan 225 (2000). Then the army chief of staff, Musharaff achieved power by placing President Nawaz Sharif and his supporters under house arrest, dissolving parliament, dismissing the provincial chief ministers, suspending the constitution, and declaring a state of emergency. Id.

[40]. See id. at 25-26 (summary of Pakistan's pre-1988 experience) and 67 (summary of Pakistan's political history between 1988 and the 1999 Musharaff coup). Chadda argues that in Pakistan in the 1990's, "the balance between democratic and non-democratic forces had shifted in favor of the former." Id. at 67. She points to the three elections that occurred during this decade, but also states that during the same period "Pakistan's military-bureaucratic establishment dismissed five elected governments." Id. Perhaps the most compelling verdict on Pakistan's efforts to democratize was delivered by General Musharaff in a July 2002 speech to the nation. According to Musharaff: "There has never been true democracy in Pakistan. If there had been true democracy, I would not have been before you today." John Lancaster, Musharaff Argues for Revision of Constitution: Leader Says Democracy in Pakistan Was Sham, Wash. Post, July 13, 2002, at A14.

[41]. Chadda, supra note 39, at 23, 43. Chadda calls India a "relatively consolidated democracy," though she notes that others argue that it is a "covertly authoritarian, low-quality democracy." Id. at 222, 143.

[42]. Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi 476 (Harper & Row, 1983).

[43]. French, supra note 11, at 364.

[44]. Compare population figures, including Muslim percentage of total population, in Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook ' Indonesia (2002), Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook ' India (2002), and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook ' Pakistan (2002), at (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).

[45]. The Palestinian Authority asserts that: "The comprehensive permanent status agreement will mark the end of conflict between Palestine and Israel, and its complete implementation will mark the end of claims between them." Palestinian Vision for the Outcome of Permanent Status Negotiations, Palestinian Authority Official Website, June 15, 2002, at * 2, The permanent status agreement the Palestinians have in mind contemplates establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital and a "just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem." Id.

[46]. David Makovsky, Making Peace With The PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord 95 (1996) ("it was the intifada that led Rabin and Peres to agree that finding a political solution to the conflict was imperative"). Id.

[47]. Id.

[48]. As Israeli negotiator Uri Savir later put it: "The Palestinians needed to know that autonomy could lead to a state, while we needed to know it would bring security. Once the red lines were understood, everything could be negotiated." Id. at 47. Statements such as these by the Israeli side "undoubtedly led the Palestinians to believe that compliance with the interim agreement would result inevitably in Palestinian statehood." Id.

[49]. According to David Makovsky: “During the Oslo negotiations, PLO officials assured their Israeli counterparts that, in return for mutual recognition, Arafat - as the "sole, legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people - would be able to enforce the deal, control terrorism, and otherwise ensure Israeli security. On that basis, Rabin persuaded Israelis that one of the virtues of the Oslo accord was that Arafat would crack down on Hamas.” Id. at 139-140.

[50]. Makovsky, supra note 46, at 53.

[51]. Id. at app. XVI.

[52]. Id. at app. XVII.

[53]. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Remarks On the Occasion of the Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (Sept. 13, 1993), at (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).

[54]. See sources cited supra notes 4 and 45.

[55]. According to Meir:

There was no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? . . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country from them. They did not exist.

quoted in Baruch Kimmerling & Joel S. Magda, Palestinians: The Making of a People xvi (1993). According to Hanan Ashrawi, Palestine's boundaries were delineated in 1923, when "the League of Nations placed it under the British Mandate, as Palestine." A Conversation with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, 25 Nova L. Rev. 443, 451 (2001). Yet the Mandate to which Ashrawi refers was for purposes of creating a "Jewish" homeland in Palestine. See Palestine Mandate, July 24, 1922, in, Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History 36 (Bernard Reich, ed. 1995) ("Article 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home . . . ."). Id. It therefore provides a curious, yet revealing, starting point for Palestinian self-definition. And, in response to the specific question, was Palestine a "sovereign nation by itself," Ashrawi began her answer as follows: "It was under occupation. It had boundaries. It was recognized." A Conversation with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, 25 Nova L. Rev. 443, 452 (2001).

