INDIA AND PAKISTAN - A Cautionary Tale for Israel and Palestine
by Jeffrey Weiss
With the Oslo process
in collapse and its troops re-occupying major Palestinian cities,
stands at a historic crossroads. It must decide between two major
policy options as it strives for a formula to counter Palestinian
terrorism. As an adjunct to military measures,
can revive political negotiations despite the violence. One goal of
this strategy would be to resolve the dispute with the Palestinians
through the creation of an Arab state in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. This
policy is the preference of
ruling Likud and opposition Labor parties,
subject to differences regarding timing, the nature of the new state,
and the suitable Palestinian negotiating partner.
There is a dissenting view within
however, which is most prominently expressed by Binyamin Netanyahu,
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's main political rival within his own
Likud party. Netanyahu's policy opinion
rejects Palestinian statehood. According to this view,
should re-occupy the autonomous areas, dismantle the Palestinian
Authority, and exile Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. While Netanyahu contemplates
future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations toward an accommodation that
will allow Palestinians to run their own affairs, he rules out the
creation of a Palestinian state as a feature of a political
the momentum favoring creation of a Palestinian state seems to be
irresistible. The Bush administration supports Palestinian
statehood, something the Europeans have
long advocated. With unanimous Arab support for such an outcome,  a
PLO-controlled state appears to be the universally-accepted key to a
comprehensive Middle East peace.
On the other hand, nine years of post-Oslo terrorism legitimately
raises the question of whether such a policy can bring peace.
Palestinian autonomy has coincided with a dramatic increase in
terrorism.That the further
step of conferring statehood will reverse the course of recent events
requires a leap of faith that is difficult to reconcile with the
violence of the past nine years. In evaluating the alternatives, it is
important to place Oslo's
failure in the proper historical context. The object would be to
determine whether, based on experience, the political process should
have been expected to fail, or whether there is still room for
optimism that a process like
Oslo can work. In other
words, analysts need to ask if there is a historical basis for the
supposition that the partition of post-1967
into Jewish and Arab states is likely to yield peace.
It is often said in political matters that 'past is prologue.'
Critics of the peace process argue that withdrawal from the 1967
territories will not lead to peace. They
point to the Arabs' rejection of partition in 1947, the three wars
fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors before the Jewish state
ever occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to pre-1967
Palestinian terror attacks. Yet this review of history, while
clearly relevant and indeed persuasive, is not broad enough. It is
necessary to place pre-1967 (and indeed post-Oslo) conduct into
broader perspective by considering the success of other two-state
solutions to ethnic conflict, particularly where the demands of a
Muslim aspirant to statehood were involved. The purpose would be to
determine if a solution of this type has worked before. If it has,
perhaps the conduct outlined by
Oslo's critics could be
considered anomalous. If not, Arab rejectionism should be seen as consistent with a
more fundamental problem with a two-state solution to address Muslim
I. THE PARTITION OF BRITISH INDIA
There is an ideal case study, in light of which it is possible to
judge the benefits, if any, that a
Palestinian state can be expected to bring. It is the 1947 partition
of British India into two states,
that occurred on the eve of
departure from the Indian subcontinent after nearly three and one-half
centuries. It has been said that
"[f]ew political decisions in the
twentieth century have altered the course of history in more dramatic
fashion than the partition of India in 1947." This makes the
experience a particularly important one for further study.
The background of the Indian partition was
post-World War II decision to depart the Asian subcontinent.
Prospects for a peaceful transition to independent rule were
complicated by a militant Muslim minority that demanded partition of
Hindu-dominated India into two countries, one Muslim and the other
Hindu. Communal violence was rampant at that time. In one day
of horrific rioting alone, a Direct Action Day called by the Muslim
League to punctuate its demand for independence, some 5,000 people
were slaughtered. Unwilling to abandon the country to chaos, the
British sought a political settlement of Hindu/Muslim grievances.
Proponents of partition argued that only an independent Islamic
state could ward off bloodshed between these religious communities.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the man who later
first ruler and the force behind Direct Action Day, predicted that
once the two states existed, Hindus and Muslims would live as
neighbors "in complete harmony." He also asserted that
without an independent Muslim state, the Hindu majority would
politically overwhelm the minority Muslim population. Full political rights for
Muslims, therefore, could also come only with partition.
Muslims were concentrated in two geographically separate regions of
the subcontinent, the proposed Muslim state would consist of Western
and Eastern portions on either side of the Hindu state, separated by
about 900 miles. The new state would be
meaning "Land of the Pure." The name
like the country it would designate, was a sum of distinct parts. It
was formed of the names of the Indian provinces that would make up its
western portion: Punjab, Afgania (the NorthWest
Frontier), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. The
happenstance of where Muslims were physically concentrated in
British India in 1947 primarily dictated the
boundaries. Because Pakistan had not existed previously, there
were no historic borders to consider in drawing the line between it
and neighboring India. Also, because partition was expected to end all
violence between Hindus and Muslims, security considerations were not
a primary factor in placing the new border.
In contrast to Jinnah's image of the
peace that would follow Pakistan's creation, Mohandas Ghandi insisted that the creation of an Islamic
State would only divide India into "possibly warring
groups," and would not "bring either happiness or prosperity
to the people concerned." Ghandi
challenged the logic of carving out of
a state that might later become its adversary. He said, "If a
Muslim state implied freedom to make unfriendly treaties with the
foreign Powers to the detriment of the country as a whole, then
obviously it cannot be a matter of agreement. No one can be asked to
sign an agreement granting freedom to launch hostilities against himself; it would be a suicidal policy."
Gandhi predicted that generations of Indians would pay the price for
first prime minister, also initially resisted
creation. He and other Indian leaders
(though not Gandhi) ultimately acceded, in the hope that
would emerge strengthened once it satisfied Muslim political demands
with partition. Nehru observed wryly that "[by] cutting off the
head we will get rid of the headache."
Those who believed that partition would create peace between the
two religious communities were proven wrong the very day
simultaneously achieved independence. Communal violence that had
continued more or less unabated since Direct Action day a year earlier
mushroomed into an orgy of violence with few parallels in the 20th
Century. Muslims slaughtered Hindus trapped in areas designated
for Pakistan. On the Indian side of the new border, Hindu and Sikh
militants set upon Muslims. The violence claimed one million lives
over the next several months, making the pre-independence ethnic
conflict look like child's play by comparison. It also produced 12
million refugees, "the greatest movement of population known to
history," as entire communities crossed borders to escape the
History's judgment of
partition, in light of the consequences it immediately produced, has
been harsh. It has been called, variously, "an unmitigated evil
for all concerned," "a disastrous affair," and
a "monumental folly." Yet the upheaval did not end with
the consolidation of power in
in the months following independence. The conflict has continued for
some five decades. On at least two other occasions since 1947, that
conflict again mushroomed into war. In between, a state of
hostility short of open warfare has prevailed, punctuated since 1989
by regularly occurring incidents of violence in the disputed
Kashmir region, which
largely controls and
covets. Often the shooting is between the opposing armies, though
in recent years terror groups operating out of Pakistan have launched
raids against Indian targets. The fact that the continuing
conflict has fueled an arms race that has led both countries to
develop nuclear weapons is most disturbing to the rest of the world.
Partition not only failed to bring peace to Hindu and Muslim
residents of British India, it also did not
succeed on the promise of political rights for the Muslims.
is, today, a military dictatorship.
Except for brief periods in its history, it has always been so.
In contrast to Pakistan's propensity for military rulers, India has
remained a democratic country, and one in which Muslim citizens are
full participants. Ironically, then, the very act calculated to
give political rights to Muslims has had precisely the opposite
effect for those in Pakistan.
The creation of
also did not lead to anything approaching a full separation between
Hindu and Muslim residents of British India,
for whatever benefit that might have brought.
After the upheaval following independence,
still retained a minority Muslim population of 42 million. Even
Dina Jinnah, Pakistani leader Mohammed Ali
Jinnah's only child, chose
over her father's new country. Today, India has the world's third
largest Muslim population, after Indonesia and Pakistan.
II. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF INDIA/PAKISTAN TO ISRAEL/PALESTINE
There is much in this history that is cautionary for
The partition of
into two nations, using religion as the basis for such division, is
the closest historical parallel to the proposed resolution of the
Israel-Palestinian conflict by fashioning a new Arab Muslim state
alongside Jewish Israel. The creation of
judged by reference to the human misery that followed its birth and
the continuing specter of nuclear conflict, did not achieve anything
like the peace its advocates promised. Striking similarities between
the India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine experiences indicate that
religion-driven partition will not be any more successful in bringing
peace to the Middle East than it was in solving
the problem of Hindu-Muslim communal violence in the Asian
The India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine situations differ in at
least one critical respect, however. This difference, though, only
makes the comparison more compelling.
came into existence on the same day, and there was no opportunity to
juxtapose the lofty promises of partition against experience with a
one-country solution. There was also no trial period, during which the
likely future course of post-partition history could be determined.
on the other hand, was formed 54 years ago, while
Palestine still remains a
topic of discussion. Moreover, the period of autonomy the Palestinians
have enjoyed since 1993 has shown what they have done with partial
independence. These circumstances make possible a fuller comparison
with India/Pakistan, and a more informed prediction of what the
Palestinians might do if given a fully independent state.