[56]. For a thorough discussion of the 1971 war, including its background and aftermath, see Ganguly, supra note 36, at 51-74.

[57]. Brown, supra note 19, at ix.

[58]. Id. at 217.

[59]. Id.

[60]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 61-69.

[61]. Id. at 52. See also, Brown, supra note 19, at 220.

[62]. Brown, supra note 19, at 206.

[63]. Kathryn Westcott, Who Are Hamas, BBC News Online, Oct. 19, 2000, at [hereinafter BBC] ("Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) - the government-in-waiting if a Palestinian state is established - views Hamas as a serious rival"); Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief: Hamas: The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization (October 14, 1993) ("Palestinians in the West Bank apparently favor the PLO over Hamas, but Hamas' popularity among Gaza's 750,000 Palestinians has grown over the past five years to a point where Hamas has seriously challenged the PLO for popular support.").

[64]. James Bennet & John Kifner, 6 Men Who Could Be Contenders to Lead the Palestinians if Arafat Goes, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2002, at A14 (listing Mahmoud Abbas, the secretary general of the PLO; Marwan Barghouti, general secretary of Fatah in the West Bank; Muhammad Dahlan, former chief of preventitive security forces in Gaza; Ahmed Qurei, an economic adviser; Jibril Rajoub; and Sheik Ahmad Yassin, Hamas's spiritual leader; as potential Arafat successors).

[65]. India Blames Pakistan Militant Group for Parliament Attack, PBS Online News Hour Update, Dec. 14, 2001, at [hereinafter PBS].

[66]. U.S. Official Says Tension Is Easing in South Asia, Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 2002, at A17.

[67]. See PBS, supra note 65. See also, At least 30 Killed in Raid in Kashmir, Wash. Post, May 15, 2002, at A23.

[68]. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel and the occupied territories (2001) [hereinafter State Report] (stating that "[t]he Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Hizballah, Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), among others, all committed acts of terrorism in Israel" in 2001). The existence of these militant groups is a violation of the Cairo Agreement between the PLO and Israel, which expressly prohibits the formation of armed forces, other than the Palestinian police, in areas under Palestinian control. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, 22 I.L.M. 622 (1994), art. IX, available at

[69]. Lee Hockstader, Israel Besieges Arafat Offices Again As Tanks Enforce Ramallah Curfew, Wash. Post, June 11, 2002, at A20; Israel Starts West Bank Fence Work, Wash. Post, June 17, 2002, at A1; Daniel Williams, Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair: Among Palestinians, a Growing Attitude of Little to Live For, Wash. Post, March 23, 2002, at A1 ("Other than exceptional cases, most suicide bombings are outfitted and dispatched by organized groups: Hamas, Islamic Jihad or al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades."). Rights Group Condemns Palestinian Attacks: Says Bombings Are "Crimes Against Humanity," Amnesty International Says, Wash. Post, July 12, 2002, at A16 (Amnesty International has called suicide bombings "crimes against humanity," and has further stated that they "may also constitute war crimes."). Yet the suicide attacks were only part of the story. According to the U.S. State Department, in 2001, there were "[n]early 2,000 terror attacks" in the West Bank, Gaza, and pre-1967 Israel. See, State Report, supra note 68. In addition to suicide bombings, these included "drive-by shootings, mortar and grenade attacks, and stabbings . . . in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper"). Id. These attacks occurred "on a daily basis." Id.

[70]. See, e.g., Doug Struck & Edward Cody, Deal Set in Bethlehem Siege: 13 Palestinians in Church Will Be Exiled to Italy, 26 Others Sent to Gaza, Wash. Post, May 7, 2002, at A1 (referring to Israel's "major offensive launched March 29 to destroy what the Israeli government called the Palestinian terror infrastructure"). As Prime Minister Sharon stated at the commencement of military actions:

In the past few days we have witnessed horrific terrorist attacks - the attack during the Pesach Seder in Netanya, where 21 people were killed, tonight's events in Elon Moreh, resulting in 4 deaths, and the incident which is currently taking place in Netzarim where so far two people have been killed. . . .

Therefore, the government . . . has made the following decision:

The Government has approved principles for extensive operational activity against Palestinian terrorism.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon & Defense Minister Binymain Ben-Eliezer, Statements at Press Conference Following Cabinet Meeting (March 29, 2002), available at'M

FAHO1180. Operation Defensive Shield, which had begun on March 29, 2002, formally ended on April 21, 2002. See Cabinet Communique, Israeli Cabinet Secratariat (April 21, 2002), available at'MFAH01180. ("Prime Minister Sharon thanked them [the members of the security establishment] upon the conclusion of this stage of the operation stating that Israel achieved great accomplishments in the framework of Operation Defensive Shield.").

[71]. Karen DeYoung, Palestinian Statehood Depends on Arafat's Removal, Bush Says, Wash. Post, June 25, 2002, at A1 ("Israeli forces intensified their incursions in Palestinian territory, occupying a half-dozen West Bank cities").

[72]. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 414-498.

[73]. Serge Schmemann, Assassination in Israel: The Overview; Rabin is Slain After Peace Rally in Tel Aviv; Israeli Gunman Held; Says He Acted Alone at, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1995, at A1.

[74]. Chadda, supra note 39, at 48; Wolpert, supra note 10, at 418, 439-41.

[75]. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 439.

[76]. The use by the Palestinians of female suicide bombers has attracted a great deal of attention in the Western media. See, e.g., David Williams, Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair, Wash. Post, May 23, 2002, at A1 (profiling suicide bomber Dareen Abu Aisheh, a 21 year-old Palestinian woman).

[77]. Etgar Lefkovits, Rehavam Ze'evi Assassinated, PFLP Claims Responsibility for Jerusalem Hotel Shooting, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18, 2001, at 1. In an odd coincidence, Ze'evi was more commonly known in Israel by his childhood nickname - Gandhi. Alexander Zvielli, A Man Who Loved His Country, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18, 2001, at 3.

[78]. Lefkovits, supra note 77. See also David Makovsky, Ze'evi Assassination and its Possible Aftermath, Peacewatch, No. 347, October 17, 2001, available at watch/Peachwach/peacewatch2002/382.htm.

[79]. See discussion infra note 4.

[80]. According to Hanan Ashrawi, who has been called "a leader for the creation of a democratic Palestine committed to human rights and peace," "Hamas is a political organization. It has a military wing. I have a constant dialogue with Hamas. We should." A Conversation With Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, supra note 55, at 449. Another terror group, the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, calls itself the military wing of Arafat's own Fatah faction of the PLO. Molly Moore & John Ward Anderson, Suicide Bombers Change Mideast's Military Balance, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2002, at A1. The idea of political parties having military wings cannot be said to comport with western democratic ideals.

[81]. Cairo Agreement, Annex I, Art. 9.

[82]. State Report, supra note 68. See also Gal Luft, Reforming the Palestinian Security Services, Peacewatch, May 15, 2002, at Luft puts the number of component bodies at twelve, a figure that does not include Tanzim and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which are affiliated with Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. To make matters worse, "[e]ach of these bodies has two branches that are independent of each other: one in the West Bank and the other in the Gaza Strip." Id.

[83]. According to the 2001 State Department Report: 'PA security forces arrested some of those implicated in the violence, but many quickly were released or not kept under credible conditions of arrest.' State Report, supra note 68. The report also notes that "[o]ff-duty Palestinian security officers and Fatah Tanzim members with firearms were deeply involved in the violence during the year." Id. Luft's assessment is more blunt: "All of the [Palestinian Police] apparatuses have either participated directly in terrorist acts or supported Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. In fact, some of the Brigades' senior activists also hold senior positions in the PSS." Luft, supra note 82. In response, the Bush administration has made reformation of the Palestinian security services a priority. See supra notes 4 and 71.