The fact that partition is not yet fully realized between
and the Palestinians makes this analysis essential. The pause in the
peace process created by the latest Intifada and
re-occupation of most West Bank cities has
provided an opportunity to reevaluate whether partition is a
worthwhile idea. The events of September 11, 2001 should also be cause to look
anew at the current process and to consider the extent to which an
agreement might actually increase rather than diminish world
and the Palestine have
embarked on the very path taken by
they will encounter a future filled with increasing bloodshed and war
rather than peace. If indeed it has taken a wrong turn,
has the ability, now, to choose a new approach, and to avoid repeating
the tragedy that continues to play out in the Asian subcontinent.
A. The Promise of Peace
The similarities between the two partition experiences begin with
the promise of peace. Just as advocates of
partition prophesied that peace would be the central benefit from
creating Hindu and Muslim-dominated states, so too comes the same
promise from Jewish and Arab states west of the Jordan River.
While Hindu-Muslim communal violence led directly to the adoption
of a partition solution for the Asian subcontinent, the impetus for
the Oslo process was the
pre-1993 Intifada. That fighting
claimed 2,000 Palestinian and 100 Israeli lives. The Palestinians
asserted, and Israel apparently believed, that Palestinian autonomy
presumably leading to Palestinian statehood would end the
violence. As one Palestinian negotiator expressed it, Arafat's
entry into Gaza would create "shock waves" among the local
population, causing the public to turn against Hamas.
Public statements surrounding the execution of the Israel-PLO
agreement expressed this theme. At the signing ceremony on the White
House lawn, then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared:
"[W]e will begin a new reckoning in the relations between
peoples, between parents tired of war, between children who will not
know war." On the Palestinian side, Yasir Arafat was unequivocal in his assurance that
the Oslo process would end
bloodshed. In a letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Arafat stated that: "The
PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles
constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful
coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger
peace and stability." Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
predicted that prosperity, as well as peace, would follow the signing
of the historic agreement. He said, "We shall convert the bitter
triangle of Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis into a triangle of
political triumph and economic prosperity. We shall lower our barriers
and widen our roads, so goods and guests will be able to move freely
to all places holy and other." And, as
Oslo's star fades,
advocates of partition based on a new political process assert that
this formula will end the bloodshed.
B. The Bifurcated
To create two states along religious lines in
the British had to form a new nation out of whole cloth:
In the Middle East too, whether through
negotiation or unilateral Israeli withdrawal, the idea is to invent a
West Bank/Gaza Strip-based
no history of independence. (It is for this reason that Golda Meir famously declared that there was no such
thing as a Palestinian people.) As with India/Pakistan, Muslim
population concentration in the territory in question (here the West
Bank and Gaza Strip) is the determining factor in establishing the
contours of the new state, with security considerations playing little
or no role in setting the border between Israel and Palestine.
consisted of geographically remote halves separated by nearly a
thousand miles of Indian territory, with a long, porous, and
difficult-to-defend border between the two states. In the
Middle East as well, there is to be a
Muslim-dominated state composed of two separated areas: the
West Bank and
Gaza. That state will
share a border with
that runs for hundreds of miles and that, as recent events have shown,
cannot be sealed against infiltration or other acts of violence such
as mortar and rocket attacks.
created by partition proved unstable, with the central government in
the West unable to exercise effective control over the ethnically
distinct Eastern portion. In 1971, following years of agitation for
autonomy, East Pakistan rebelled against the
central government in
Karachi. The Pakistani
army initially suppressed the rebellion in extremely brutal fashion.
According to one historian,
civil war "was fought with the greatest human-made atrocities the
subcontinent has known since the invasion of
at the end of the fourteenth century" by Tammerlane. Ten
million new refugees poured across the border to
and, by one count, there were three million killed. Concerned by
the instability, and seeing an opportunity to weaken Pakistan, India
gave military support to groups seeking an independent state. In
retaliation, the Pakistanis launched attacks against Indian air bases.
The Indian forces quickly gained the upper hand, capturing
Pakistan's largest city. At the end of the war, the
separatists proclaimed the independent nation of
out of what had been East Pakistan. The
civil war that produced Bangladesh has been called "a direct
result of partition."
There is ample reason to doubt that the two portions of
Palestine, like those of
will be able to maintain their unity. Hamas,
with a particularly large base of power in
Gaza, has emerged as a
credible rival to Arafat's Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, even within the Authority, there
are competing strongmen with their own sources of support. These
include MarwanBarghouti, the Fatah
chief in the West Bank (who is, for the time at least, in Israeli
custody); Muhammad Dahlan, the head of
Preventative Security in the Gaza Strip; and JibrilRajoub, the
former head of Preventative Security in the West Bank. It is
possible, for example, that an Islamic-dominated Gaza Strip will draw
away from a more secular West Bank, or that rival warlords will
establish separate bases of strength in the two territories, leaving
Israel with yet another hostile Arab neighbor with which to contend.
The presence of a long and indefensible border is a further
destabilizing factor common to both the Asian and Middle Eastern
examples. The Pakistanis have taken advantage of the border situation
to permit militant groups to launch raids against
Today, there are more than a dozen guerilla groups fighting Indian
control over Kashmir. These attacks,
which have claimed 60,000 lives in the last 12 years have strained
India/Pakistan relations to the breaking point. Indeed, it was an
attack on the Indian parliament building by the Lashkar-e-Tayyab, one such Pakistan-based group,
following closely on the heels of a devastating attack on the
Kashmir state legislature by another, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, that brought the two nations to
the brink of war in early 2002. The Palestinians, for their part,
have harbored numerous terror groups implicated in attacks against
Israel, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al
Aksa Martyrs Brigade, the Tanzim, and the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine. The terror operations (including more than 70
suicide bombings) attributed to them have inflamed Palestinian/Israeli
relations. Their actions led directly to Operation Defensive
Shield, Israel's invasion of major West Bank cities in March and April
of 2002 and Israel's re-occupation of those cities a short while
later. Moreover, Palestinian terror operations promise future
instability and conflict.
C. Political Upheaval
Post-partition conflict has had a damaging effect on the stability
political system, a result that can be seen in
as well. While
has remained a democracy, assassination and the resulting disruption
have been a regular feature on its political
scene from the beginning. In 1948, Indian militants opposed to Ghandi's efforts to reach out to Muslims and the
murdered the man most-identified with
struggle for independence. In a startling parallel, a Jewish
militant opposed to Yitzhak Rabin's concessions to the Palestinians
gunned down the Israeli leader following a peace rally in 1995.
Assassinations have been commonplace in
since the slaying of Ghandi. Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi and her son, former Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, each fell victim to
political murder. (Rajiv's assassin was
a female suicide bomber, showing that this phenomenon as well is not
new to Israel/Palestine.) In Israel, violence related to partition
claimed a second political leader when, in late 2000, Palestinians
murdered Israeli Minister of Tourism RehavemZe'evi at a hotel in Jerusalem. Ze'evi had been one of the most fervent critics of
the Oslo accords, and had been on the verge of taking his political
faction out of Prime Minister Sharon's national unity government.
The post-Oslo political violence can only have a destabilizing effect
on Israel's democracy, and may well breed future such acts and further
The form of government in the Palestinian territories provides yet
another similarity between the India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine
the Palestinian areas are controlled by a military dictatorship. Prior
to the Bush speech, Yasir Arafat was
recognized as the Palestinian ruler for life, with no plans for
democratic elections to consider a successor. While the West is now
pushing for the replacement of Arafat and for democratic changes to
the Palestinian Authority, there is no
indication that either event is forthcoming. Put simply, the
Palestinians have never considered adopting a true, multi-party
Like the Pakistanis before them, the Palestinians have made the
development of a military capability to continue the conflict with
their neighbor a top priority. While the
Oslo and subsequent
accords limit the Palestinians to an 8,000 member "police"
force, the fatigue-clad units armed with
automatic weapons the Palestinian Authority created, bear no
resemblance to such a body. Officially, it is comprised of numerous
individual security agencies, including the Palestinian Public
Security Force, the Palestinian Civil Police, the Preventitive Security Force, the General
Intelligence Service, the Palestinian Presidential Security Force, and
the Palestinian Coastal Police. The utter failure of the
Palestinian Authority to control acts of terror issuing from its
territory makes it abundantly clear that whatever the purpose of
these units, they have not been effectively engaged in police work of
any meaningful kind.