[84]. James Bennet, Seized Arms Would Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2002, at A5. The ship was captained by a colonel in the Palestinian Authority's coast guard. See Luft, supra note 82.

[85]. Lee Hockstader, Israeli Troops Take Over West Bank Town, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 2002, at A1. See also Ilan Berman, Missile Defense Briefing Report No. 31, American Foreign Policy Council (December 6, 2001), at

[86]. Evelyn Gordon, Opinion Red Lines Disappearing Ink, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 19, 2002, at 8.

[87]. On several occasions, Palestinians soaked the bolts, nails, and other hardware packed into suicide bombs in rat poison. Ian Fisher, For Israelis Wounded in Bomb Attacks, Recovery is a Battle, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2002, at A6.

[88]. David Rhode, Mideast Turmoil: The Marketplace; Both Economies Drained. Palestinians' Is Worse, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2002, at A13.

[89]. Id.

[90]. Germany, France and Britain have each embargoed the sale of certain defense equipment to Israel. European Countries Holding Up Sale of Defense Equipment to Israel, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Apr. 9 2002. Other trade sanctions have also been under consideration. Peter Finn, Germany, in Protest, Suspends Arms Sales to Israel; Decision May Foreshadow European Trade Sanctions as Criticism of West Bank Incursions Mounts, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 2002 A15. Norway's actions have caused particular consternation within Israel. Gwen Ackerman, Government Slams Norwegian Supermarket Boycott, Jerusalem Post, Apr. 5, 2002, at A5. While one Norwegian supermarket chain has announced its decision to boycott Israeli products, a second decided to mark Israeli products clearly, so that consumers will know their origin and be able to decide whether or not to purchase them. This has raised associations with the infamous yellow Star of David that Jews were forced to wear during the Holocaust.

[91]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 4.

[92]. In 1995, Israel's GDP was comparable to that of Great Britain, Sweden, and Finland. Israel Yearbook and Almanac 2003 (Naftali Greenwood, ed., 1998). Israel's growth rate in 1994 to 1996 was among the highest in the world ‑‑ higher than that of the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Japan. Donald H. Straszheim, Israel's Economy: A Briefing Book 4 (1998).

[93]. Rhode, supra note 88.

[94]. Avi Machlis, Israel's GDP Fall Adds to Economic Gloom, Fin. Times, Feb. 28, 2002, at 8. See also Stanley Reed & Neal Sandler, Israel: The Economic Cost of War; Violence has Ended the Rapid Growth of the 90's, Scaring off Investors and Eroding the Hard-Won Gains of Economic Reform, Business Week Online, Apr. 23, 2002, at (stating that Israeli real estate prices have plummeted thirty to fifty percent and that hotel occupancy in Jerusalem is about seven percent).

[95]. See Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - India, supra note 44 ("More than a third of the population is too poor to be able to afford an adequate diet"); Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - Bangladesh, supra note 44 (stating that "[d]espite sustained domestic and international efforts to improve economic and demographic prospects, Bangladesh remains one of the world's poorest, most densely populated, and least developed nations."); Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - Pakistan, supra note 44 ("Pakistan is a poor, heavily populated country, suffering from internal political disputes, lack of foreign investment, and a costly confrontation with neighboring India.").

[96]. See Makovsky, supra note 46.

[97]. For statistics on number of Israelis killed in acts of terrorism since the Declaration of Principles, and specifically since September 2000, see Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993), at'mfa'go.asp'MFAH0cc40. For number of Israelis killed during the Intifada, see Makovsky, supra note 46.

[98]. Lamia Lauhoud, Israeli Arab Terrorism on the Rise, Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, Aug. 28, 2002 (stating that "[s]ince the beginning of the year, some 27 Israeli Arabs have been charged with helping Palestinian terrorists carry out attacks in Israel; in 2001 there were 25 such cases, and in 2000 there were eight cases"), at

[99]. Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak), The New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002, available at

[100]. Id. Morris discusses the recent attempts to revise the history of the failed Camp David summit, which began with an article by New York Times writer Deborah Sontag. See Deborah Sontag, Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why it Failed, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1991, at A1. Sontag questions the extent of Israel's territorial offers at Camp David and challenges the quality of the preparations leading to the summit. Id. However, Sontag notes that, according to then President Bill Clinton, "it was the refugee issue that did it in." Id.