Rather, the Palestinian Authority has made strenuous efforts to arm
these fighters with weapons more like those used to terrorize northern
Israeli cities from Lebanon during the 1970's and 1980's, than with
side-arms of a type that traditional police
officers carry. In January of 2002,
intercepted a ship bound for the Gaza Strip that was transporting
Katyusha rockets and other heavy weapons
prohibited under Oslo, as
well as sophisticated plastic explosives of a type ideally suited for
terror operations. With no interference from Arafat's
"police," Hamas has developed a
rocket, the Kassam 2, with a range of five
miles. (In February of 2002, Hamas fired
the first Kassam 2's from the Gaza
Strip, and Kassam launchings are now a
regular occurrence.) The Palestinians have also made their first
primitive foray into the area of chemical warfare. In short, the Palestinians have given every
indication that they will use independence, like the Pakistanis have,
to further bolster their fighting capacity. Swords and not
ploughshares are the priority of the day in the areas that the
Shimon Peres' prosperity dividend from the agreement with the
Palestinians has also not been realized.
economy is now reeling from the impact of sustained terror attacks.
Since September 2000,
has been forced to spend $5 to $6 billion to fight Palestinian
terror. Tourism, upon which
is heavily dependent, is almost non-existent. And Israeli military
actions in response to Palestinian terror also triggered threats of
economic retaliation from Israel's trading partners, calling to
mind the U.S. decision to end military assistance to India and
Pakistan after their second war. While Israel's economy, led by a
burgeoning high-tech sector, soared in the mid-1990's, Israel is
now "mired in recession" and is suffering its
"worst economic performance in nearly half a century."
This also correlates with the India/Pakistan experience, where decades
of conflict have held back both nations' economies and left the people
of the Asian subcontinent trapped in hopeless poverty.
The supporters of the
Oslo process had argued
that it would end the Intifada. Yet it was precisely the concern over street
violence between Muslim and Hindu that caused adoption of the
two-nation solution in British India. Rather
than reducing the violence, however, the partition of
grossly exacerbated it. The killings of hundreds
was followed by the killing of hundreds of thousands, with no
end in sight more than half a century later. And, indeed, since
Oslo, more than 1,000
Israelis have been killed in terror attacks (including more than 700
since September 2000 alone), ten times the total number killed during
the Intifada. The current
political process has served only to replace the rocks of the pre-Oslo
Intifada with the suicide bombings
and mortar and rocket attacks of the post-Oslo version.
E. A Muslim Minority in the
The arguments for the creation of
Palestine also ignore
pre-1967 Arab population. They have lived as citizens in
for more than 50 years, and their involvement in the post-DOP
violence, though increasing, has been minimal. Moreover, since the
signing of the Oslo accords in 1993, there has been no movement on the
part of Israeli Arab communities to relocate to Palestinian-controlled
areas in the West Bank or Gaza. While
Oslo's advocates argue
that two states are needed for there to be peace and
self-determination for Arab and Jew alike,
Arabs have not embraced this concept. Instead, they have voted their
preference in the most demonstrative way possible by staying put in
Indeed, and perhaps somewhat incredibly given the logic of the
Palestine argument, the
Palestinian Authority has demanded the right of Palestinians to
"return" to live in
Israel. It was, in significant part, on this issue
that the Camp David summit between Arafat, EhudBarak, and Bill
Clinton foundered. Yet the "return" of Palestinians to
Israel's territory runs counter to the logic of partition. If peace
requires Jews and Arabs to live in separate countries, there can be no
logic to settling additional Arabs in
(If, on the other hand, the demand reflects Palestinian aspirations to
use the political process to destroy
the Palestinian position is entirely consistent.) And, on the other
side of the proposed border, the Palestinians have been adamant that
every last Jewish settler leave all territory transferred to
Palestinian rule.[101 The behavior of
Arab community is like that of the 42 million Muslims who, after 1947,
By its conduct, each minority community has rejected the notion that
only partition along religious lines can bring peace.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear why the partition of
increased the level of violence. During the campaign for partition,
Jinnah's Muslim League unleashed religious
passions in an attempt to garner Muslim support and to demonstrate the
impossibility of Hindu-Muslim coexistence in a single state. The League incorporated Islamic rhetoric
into its appeal, claiming that Muslims faced a choice between
Pakistan, Land of the Pure, and Kafiristan,
Land of the Unbeliever. Once aroused, such passions are not
easily quieted. To complicate matters, Muslims were dissatisfied with
the amount of land allocated them by the British. Jinnah complained that he was being given a
Following partition, Muslim territorial frustrations were translated
into efforts to seize control of the Muslim-majority state of
Kashmir, in order to ensure
In the independent state of
Muslims' religious passions had been inflamed. They had demonstrated
their murderous rage toward Hindus and dissatisfaction with the amount
of territory allotted to them. Further, the Muslims in
now had the powers that come with statehood to give fuller expression
to this hostility. A state can build a conventional army, and to do so
may import sophisticated war materiel with little or no restriction.
Dissident elements within a country do not have the same powers. Thus,
their enmity rewarded by partition, and lacking the stability that a
history of independence and established borders might have provided,
the Pakistanis invested in the development of a powerful military to
press their grievances against Hindu India.
The Pakistanis have not been satisfied with a conventional armed
force. Undoubtedly spurred by
pursuit of nuclear weapons,
has tested its own atomic devices. These
two countries' nuclear arsenals have increased the intensity level of
any future war. In May 2002, a former official in the
disclosed publicly that
appeared to be on the verge of initiating a nuclear attack in
1999. In response to
pressure, the Pakistanis took steps to defuse the crisis that led to
their nuclear deployment. Nevertheless, the fact that Pakistan
was apparently willing to start a nuclear war for tactical gain, and
not to counter an existential threat, is sobering. It is no doubt for
this reason that former President Bill Clinton called South
Asia "the most dangerous place on earth."
The consequences of an all-out war between
in the post-nuclear era would be devastating. According to a recently
completed assessment by the
government, a nuclear war between
could result in as many as 12 million killed and 7 million injured in
just the initial minutes. Millions of
additional casualties could result from related firestorms and longer
term consequences, such as starvation and radiation poisoning.
Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear program has implications that extend well
beyond the India-Pakistan theater. Several of
nuclear scientists traveled to
in recent years, offering their expertise to al Qaeda. In 1999,
considered transferring some of its nuclear weapons to
to protect them from Indian attack. It is no exaggeration to
state, then, that the Indian partition has decreased security for the
Had there not been a partition of British
India, violent ethnic conflict between Hindu and Muslim
communities would have continued, at least for a time, as Muslim
aspirations for statehood went unrealized. But compared to the horrible bloodshed of
1947 alone, the casualties would have been minor. The conflict also
would have been domestic, with little or no potential for triggering a
war between sovereign states. Most importantly, an aggrieved Muslim
would have had no ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, nor
would Hindu-India have been motivated to pursue such technology.
Another aspect of independence, when considering the creation of a
majority Muslim state, is the government's ability to dismantle the
barrier between religion and state, so that Jihad can become national
policy. Since independence,
has moved steadily toward the Islamization
of its laws and political institutions. In 1979, it instituted
the Islamic penal code. Non-Islamic banking was abolished in 1985
and, that same year, Pakistan declared that its economy conformed with
Islamic principles. Pakistan was one of the only countries in the
world to recognize Afghanistan's Taliban government, and the move
toward fundamentalist Islam led hundreds of Pakistanis to fight the
U.S. alongside the Taliban. It remains an open question whether
Pakistan's current military ruler can put this genie back into its
In the Palestinian areas, a similar process is underway. The
Palestinian Authority has incorporated Islamic rhetoric into appeals
to the masses for martyrs in the cause for a Palestinian state with
Jerusalem as its
capital. Islamist groups have steadily
accumulated power, with Hamas taking a
prominent role in running schools and offering other social services
in the autonomous areas. These activities have given Hamas the ideal platform for recruiting new
suicide bombers. All of this has had a demonstrably corrosive effect
on the young. Between 1967 and
cession of territory to the Palestinians in 1993, there were virtually
no suicide attacks. Since September 2000, these have been near weekly
occurrences, as a seemingly limitless reservoir of would be
"martyrs" has sprung up under Yasir Arafat's gaze. This would not have
happened had Israel kept control.
There is another critical area of similarity that tends to support
the analogy between India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine. Jinnah had demanded far more territory for the
Muslims than they ultimately received through partition. Following partition, Muslim territorial
frustrations centered on control over the former princely state of
Kashmir. That issue has contributed to the
continuing conflict between these two countries, and Pakistan-based
terror groups have continually struck at
for control over Kashmir. Here too, partition
is beginning in the shadow of continuing political disagreements. The
Palestinian Authority claims the right to East
Jerusalem, a Palestinian state in virtually all of the
West Bank and
Gaza, and the right of
Palestinians to return to pre-1967 Israeli territory. And,
whatever one thinks of the sincerity of the Authority's recognition of
Israel's right to exist, Hamas represents a
powerful force within the Palestinian areas that remains overtly
committed to Israel's destruction. Israel, for its part, opposes
a return to the pre-1967 borders, rejects the uprooting of all Jewish
settlements, and will not agree to a wholesale Palestinian return to
Because partition, whether negotiated or Israeli-imposed, will not
solve all issues, it will prevent rather than bring peace. Such a
policy will give the Palestinians the "freedom" to further
militarize the conflict, to foster unofficial military groups involved
in attacks against
and to continue to indoctrinate the masses for war - all in an effort
to pursue unresolved claims. Partition in the Middle
East could only be logical if it genuinely settled all
issues separating the parties, including militant groups operating
within Palestinian areas. The idea of granting autonomy/independence
first and addressing important issues later, which has been the
hallmark of Oslo and
subsequent Israeli/Palestinian agreements, is contrary to historical
experience. Far from minimizing the chance for future conflict, it
F. External Considerations Favoring Partition
Of course, the creation of a Palestinian state has not only been
the wish of those with animus toward
Many argue that only partition can preserve the country's Jewish
character. Without two states west of the Jordan
river, they posit, the Arab minority will overwhelm Jewish
Israel. However, the current political process will not affect
Israel's pre-1967 Arab population, and indeed may even supplement it
if some form of a Palestinian right of return is granted. At best,
then, the creation of
Palestine offers only a
partial solution to the demographic problem. And, guided by
India/Pakistan and post-Oslo events, a solution of this type is as
likely to destroy Israel as it is to save it. Solving the demographic
problem through partition is, as Nehru pointed out, like cutting off
the head to get rid of the headache.
may have allowed demography to color its perception of the
advisability of entering into the
policy is also influenced by external factors. Historically, the
has sought to balance its support for
with friendly relations with Arab regimes in an effort to ensure a
secure and reasonably- priced supply of oil. More recently, the Bush administration has
sought to build Arab support for the war on terrorism, including a
Support for a Palestinian state is seen as supportive of these
The India/Pakistan experience, however, counsels against allowing
external considerations to promote an unwise partition. In 1940,
Muslims pledged support for
fight against the Axis powers. The mostly-Hindu Congress party,
by contrast, continued the struggle for independence during World War
II and maintained a policy of confrontation with
colonial ruler. Anxious to shore up Muslim support for the war
effort, Britain pledged that the Muslims would not be coerced into any
system of Indian government of which they disapproved. Partition
was the fruit of this earlier pledge, which essentially gave Muslims a
veto on any political resolution that they disapproved. World War
II has now been over for more than 50 years and there can be no
credible claim that India's Muslims somehow played a significant role
in its outcome. Nevertheless, the effects of that wartime political
calculation are still being felt today, some
three generations later.
Based on the India/Pakistan and post-Oslo histories, we can predict
several things with a high degree of certainty. A Palestinian state
will be a dictatorship and will become increasingly Islamicized. It will be
unstable and prone to revolution as competing strongmen vie for power.
It will be militaristic and will continue to pursue avenues for
increasing its ability to wage war with
It will develop unconventional as well as conventional means for doing
so. It will precipitate violence on a scale that dwarfs pre-Oslo
levels, including the use of terror groups as surrogate fighters. It
will have a limited ability to maintain control over both the
West Bank and
Gaza, paving the way for a
possible second Palestinian state.
economy will suffer, as it struggles to confront the continuing threat
of violence issuing from Palestinian areas. These things will happen.
Indeed most are already well underway.
The more attractive alternatives to partition are those that have
fewer of the attributes of a two-state solution. A red-line that
cannot be crossed is that of creating a Palestinian state with control
over its borders, whether through negotiation or Israeli-imposed
separation. Such control will only lead to a further build up of Arab
armed forces and will precipitate increasingly intense conflict.
Assuming the Palestinians, like the Pakistanis before them, pursue
unconventional weapons, a Palestinian state will be a threat not only
but to other countries as well, including the
Preserving the status quo and allowing the Palestinians to retain
autonomy within areas they now control while continuing Israeli
supervision over the borders, eliminates some
of the vices of partition but not all of them. Since 1993,
has witnessed the enormous harm an autonomous Palestinian entity can
inflict. It can educate its citizens for war and it can engage in a
weapons build-up sufficient to constitute a powerful terrorist threat
civilian population, with devastating impact on
economy and morale. To address these problems,
should re-assert full, permanent control over the West
Bank and Gaza.
It should de-militarize formerly autonomous areas by disarming all
official and unofficial armed Palestinian groups, and preferably
remove their leaders from the scene.
needs to reassert supervision over the educational system and media,
to end the brainwashing of the young to commit suicide attacks. This
would be a difficult, costly, and long-term process, and in the short
term would exact significant casualties.
public standing also would no doubt suffer. Over the long term,
however, the costs of alternatives to re-asserted Israeli control are
An essential basis of the
Oslo process has been
assumption of risks for peace.
has been asked to make tangible concessions in land and control in
exchange for intangibles, such as the promise of future peaceful
behavior. Despite the continuing violence, the prevailing wisdom is
that a new political process leading to formation of a Palestinian
state can succeed in
Oslo's place. A review of
the strikingly similar India/Pakistan experience is an important
vehicle for judging the worth of this approach. It can inform an
assessment of the likelihood that Israeli risks will produce the
desired result. The aftermath of the partition of British
India, particularly in the light of post-Oslo experience,
indicates strongly that they will not.
The Oslo process
represented a conscious effort to disregard historical experience as a
predictor of future events. As Shimon Peres wrote in the immediate
afterglow of the signing ceremony at the White House:
"We must study history to learn its critical
lessons, but we must also know when to ignore history. We cannot allow
the past to shape immutable concepts that negate our ability to build
new roads. Like the river, we are part of the process of perpetual
change: landscapes shift, knowledge widens, and technology expands our
horizons. Those of us active in the political arena today differ from
our predecessors in the burden we carry, in our hopes and in our
expectations. A person who hails historical precedent as a formula for
controlling future events is headed for disappointment and failure.
Knowing when to depart from the past brings a distinct advantage: the
element of surprise. Sometimes, in fact, what comes by surprise
generates much less opposition than what was expected."
Yet the contrast between the pre-Oslo vision of peace and
prosperity and the post-Oslo reality could not be more striking.
Indeed, "disappointment and failure" describe, in a
particularly apt manner, that agreement's aftermath.
Had history's lessons been considered thoughtfully before
empowered the PLO and opened the door to a Palestinian state, this
need not have occurred. If the bloodletting of the past nine years
serves to focus policymakers on the need to confront partition's
abysmal record and help
avoid India/Pakistan's fate, that loss will not have been in vain. For
those who still favor partition and are tempted to again ignore
history, there can be no greater counsel than Santayana's: "Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
has begun construction of a high tech security fence that will
separate the West Bank from pre-1967
John Ward Anderson, Israel Starts West Bank Fence Work;
PalestinianInterimState is Rejected by
Sharon, Wash. Post,
June 17, 2002, at
A1. The fence is to include a 71-mile section running from Sale
Junction in the north to an area outside of Tel Aviv, and an
eight-mile section near
Id. The erection of the
security fence is seen by some as the de facto creation of a border
and a future Palestinian state. Id. ("[S]ome Israeli critics say the proposed fence would
effectively formalize - and possibly finalize - Israel's borders,
giving up the country's claim to parts of the West Bank . . .").
. Binyamin Netanyahu, Speech Before the
Likud Central Committee (May 12, 2002) (English version), at
www.netanyahu.org/binnetspeeca.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). In his speech,
Netanyahu called on the Israeli government to take three steps: (1)
complete the removal of all Palestinian fighters, weapons and
ammunition from the area; (2) establish security buffer zones opposite
the main Palestinian population centers in order to seal off the free
passage of Palestinians into [Israel’s] cities and towns; and
(3) completely and totally eradicate Arafat’s regime and remove
him from the vicinity. Netanyahu addressed at some length the issue of
creating a Palestinian state:
In any future agreement, if and when we
get that far, I see self-rule in which the Palestinians will have the
freedom to rule themselves. But to establish a state, with everything
that that concept entails, with all the powers I have enumerated
[control over borders, control over air space, right to make military
alliances with other counties, control over underground water
sources], which would endanger
existence - that no. Not under Arafat or under any other leadership.
Not today, not tomorrow, not ever.
. Before September 11, the administration had been on the verge
of announcing a diplomatic initiative that was to include support for
the creation of a Palestinian state. Jane Perlez & Patrick E.
Taylor, Before Attacks,
Was Ready To Say It Backed Palestinian
State, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 2001, at
A1. It then did so on October
2, 2001. Ken Fireman, Goal Is Palestinian State: Bush Backs
Eventual Creation of an Independent Nation, Newsday, Oct. 3, 2001, at
A8 ("The Bush administration yesterday formally endorsed the goal
of creating an independent Palestinian state, saying that was part of
its 'vision' for an eventual political settlement of the Middle East
conflict."). In June of 2002, President Bush again expressed his
"vision of "two states, living side by side, in peace and
security." Text of President Bush's Address on the Middle East,
Wash. Post, June 25, 2002, at A12. Over time,
support for Palestinian statehood has become more qualified, now
demanding Palestinian reform as a condition for American support for a
"provisional" Palestinian state.
Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject
terror, they can count on American support
for the creation of a provisional state of
. On March 28, 2002, the Arab League formally approved a plan
calling for recognition of Israel in exchange for a full Israeli
withdrawal from all land occupied in 1967, creation of a Palestinian
state with Jerusalem as its capital, and a 'just solution' for
Palestinian refugees. Mohammed Bazzi, Arabs
at Summit in Agreement;
Approve Saudi Peace Proposal, Voice Their Support for Iraqis, Newsday,
Mar. 29, 2002, at
A7. See also Arab Summit Adopts Saudi Peace Initiative, CNN.com., at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/38/arab.league (Mar. 28, 2002);
See also Michael Slackman, Arab League
Approves Saudi Peace Initiative at Beirut Summit, L.A. Times, Mar. 29,
2002, at A1. According to a declaration accompanying the plan, the
'just solution' means a 'right of return' for the refugees.
. This can be seen, in particular, with
suicide bombings, discussed infra Part II D. While there were two
Israeli deaths from such attacks in 1993, the year
and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, there were more than
20 in 1994 and 1995, more than 60 in 1996 and, after a precipitous
drop from 1998 to 2000, 315 Israeli deaths from suicide bombings since
September 2000. Molly Moore & John Ward Anderson, Suicide Bombers
Change Mideast's Military Balance, Wash.
Post, Aug. 18, 2002, at A1; Molly Moore & John Ward Anderson,
Suicide Bomber Kills 15 on Bus in Northern Israel, Wash. Post, Mar. 6,
2003, at A12.
. John F. Manley, Presidential Power and White House Lobbying,
93 Pol. Sci. Q.
255, 274 (1978) ("Historians are found of saying the past is
prologue."). See also Stuart Rothenberg, For George W. Bush, the
Past is Prologue, CNN.com, at
(Jan. 20, 2001).
. See, e.g., George F. Will, Unhelpful Amnesia,
Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 2002, at A19.
. Id. ("It has been 37 years since [Arafat's] Fatah launched its first attack on Israel, which
then (as when attempts were made to crush Israel in 1948, 1956 and in
1967) was within the 1967 borders that amnesiacs believe are the key
to appeasing Arafat.").
. The beginning of
can be traced to 1608, when three ships of the English East India
Company arrived at Surat.
StanleyWolpert, New History of
India 142 (6th ed. 2000). By 1850, the British
controlled nearly all of the subcontinent.
224. In 1858, the British government formally took over
from the East India Company. This followed the suppression of an
uprising by Hindu and Muslim conscripts in the Indian army.
. Patrick French,
Liberty or Death:
Journey to Independence
and Division 365 (1997). See also Introduction to The Partition of
India: Causes and Responsibilities, at viii (T. Walter Wallbank ed., 1966) [hereinafter Partition]
("The Partition of the political unit created under British rule
is one of the most significant events in twentieth century Asian
. Partition, supra note 11, at xi (T. Walter Wallbank,
. For a detailed discussion of
decision to depart
and its efforts to bridge Hindu/Muslim differences, see H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan
. The term communal "refers to
groups that are set apart by reason mainly of language, religion,
occupation, and historical origin." Partition, supra note 11, at
viii. In the Indian context, it typically refers to Hindu-Muslim
. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 344.
. The British were adamant that the transfer of power to Indian
(or Indian and Pakistani) hands be the subject of agreement. However,
because the Muslim League refused to accept anything less than
partition as part of an agreed settlement, this decision had the
effect of ensuring partition. See, e.g., French, supra note 11, at
. Allen Hayes Merriam, Gandhi vsJinnah: The Debate Over the Partition of India 68 (1980). Recounting a
conversation with Jinnah, British official
Lord Ismay wrote: "Mr. Jinnah said with the greatest earnestness that,
once partition had been decided upon . . . all troubles would cease,
and they would live happily ever after." Hodson, supra note 13, at 229. Jinnah's sister and confidante Fatima made a
similar assertion, telling the wife of the Viceroy that "the
problems involved would be quite easy once Muslim demands had been
agreed to." StanleyWolpert, Jinnah of
Pakistan 322 (1984).
. As Jinnah once put it: "[B]rother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one
vote." Wolpert, supra note 17, at 181.
. William Norman Brown, TheUnited
2, 147 (1972); Larry Collins & Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at 120 (1975).
. French, supra note 11, at 224; Collins & Lapierre,
supra note 19, at 41. The translation is from Persian. Brown, supra note 19, at
. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at
. To establish the border between Pakistan
and India, the
parties agreed to form a five member boundary commission. The commission had
two Muslims and two Hindus, and was chaired by British barrister Sir CyrillRadcliffe. Because the
Hindus and Muslims deadlocked on all of the difficult issues, Radcliffe was forced to decide all the contested issues
alone. He was guided by the commission's official terms of reference, which
stated that a decision should be made on the basis of "contiguous majority
areas of Moslems and non-Moslems," while taking into account "other
factors." French, supra note 11, at 323-24; Hodson,
supra note 13, at 346-47. According to Hodson, the "other
factors" were not specified, but could include "material
considerations such as administrative viability, natural boundaries,
communications, or water and irrigation systems. Id. at 347.
However, the commission's "prime duty was to delimit contiguous
communal-majority areas, and no wide variation from that criterion would have
been within the spirit of their terms of reference.' Id.
. Id. at 355.
. Merriam, supra note 17, at 107, 122.
. Id. at 124.
. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at
. See, e.g., Hodson, supra note 13, at 71-72.
. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 347.
. For a detailed and moving description of the post-independence
violence, see Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19,
. This figure comes from historian Stanley Wolpert,
who has provided a relatively recent estimate of the number killed in the
post-independence upheaval. Wolpert, supra note 10,
at 348. However, the actual number of persons killed has been a matter of some
dispute, with estimates ranging from 200,000 to 2,000,000. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 399. British commentators have
tended to cite lower numbers, with Hodson asserting
the 200,000 figure. Hodson, supra note 13, at 418.
. See Penderel Moon, The Cabinet Mission, Doomed from the Outset, in Partition, supra note 11, at 82.
Regarding the Direct Action Day killing of 5,000, which occurred before
partition, Moon observed: "Compared with what was to follow this holocaust
was nothing extraordinary, but it made a deep impression at the time." Id.
. Brown, supra note 19, at 161. Here as well Hodson
offers a lower total, asserting that "some five million" people
crossed the new border following independence. Hodson,
supra note 13, at 418. According to Wolpert, there
were ten million refugees. Wolpert, supra note 10, at
348. There have been higher figures as well. According to Brown, if Indian and
Pakistani government claims are added, the total comes to about seventeen
million. Brown, supra note 19, at 161.
. S. K. Majumdar, Jinnah
and Gandhi: Their Role in India's
Quest for Freedom, at xvii (1966).
. Brown, supra note 19, at 2.
. Edward D'Cruz, India:
The Quest for Nationhood 114 (1967).
. Post-independence wars were fought in 1965 and 1971. In 1965, Pakistan
launched Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating thousands of armed insurgents into
Indian-controlled Kashmir. These soldiers were supposed to link up with the
local population and foment a rebellion. Indian forces retaliated, Pakistan counter-attacked,
and the fighting spread to the Punjab. A cease-fire was declared in September
of that same year. SumitGanguly,
Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, 43-45 (2001). The next
war was fought in 1971, and led to the secession of East Pakistan and the
formation of the independent nation of Bangladesh. Id. at 51-74. In 1999, the
two nations engaged in sustained battle in Kashmir, along the line of control
that separates Indian and Pakistani forces. Id. at 114-120. Because there were
more than one thousand battlefield deaths during this fighting, Ganguly characterizes Kargil as a
third post-independence war between these two rivals. Id. at 11; see also Jasjit Singh, Kargil 1999:
Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, at i (1999).
. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 43-45.
. See infra notes 65-77.
. Its current ruler, General PervezMusharaff, seized control
in 1999. Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South
Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan 225 (2000). Then the army chief of staff, Musharaff achieved power by placing President NawazSharif and his supporters
under house arrest, dissolving parliament, dismissing the provincial chief
ministers, suspending the constitution, and declaring a state of emergency. Id.
. See id. at 25-26 (summary of Pakistan's
pre-1988 experience) and 67 (summary of Pakistan's
political history between 1988 and the 1999 Musharaff
coup). Chadda argues that in Pakistan
in the 1990's, "the balance between democratic and non-democratic forces
had shifted in favor of the former." Id. at 67.
She points to the three elections that occurred during this decade, but also
states that during the same period "Pakistan's military-bureaucratic
establishment dismissed five elected governments." Id. Perhaps the most
compelling verdict on Pakistan's efforts to democratize was delivered by
General Musharaff in a July 2002 speech to the
nation. According to Musharaff:
"There has never been true democracy in Pakistan. If there had been true democracy, I would not have been
before you today." John Lancaster, Musharaff
Argues for Revision of Constitution: Leader Says Democracy in Pakistan Was
Sham, Wash. Post, July 13, 2002, at A14.
. Chadda, supra note 39, at 23, 43. Chadda calls India
a "relatively consolidated democracy," though she notes that others
argue that it is a "covertly authoritarian, low-quality democracy." Id. at 222, 143.
. Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi 476
(Harper & Row, 1983).
. French, supra note 11, at 364.