[101]. See supra notes 5 and 45.

[102]. Though Jinnah himself was not a religious man, his appeal for a separate Muslim state of Pakistan, and his utter rejection of Muslim minority status in a Hindu-dominated India, was nakedly sectarian. Partition, supra note 11, at xiv, 226; see also French, supra note 11, at 223. Thus, "the circumstances surrounding Pakistan's creation, including the raising of Muslim consciousness, provided a pool of potent symbols on which Islamic groups could later draw." Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State 130 (Anita M. Weiss, ed., Syracuse University Press 1986) [hereinafter Islamic Laws].

[103]. French, supra note 11, at 224. This appeal came during British-supervised elections in late 1945 and early 1946, which became, in effect, a referendum on Pakistan. Id. at 223; see also Wolpert, supra note 17, at 305 (quoting Jinnah as stating: "If a Hindu empire is achieved, it will mean the end of Islam in India, and even in other Muslim countries."); Hodson, supra note 13, at 227-231.

[104]. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 318; Hodson, supra note 13, at 227-331.

[105]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 5.

[106]. Molly Moore & Kamran Khan, Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons; Musharaf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 2001, at A1. Pakistan, which began its nuclear program in 1974, first conducted underground tests in 1998. It has test-fired intermediate-range missiles and is believed to have 24 assembled warheads. Id.; Jack Kelley, Terrorists Courted Nuclear Scientists, USA Today, Nov. 12, 2001.

[107]. Perhaps no less troubling, Pakistan also considered, out of fear of an Indian strike on its nuclear sites, moving some of its nuclear assets to Afghanistan for safekeeping. Alan Sipress & Thomas E. Ricks, India, Pakistan Were Near Nuclear War in '99, Wash. Post, May 15, 2002, at A1.

[108]. Id.

[109]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 1.

[110]. Alan Sipress & Bradley Graham, U.S. Tells Pakistan to Stop Militants, Wash. Post, May 31, 2002, at A1. See also Sam Gardiner, It Doesn't Start in Kashmir and It Never Ends Well, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2002, at B1. (describing U.S.-developed scenarios of a potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan). It has been projected that an attack on the Indian city of Bombay could claim 850,000 victims. Sipress & Ricks, supra note 107.

[111]. Sipress & Graham, supra note 110.

[112]. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Al Qaida May Have "Dirty" Nuclear Device, United Press Int'l, Dec. 9, 2001. As a whole, "Pakistan's community of nuclear scientists is know as 'proudly fundamentalist' and anti-American." Id.; see also John F. Burns, A Nation Challenged: Nuclear Fears; Pakistan Atom Experts Held Amid Fear of Leaked Secrets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2001, at A1. Two of Pakistan's nuclear scientists met directly with Osama Bin Laden, to advise him on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Julian Borger, Pakistan Nuclear Experts Advised Bin Laden, The Guardian, Dec. 13, 2001,,1284,617842,00.html.

[113]. Moore & Khan, supra note 106. The broader implications of the Pakistani nuclear program are also visible in North Korea, which is believed to have received "nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly material" from the Musharaf government. Glenn Kessler, Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny; Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 2002, at A1.