. Compare population figures, including Muslim percentage of total
population, in Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook
' Indonesia (2002), Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook
' India (2002), and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook
' Pakistan (2002), at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
(last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
. The Palestinian Authority asserts that: "The comprehensive
permanent status agreement will mark the end of conflict between Palestine
and Israel, and
its complete implementation will mark the end of claims between them." Palestinian Vision for the Outcome of Permanent Status
Negotiations, Palestinian Authority Official Website, June 15, 2002, at * 2, http://www.pna.gov.ps/new/vision.html. The
permanent status agreement the Palestinians have in mind contemplates
establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital and a
"just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem." Id.
. David Makovsky, Making Peace With The PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord
95 (1996) ("it was the intifada that led
Rabin and Peres to agree that finding a political solution to the conflict was
. As Israeli negotiator Uri Savir later put
it: "The Palestinians needed to know that autonomy could lead to a state,
while we needed to know it would bring security. Once the red lines were
understood, everything could be negotiated." Id. at 47.
Statements such as these by the Israeli side "undoubtedly led the Palestinians
to believe that compliance with the interim agreement would result inevitably
in Palestinian statehood." Id.
. According to David Makovsky: “During
the Oslo negotiations, PLO officials assured their Israeli counterparts that,
in return for mutual recognition, Arafat - as the "sole, legitimate
representative" of the Palestinian people - would be able to enforce the
deal, control terrorism, and otherwise ensure Israeli security. On that basis,
Rabin persuaded Israelis that one of the virtues of the Oslo
accord was that Arafat would crack down on Hamas.”
Id. at 139-140.
. Makovsky, supra note 46, at 53.
. Id. at app. XVI.
. Id. at app. XVII.
. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Remarks On the
Occasion of the Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles
(Sept. 13, 1993), at www.mfa.gov.il. (last visited Aug.
. See sources cited supra notes 4 and 45.
. According to Meir:
There was no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an
independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? . . . It was
not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine
considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and
took their country from them. They did not exist.
quoted in Baruch Kimmerling
& Joel S. Magda, Palestinians: The Making of a
People xvi (1993). According to HananAshrawi, Palestine's
boundaries were delineated in 1923, when "the League of Nations
placed it under the British Mandate, as Palestine."
A Conversation with Dr. HananAshrawi, 25 Nova L. Rev. 443, 451 (2001). Yet the
Mandate to which Ashrawi refers was for purposes of
creating a "Jewish" homeland in Palestine.
See Palestine Mandate, July 24, 1922, in, Arab-Israeli
Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History 36 (Bernard Reich, ed. 1995)
("Article 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country
under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the
establishment of the Jewish national home . . . ."). Id.
It therefore provides a curious, yet revealing, starting point for Palestinian
self-definition. And, in response to the specific question, was Palestine
a "sovereign nation by itself," Ashrawi
began her answer as follows: "It was under occupation. It had boundaries.
It was recognized." A Conversation with Dr. HananAshrawi, 25 Nova L. Rev.
443, 452 (2001).
. For a thorough discussion of the 1971 war,
including its background and aftermath, see Ganguly,
supra note 36, at 51-74.
. Brown, supra note 19, at ix.
. Id. at 217.
. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 61-69.
. Id. at 52. See also,
Brown, supra note 19, at 220.
. Brown, supra note 19, at 206.
. Kathryn Westcott, Who Are Hamas, BBC News
Online, Oct. 19, 2000, at
[hereinafter BBC] ("Yasser
Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) - the government-in-waiting if a
Palestinian state is established - views Hamas as a
serious rival"); Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief: Hamas: The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant
Palestinian Organization (October 14, 1993) ("Palestinians in the West
Bank apparently favor the PLO over Hamas, but Hamas' popularity among Gaza's 750,000 Palestinians has
grown over the past five years to a point where Hamas
has seriously challenged the PLO for popular support.").
. James Bennet & John Kifner,
6 Men Who Could Be Contenders to Lead the Palestinians if Arafat Goes, N.Y.
Times, June 14, 2002, at A14 (listing MahmoudAbbas, the secretary general of the PLO; MarwanBarghouti, general
secretary of Fatah in the West Bank; Muhammad Dahlan, former chief of preventitive
security forces in Gaza; Ahmed Qurei, an economic
adviser; JibrilRajoub; and
Sheik Ahmad Yassin, Hamas's
spiritual leader; as potential Arafat successors).
. India Blames Pakistan Militant Group for Parliament Attack, PBS Online
News Hour Update, Dec. 14, 2001, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/december01/india_12-14.html.
Official Says Tension Is Easing in South Asia, Wash.
Post, Aug. 25, 2002, at
. See PBS, supra note 65. See also, At least 30 Killed in Raid in
Kashmir, Wash. Post, May 15, 2002, at A23.
. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel and the occupied
territories (2001) [hereinafter State Report] (stating that "[t]he Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas), Hizballah,
Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PLFP), among others, all committed acts of terrorism in Israel"
in 2001). The existence of these militant groups is a violation of the Cairo
Agreement between the PLO and Israel, which expressly prohibits the formation
of armed forces, other than the Palestinian police, in areas under Palestinian
control. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and
the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, 22 I.L.M. 622 (1994), art.IX, available at
. Lee Hockstader, Israel Besieges Arafat
Offices Again As Tanks Enforce Ramallah Curfew, Wash.
Post, June 11, 2002, at A20; Israel Starts West Bank Fence Work, Wash. Post,
June 17, 2002, at A1; Daniel Williams, Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair: Among
Palestinians, a Growing Attitude of Little to Live For, Wash. Post, March 23,
2002, at A1 ("Other than exceptional cases, most suicide bombings are
outfitted and dispatched by organized groups: Hamas,
Islamic Jihad or al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.").
Rights Group Condemns Palestinian Attacks: Says Bombings Are "Crimes
Against Humanity," Amnesty International Says, Wash. Post, July 12, 2002,
at A16 (Amnesty International has called suicide bombings "crimes against
humanity," and has further stated that they "may also constitute war
crimes."). Yet the suicide attacks were only part of the story. According
to the U.S. State Department, in 2001, there were "[n]early 2,000 terror
attacks" in the West Bank, Gaza, and pre-1967 Israel. See, State Report,
supra note 68. In addition to suicide bombings, these included "drive-by
shootings, mortar and grenade attacks, and stabbings . . . in the West Bank,
Gaza, and Israel proper"). Id. These attacks occurred "on a daily
. See, e.g., Doug Struck & Edward Cody, Deal Set in Bethlehem Siege:
13 Palestinians in Church Will Be Exiled to Italy, 26 Others Sent to Gaza,
Wash. Post, May 7, 2002, at A1 (referring to Israel's "major offensive launched
March 29 to destroy what the Israeli government called the Palestinian terror
infrastructure"). As Prime Minister Sharon stated at the commencement of
In the past few days we have witnessed horrific terrorist attacks - the
attack during the Pesach Seder in Netanya, where 21
people were killed, tonight's events in ElonMoreh, resulting in 4 deaths, and the incident which is
currently taking place in Netzarim where so far two
people have been killed. . . .
Therefore, the government . . . has made the following decision:
The Government has approved principles for extensive operational activity
against Palestinian terrorism.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon & Defense Minister Binymain
Ben-Eliezer, Statements at Press Conference Following
Cabinet Meeting (March 29, 2002), available at www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp'M
FAHO1180. Operation Defensive Shield, which had begun on March 29, 2002,
formally ended on April 21, 2002. See Cabinet Communique,
Israeli Cabinet Secratariat (April 21, 2002), available
at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp'MFAH01180. ("Prime Minister Sharon
thanked them [the members of the security establishment] upon the conclusion of
this stage of the operation stating that Israel
achieved great accomplishments in the framework of Operation Defensive
. Karen DeYoung, Palestinian Statehood Depends
on Arafat's Removal, Bush Says, Wash. Post, June 25, 2002, at A1 ("Israeli
forces intensified their incursions in Palestinian territory, occupying a
half-dozen West Bank cities").
. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at
. Serge Schmemann, Assassination in Israel:
The Overview; Rabin is Slain After Peace Rally in Tel Aviv; Israeli Gunman
Held; Says He Acted Alone at http://www.lexis-nexis.com., N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,
1995, at A1.
. Chadda, supra note 39, at 48; Wolpert, supra note 10, at 418, 439-41.
. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 439.
. The use by the Palestinians of female suicide
bombers has attracted a great deal of attention in the Western media. See,
e.g., David Williams, Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair, Wash. Post, May 23,
2002, at A1 (profiling suicide bomber Dareen Abu Aisheh, a 21 year-old Palestinian woman).
. EtgarLefkovits, RehavamZe'evi Assassinated, PFLP
Claims Responsibility for Jerusalem Hotel Shooting, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18,
2001, at 1. In an odd coincidence, Ze'evi was more
commonly known in Israel by his childhood nickname - Gandhi. Alexander Zvielli, A Man Who Loved His
Country, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18, 2001, at 3.
. Lefkovits, supra note 77. See also David Makovsky, Ze'evi Assassination
and its Possible Aftermath, Peacewatch, No. 347,
October 17, 2001, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
. See discussion infra note 4.
. According to HananAshrawi,
who has been called "a leader for the creation of a democratic Palestine
committed to human rights and peace," "Hamas
is a political organization. It has a military wing. I have a constant dialogue
with Hamas. We should." A Conversation With Dr. HananAshrawi,
supra note 55, at 449. Another terror group, the Al Aksa
Martyrs Brigade, calls itself the military wing of Arafat's own Fatah faction of the PLO. Molly Moore
& John Ward Anderson, Suicide Bombers Change Mideast's Military
Balance, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2002, at A1.
The idea of political parties having military wings cannot be said to comport
with western democratic ideals.
. Cairo Agreement, Annex I,
. State Report, supra note 68. See also Gal Luft,
Reforming the Palestinian Security Services, Peacewatch,
May 15, 2002,
at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/peacewatch/peacewatch2002/382htm. Luft puts the number of component bodies at twelve, a
figure that does not include Tanzim and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which are affiliated with Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. To make matters worse,
"[e]ach of these bodies has two branches that are independent of each
other: one in the West Bank and the other in the Gaza
. According to the 2001 State Department Report: 'PA security forces
arrested some of those implicated in the violence, but many quickly were
released or not kept under credible conditions of arrest.' State Report, supra
note 68. The report also notes that "[o]ff-duty Palestinian security officers
and FatahTanzim members
with firearms were deeply involved in the violence during the year." Id. Luft's assessment is more blunt:
"All of the [Palestinian Police] apparatuses have either participated
directly in terrorist acts or supported Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. In
fact, some of the Brigades' senior activists also hold senior positions in the
PSS." Luft, supra note 82. In response, the Bush
administration has made reformation of the Palestinian security services a
priority. See supra notes 4 and 71.
. James Bennet, Seized Arms Would Have Vastly
Extended Arafat Arsenal, N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 2002, at A5. The ship was captained by a colonel in the
Palestinian Authority's coast guard. See Luft, supra
. Lee Hockstader, Israeli Troops Take Over
West Bank Town, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 2002, at A1. See also Ilan Berman, Missile Defense Briefing Report No. 31,
American Foreign Policy Council (December
6, 2001), at http://www.afpc.org/mdbr/mdbr31/htm.
. Evelyn Gordon, Opinion Red Lines Disappearing Ink, Jerusalem
Post, Feb. 19, 2002, at 8.
. On several occasions, Palestinians soaked the
bolts, nails, and other hardware packed into suicide bombs in rat poison. Ian
Fisher, For Israelis Wounded in Bomb Attacks, Recovery is a Battle, N.Y. Times,
July 8, 2002, at A6.
. David Rhode, Mideast
Turmoil: The Marketplace; Both Economies Drained. Palestinians' Is Worse, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30, 2002, at A13.
France and Britain
have each embargoed the sale of certain defense equipment to Israel.
European Countries Holding Up Sale of Defense
Equipment to Israel, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Apr. 9 2002. Other trade sanctions have also been under consideration.
Peter Finn, Germany,
in Protest, Suspends Arms Sales to Israel;
Decision May Foreshadow European Trade Sanctions as Criticism of West
Bank Incursions Mounts, Wash.
Post, Apr. 10, 2002 A15. Norway's
actions have caused particular consternation within Israel.
Gwen Ackerman, Government Slams Norwegian Supermarket Boycott, Jerusalem
Post, Apr. 5, 2002, at A5.
While one Norwegian supermarket chain has announced its decision to boycott
Israeli products, a second decided to mark Israeli products clearly, so that
consumers will know their origin and be able to decide whether or not to
purchase them. This has raised associations with the infamous yellow Star of
David that Jews were forced to wear during the Holocaust.
. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 4.
. In 1995, Israel's
GDP was comparable to that of Great Britain,
Sweden, and Finland.
Israel Yearbook and Almanac 2003 (Naftali
Greenwood, ed., 1998).Israel's
growth rate in 1994 to 1996 was among the highest in the world ‑‑
higher than that of the U.S.,
the United Kingdom,
Donald H. Straszheim, Israel's
Economy: A Briefing Book 4 (1998).
. Rhode, supra note 88.
Israel's GDP Fall Adds to
Economic Gloom, Fin. Times, Feb. 28,
2002, at 8. See also Stanley Reed & Neal Sandler, Israel:
The Economic Cost of War; Violence has Ended the Rapid
Growth of the 90's, Scaring off Investors and Eroding the Hard-Won Gains of
Economic Reform, Business Week Online, Apr.
23, 2002, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com. (stating
that Israeli real estate prices have plummeted thirty to fifty percent and that
hotel occupancy in Jerusalem is
about seven percent).
. See Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook -
India, supra note 44 ("More than a third of the population is too poor to
be able to afford an adequate diet"); Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - Bangladesh, supra note 44 (stating that
"[d]espite sustained domestic and international
efforts to improve economic and demographic prospects, Bangladesh remains one
of the world's poorest, most densely populated, and least developed
nations."); Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook
- Pakistan, supra note 44 ("Pakistan is a poor, heavily populated country,
suffering from internal political disputes, lack of foreign investment, and a
costly confrontation with neighboring India.").
. See Makovsky, supra note 46.
. For statistics on number of Israelis killed in acts of terrorism since
the Declaration of Principles, and specifically since September 2000, see Fatal
Terrorist Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (September
1993), at http://www.mfa.gov.il'mfa'go.asp'MFAH0cc40. For number of Israelis
killed during the Intifada, see Makovsky, supra note 46.
. Lamia Lauhoud, Israeli Arab Terrorism on the
Rise, Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, Aug. 28, 2002 (stating that "[s]ince the beginning of the year, some 27 Israeli Arabs have
been charged with helping Palestinian terrorists carry out attacks in Israel;
in 2001 there were 25 such cases, and in 2000 there were eight cases"), at
. Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange
(1. An Interview with EhudBarak), The New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15501.
. Id. Morris discusses the recent attempts to revise the history of the
failed Camp David summit, which began with an article by
New York Times writer Deborah Sontag. See Deborah Sontag, Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why it Failed, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1991, at A1. Sontag
questions the extent of Israel's
territorial offers at Camp David and challenges the
quality of the preparations leading to the summit. Id.
However, Sontag notes that, according to then
President Bill Clinton, "it was the refugee issue that did it in." Id.
. See supra notes 5 and 45.
. Though Jinnah himself was not a religious
man, his appeal for a separate Muslim state of Pakistan,
and his utter rejection of Muslim minority status in a Hindu-dominated India,
was nakedly sectarian. Partition, supra note 11, at xiv, 226; see also French,
supra note 11, at 223. Thus, "the circumstances surrounding Pakistan's
creation, including the raising of Muslim consciousness, provided a pool of
potent symbols on which Islamic groups could later draw." Islamic
Reassertion in Pakistan:
The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State 130 (Anita M. Weiss, ed.,
Syracuse University Press 1986) [hereinafter Islamic Laws].
. French, supra note 11, at 224. This appeal came during British-supervised
elections in late 1945 and early 1946, which became, in effect, a referendum on
at 223; see also Wolpert, supra note 17, at 305
(quoting Jinnah as stating: "If a Hindu empire
is achieved, it will mean the end of Islam in India,
and even in other Muslim countries."); Hodson,
supra note 13, at 227-231.
. Wolpert, supra note 17,
at 318; Hodson, supra note 13, at 227-331.
. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 5.
. Molly Moore & KamranKhan,
Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons;
Musharaf Says Arsenal Is Now Secure, Wash.
Post, Nov. 11, 2001, at
which began its nuclear program in 1974, first conducted underground tests in
1998. It has test-fired intermediate-range missiles and is believed to have 24
assembled warheads. Id.; Jack
Kelley, Terrorists Courted Nuclear Scientists, USA
Today, Nov. 12, 2001.
. Perhaps no less troubling, Pakistan
also considered, out of fear of an Indian strike on its nuclear sites, moving
some of its nuclear assets to Afghanistan
for safekeeping. Alan Sipress & Thomas E. Ricks, India,
Near Nuclear War in '99, Wash.
Post, May 15, 2002, at A1.
. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 1.
. Alan Sipress & Bradley Graham, U.S.
to Stop Militants, Wash. Post, May 31, 2002, at A1. See also Sam
Gardiner, It Doesn't Start in Kashmir and It Never Ends
Well, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2002,
at B1. (describing U.S.-developed scenarios of a
potential nuclear conflict between India
It has been projected that an attack on the Indian city of Bombay
could claim 850,000 victims. Sipress & Ricks,
supra note 107.
. Sipress & Graham, supra note 110.
. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Al Qaida May Have "Dirty" Nuclear Device, United
Press Int'l, Dec.
9, 2001. As a whole, "Pakistan's
community of nuclear scientists is know as 'proudly fundamentalist' and
anti-American." Id.; see
also John F. Burns, A Nation Challenged: Nuclear Fears; Pakistan Atom Experts
Held Amid Fear of Leaked Secrets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2001, at A1. Two of Pakistan's
nuclear scientists met directly with Osama Bin Laden,
to advise him on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Julian Borger,
Pakistan Nuclear Experts Advised Bin Laden, The Guardian, Dec. 13, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,617842,00.html.