[114]. Certainly, the British seriously examined alternatives to partition before agreeing to Pakistan's creation. The most promising of these was the 1946 "Cabinet Mission Plan," so named because it was developed by a three-man British cabinet mission, following extensive discussions with Hindu and Muslim leaders. It rejected the Pakistan demand "in its full and complete form." Brown, supra note 19, at 155. Instead, it envisioned a union covering the entire Indian subcontinent and having central powers limited to foreign affairs, defense, communication, and the powers necessary to raise the finances required for such functions. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 341-2. Other powers would be vested in provinces, that would be free to join one of three groups, designated "A, B and C." Id. at 342. The Hindus would have had a majority in Group A, while the Muslims would have had majorities in Groups B and C. Id. Initially, the Cabinet Mission Plan gained the support of the Muslim League and the Hindu-dominated Congress Party, though an intemperate speech by Jawarhalal Nehru is generally credited with torpedoing its adoption. Id. at 343; see also French, supra note 11, at 227. Whether or not the Cabinet Mission Plan could have succeeded is a matter of some debate. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Britain's last Viceroy and the individual charged with presiding over the transfer of power to Indian hands, lobbied hard for its adoption but in the end believed that partition was the only possible course. Hodson, supra note 13, at 225-231, 246-47. On the other hand, Maulana Azad, a Muslim and former Congress president, thought the British could have postponed partition and ultimately won acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. See Maulana Azad, The Mission Plan Was Practicable and Partition Should Have Been Postponed, reprinted in Partition, supra note 11, at 66-72 and 85-87.

[115]. Pakistan's 1973 constitution declared Islam to be the state religion, and required all existing laws to be brought into conformity with Islam. Islamic Laws, supra note 102, at 8-9. In 1977, the government banned drinking, gambling and nightclubs. Id. at 9. There have also been restrictions on women's sports, and a dress code for women appearing on television. Id. at 134.

[116]. These laws include the criminalization of adultery and fornication as well as the consumption of intoxicants. Id. at 13. Pakistan also enacted a series of Islamic punishments, including lashing, amputation, and stoning. Id. at 13-15.

[117]. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Pakistan: A Country Study, at xvii, tbl. A (Peter R. Blood, ed., 6th ed. 1995).

[118]. Mohamad Bazzi, America's Ordeal; Taliban More Isolated; One of Movement's Few Backers, Saudi Arabia, Breaks Ties, Newsday, Sept. 26, 2001, at A7.

[119]. Afghanistan Starts Releasing Pakistanis Who "Joined Jihad"; Volunteers "Were Deceived by the Taliban," Edmonton J., Apr. 26, 2002, at B5.

[120]. See, e.g., Arafat: "I Hope I Will be a Martyr," Mar. 29, 2002,, at (last visited Aug. 16, 2002) ('I hope I will be a martyr in the Holy Land.') Arafat has also talked of 'millions of martyrs' flowing to Palestine. Id.; Recent Statements by Yasser Arafat,, Dec. 20, 2001, available at (last visited Aug. 16, 2002) ('Oh brothers, there is a conspiracy to Judaize Jerusalem, therefore I tell you, oh my comrades to this journey, you are standing now at the frontline of battle in the midst of challenging, in Jerusalem, you are blessed to be in this region.').

[121]. Asser, supra note 63 ("It [Hamas] is involved in building schools and hospitals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in helping the community in social and religious ways.").

[122]. According to Eyad Sarraj, the director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Center and a founder of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights: "Today's children of Palestine are preoccupied with death and sacrifice, and they dream of becoming martyrs." Eyad Sarraj, A Challenge We Must Accept: But Democracy Means Choosing for Ourselves, Wash. Post, June 30, 2002, at B1. In the month prior to a successful attack on March 5, Israeli security forces intercepted 57 would-be Palestinian attacks, most of whom were suicide bombers. Moore & Anderson, supra note 6.

[123]. Specifically, Jinnah wanted Pakistan to receive the entire Punjab and Bengal provinces, each of which had large Hindu (and, in the case of the Punjab, Sikh) minorities. Mountbatten asserted that if the logic of partition along communal lines was accepted, it would have to be applied even at the province level. Although Jinnah complained that he was being offered a "moth-eaten" Pakistan, he recognized that this was the price of partition and ultimately agreed to its application to the Punjab and Bengal. Hodson, supra note 13, at 227-31.

[124]. See, e.g., supra note 5.

[125]. John Ward Anderson, Palestinians Explore United Front: 12 Disparate Groups Pursuing Secret Talks on Future of Conflict, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1 ("Hamas . . . has declined to clearly renounce the goal of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.").

[126]. In a speech given after the failure of the Camp David summit, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak listed the elements that must be included in any Israel-Palestinian agreement:

1. Permanent, recognized borders for the State of Israel.

2. 80% of Israeli settlers within settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty.

3. Security arrangements that will provide adequate safeguards from Israel against external threats, mainly on our eastern fronts.

4. No right of return for Palestinian refugees into Israel proper.

5. A Jerusalem broader than it ever has been in our history, with a solid Jewish majority for generations to come; a capital united under our sovereignty and recognized by the entire world.

Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Excerpts from Remarks to the General Assembly of United Jewish Communities (Nov. 13, 2000), available at'MFAH0iaa0.

[127]. Caroline Glick, Column One: Palestine and the National Interest, Jerusalem Post, May 21, 2002 ("From Yitzhak Rabin to Yossi Beilin to Haim Ramon, the Left has argued that the real reason to give the Palestinians control over territory west of the Jordan and to grant them statehood is to prevent them from overrunning Israel. It was, for instance, Rabin's repeated contention that holding on to 3.5 million Arabs in the territories would make it impossible for Israel to maintain its identity as a Jewish, democratic state.").

[128]. Indeed, Arnon Soffer, author of a study entitled Israel Demography 2000-2020: Danger and Opportunities, argues that "implementing the Saudi separation plan along the 1967 ceasefire lines is dangerous because it would leave Israel with such a large Palestinian population that its Jewish character would be in danger." Soffer proposes an even more radical solution: "Israel must do more than withdraw from nearly all of the West Bank and Gaza; it must also hand over to the Palestinians some of the majority-Arab parts of pre-1967 Israel." Arnon Soffer, Demographics in the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute, Peacewatch, Mar. 22, 2002, at There is, however, an opposing view. According to commentator Ben Wattenberg, "the demographic situation for the Jews of Israel is not nearly as bleak as it is sometimes portrayed." Ben J. Wattenberg, Parents of Arabia, Wall St. J. May 16, 2002. He points to the total fertility rate of Jewish Israelis, which is the highest of any modern country, and compares that to plunging fertility rates in the Arab world.

[129]. Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War 110-111 (1995).

[130]. Israel Palestinian Violence is Likely to be a Thorny Issue in His Upcoming Trip to Gain Arab Support for the War on Terrorism, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 2002, at A4:

Kenneth M. Pollack, deputy director of national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank and a former Persian Gulf expert at the National Security Council, described the message Cheney is likely to hear from his Arab hosts this way: "Our ability to help you on the war on terrorism and our willingness to abide any military move against Iraq is going to be guided by the status of the Israeli-Palestinian situation because popular opinion would tolerate neither until Palestinians feel more secure." See also Mideast Conflict Damaging U.S. Ties with Arab States; Escalation Threatens Efforts to Oust Hussein, Baltimore Sun, Apr. 2, 2002, at A1.

[131]. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 187.

[132]. On August 8, 1942, the Congress Party announced the launching of a "Quit India" campaign. Brown, supra note 19, at 91, 124. The next day, the British threw Gandhi and other Congress leaders into jail. Id. In the course of India's long struggle for independence, Gandhi spent a total of 2,089 days in Indian jails. Fischer, supra note 42, at 394. Gandhi was reviled by British leaders, with Winston Churchill famously calling him a "half-naked fakir." Id. at 277.

[133]. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 187, 196.

[134]. See supra note 16.

[135]. Shimon Peres, The New Middle East 3-4 (Henry Holt & Co., 1993).

[136]. George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in The Life of Reason 3, 284 (Constable & Co. Ltd., 1954).

Jeffrey Weiss is a practicing attorney with the firm of Weiss, Moy & Harris in Washington, D.C. He holds a L.L.M. (International and Comparative Law) from Georgetown University Law Center. He writes, "I wish to express my gratitude to Leisha Self, for her suggestions and comments."

This articles originally appeared in the Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2003.

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