. Moore & Khan, supra note 106. The broader implications of the
Pakistani nuclear program are also visible in North
Korea, which is believed to have received
"nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly material" from the
Musharaf government. Glenn Kessler,
Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny; Aid to Nuclear Arms Bid May Be Recent, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 2002, at A1.
. Certainly, the British seriously examined
alternatives to partition before agreeing to Pakistan's
creation. The most promising of these was the 1946 "Cabinet Mission
Plan," so named because it was developed by a three-man British cabinet
mission, following extensive discussions with Hindu and Muslim leaders. It
rejected the Pakistan
demand "in its full and complete form." Brown, supra note 19, at 155.
Instead, it envisioned a union covering the entire Indian subcontinent and
having central powers limited to foreign affairs, defense, communication, and
the powers necessary to raise the finances required for such functions. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 341-2. Other powers would be
vested in provinces, that would be free to join one of
three groups, designated "A, B and C." Id. at 342.
The Hindus would have had a majority in Group A, while the Muslims would have
had majorities in Groups B and C. Id. Initially, the Cabinet Mission Plan
gained the support of the Muslim League and the Hindu-dominated Congress Party,
though an intemperate speech by Jawarhalal Nehru is
generally credited with torpedoing its adoption. Id.
at 343; see also French, supra note 11, at 227. Whether or not the Cabinet
Mission Plan could have succeeded is a matter of some debate. Lord Louis
last Viceroy and the individual charged with presiding over the transfer of
power to Indian hands, lobbied hard for its adoption but in the end believed
that partition was the only possible course. Hodson,
supra note 13, at 225-231, 246-47. On the other hand, MaulanaAzad, a Muslim and former Congress president, thought
the British could have postponed partition and ultimately won acceptance of the
Cabinet Mission Plan. See MaulanaAzad,
The Mission Plan Was Practicable and Partition Should Have Been Postponed,
reprinted in Partition, supra note 11, at 66-72 and 85-87.
1973 constitution declared Islam to be the state religion, and required all
existing laws to be brought into conformity with Islam. Islamic Laws, supra
note 102, at 8-9. In 1977, the government banned drinking, gambling and nightclubs.
Id. at 9. There have also been restrictions on women's sports, and a dress code for women appearing on television. Id. at 134.
. These laws include the criminalization of
adultery and fornication as well as the consumption of intoxicants. Id. at 13.Pakistan also
enacted a series of Islamic punishments, including lashing, amputation, and
stoning. Id. at 13-15.
. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
Pakistan: A Country
Study, at xvii, tbl. A (Peter R.
Blood, ed., 6th ed. 1995).
America's Ordeal; Taliban More Isolated; One of Movement's Few Backers, Saudi
Arabia, Breaks Ties, Newsday, Sept. 26, 2001, at A7.
Starts Releasing Pakistanis Who "Joined Jihad"; Volunteers "Were
Deceived by the Taliban," Edmonton
J., Apr. 26, 2002, at B5.
. See, e.g., Arafat: "I Hope I Will be a Martyr," Mar. 29, 2002, CNN.com/world, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/29/arafat.reaction (last visited Aug. 16, 2002) ('I hope I will be a
martyr in the Holy Land.') Arafat has also talked of
'millions of martyrs' flowing to Palestine.
Id.; Recent Statements by Yasser Arafat, Memri.org,
Dec. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.gamla.org.il/english/article/2001/dec/memri2.htm (last visited Aug.
16, 2002) ('Oh brothers, there is a conspiracy to Judaize
Jerusalem, therefore I tell you, oh my comrades to this journey, you are
standing now at the frontline of battle in the midst of challenging, in
Jerusalem, you are blessed to be in this region.').
. Asser, supra note 63 ("It [Hamas] is involved in building schools and hospitals in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in helping the community in social and
. According to EyadSarraj,
the director of the GazaCommunityMentalHealthCenter
and a founder of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights:
"Today's children of Palestine
are preoccupied with death and sacrifice, and they dream of becoming
A Challenge We Must Accept: But Democracy Means Choosing for Ourselves, Wash.
Post, June 30, 2002, at B1.
In the month prior to a successful attack on March 5, Israeli security forces
intercepted 57 would-be Palestinian attacks, most of whom were suicide bombers.
Moore & Anderson, supra note 6.
. Specifically, Jinnah wanted Pakistan
to receive the entire Punjab and Bengal
provinces, each of which had large Hindu (and, in the case of the Punjab,
Sikh) minorities. Mountbatten asserted that if the logic of partition along
communal lines was accepted, it would have to be applied even at the province
level. Although Jinnah complained that he was being
offered a "moth-eaten" Pakistan,
he recognized that this was the price of partition and ultimately agreed to its
application to the Punjab and Bengal.
Hodson, supra note 13, at 227-31.
. See, e.g., supra note 5.
. John Ward Anderson, Palestinians Explore United Front: 12 Disparate
Groups Pursuing Secret Talks on Future of Conflict, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2002,
at A1 ("Hamas . . . has declined to clearly
renounce the goal of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state stretching from
the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.").
. In a speech given after the failure of the Camp David summit, then
Israeli Prime Minister EhudBarak
listed the elements that must be included in any Israel-Palestinian agreement:
1. Permanent, recognized borders for the State of Israel.
2. 80% of Israeli settlers within settlement blocs under Israeli
3. Security arrangements that will provide adequate safeguards from Israel
against external threats, mainly on our eastern fronts.
4. No right of return for Palestinian refugees into Israel proper.
5. A Jerusalem broader than it ever has been in our history, with a solid
Jewish majority for generations to come; a capital united under our sovereignty
and recognized by the entire world.
Prime Minister EhudBarak,
Excerpts from Remarks to the General Assembly of United Jewish Communities
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp'MFAH0iaa0.
. Caroline Glick, Column One: Palestine and the National Interest,
Jerusalem Post, May 21, 2002 ("From Yitzhak Rabin to YossiBeilin to Haim Ramon, the
Left has argued that the real reason to give the Palestinians control over
territory west of the Jordan and to grant them statehood is to prevent them
from overrunning Israel. It was, for instance, Rabin's repeated contention that
holding on to 3.5 million Arabs in the territories would make it impossible for
Israel to maintain its identity as a Jewish, democratic state.").
. Indeed, ArnonSoffer,
author of a study entitled Israel Demography 2000-2020: Danger and
Opportunities, argues that "implementing the Saudi separation plan along
the 1967 ceasefire lines is dangerous because it would leave Israel with such a
large Palestinian population that its Jewish character would be in
danger." Soffer proposes an even more radical
solution: "Israel must do more than withdraw from nearly all of the West
Bank and Gaza; it must also hand over to the Palestinians some of the
majority-Arab parts of pre-1967 Israel." ArnonSoffer, Demographics in the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute, Peacewatch, Mar. 22, 2002, at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. There is, however, an opposing view.
According to commentator Ben Wattenberg, "the demographic situation for
the Jews of Israel is not nearly as bleak as it is sometimes portrayed."
Ben J. Wattenberg, Parents of Arabia, Wall St. J. May 16, 2002. He points to
the total fertility rate of Jewish Israelis, which is the highest of any modern
country, and compares that to plunging fertility rates in the Arab world.
. Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations
After the Cold War 110-111 (1995).
. Israel Palestinian Violence is Likely to be a Thorny Issue in His
Upcoming Trip to Gain Arab Support for the War on Terrorism, L.A. Times, Mar.
9, 2002, at A4:
Kenneth M. Pollack, deputy director of national security studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations think tank and a former Persian Gulf expert at the
National Security Council, described the message Cheney is likely to hear from
his Arab hosts this way: "Our ability to help you on the war on terrorism
and our willingness to abide any military move against Iraq is going to be
guided by the status of the Israeli-Palestinian situation because popular
opinion would tolerate neither until Palestinians feel more secure." See
also Mideast Conflict Damaging U.S. Ties with Arab
States; Escalation Threatens Efforts to Oust Hussein, Baltimore Sun, Apr. 2, 2002, at A1.
. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 187.
. On August 8, 1942,
the Congress Party announced the launching of a "Quit India"
campaign. Brown, supra note 19, at 91, 124. The next day, the British threw
Gandhi and other Congress leaders into jail. Id. In the course of India's long
struggle for independence, Gandhi spent a total of 2,089 days in Indian jails.
Fischer, supra note 42, at 394. Gandhi was reviled by British leaders, with
Winston Churchill famously calling him a "half-naked fakir." Id. at 277.
. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 187, 196.
. See supra note 16.
. Shimon Peres, The New Middle East
3-4 (Henry Holt & Co., 1993).
. George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in The
Life of Reason 3, 284 (Constable & Co. Ltd., 1954).
Jeffrey Weiss is a practicing attorney with the firm of Weiss, Moy
& Harris in Washington, D.C. He holds a L.L.M. (International
and Comparative Law) from Georgetown University Law Center.
He writes, "I wish to express my gratitude to Leisha
Self, for her suggestions and comments."
This articles originally appeared in the Connecticut Journal of
International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2003.