Think-Israel

The Safavids in the 16th and 17th century had invited assistance from the English. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Qajar Shahs sought help from the Great Powers. The aid needed varied widely. Technical support in finance, manufacturing, merchandising transportation, education and defense was always vital. Over the centuries the same sequence would occur spasmodically. After long periods of royal unconcern,an energetic and nationalisticly minded shah would recognize the inadequacy of his native-born retainers. He could see clearly that they were unable to staff the upper and middle levels of political and economic endeavor; in short they were unable to further the building and running of a nation-state.

Much, perhaps too much, was expected of the foreign experts. Failure to meet all the needs set out by the government was disappointing, then resented and sometimes it was later magnified into feelings of betrayal of trust. Not infrequently these feelings were justified. The avarice of some concessionaires plundered some Iranian resources; the arrogance of some business agents demeaned some accomplished Iranians. At other times cultural and religious constraints made job completion difficult or even impossible. The invited experts were dismissed. Educated Iranians would damn the foreigners, and the level of xenophobia would increase another notch. After a time, agents of another Power would be invited in, beginning another cycle of hope, excessive expenditure, at best partial success and finally resentment. The rise of the Pahlavi dynasty in some ways repeats history, but with some new twists and several new players.

The Constitutional Crisis, the end of World War I (WWI), and the collapse of Lord Curzon's Anglo-Persian Agreement taken together, made the appearance of a nationalist leader, if not a new dynasty, almost inevitable.

The tools and mechanisms of governments, even those created by strongmen do not appear de novo. Even dictators are at first forced to make do with what is at hand. It is important, if we are to understand what drove Reza Shah and his son to various pro-Western policies, to look at the state of Iran as the first Pahlavi found it at the beginning of his rise to power in 1921.

The governmental structure perforce inherited by Reza Kahn has been termed a "court monarchy." Members of the ruler's coterie and prominent supporters would be given the titles and functions similar to those of cabinet officers in Western countries. Outside the capital, there was no systematic and continuous hierarchical structure of officialdom to apply or implement ministerial decisions or directives. Executive function in each ministry reached into the periphery to haphazard extents, dependent on the connections - tribal and clerical for the most part - of the cabinet officer.

For example, a finance minister might have no trouble collecting the full debt of taxes from subprovince A, while able to squeeze only minuscule sums from all of province B, depending on his or his assistants' relationship to the headman involved. Every ruler of Iran since the Safavids continued to pay the increasing price for deferring construction of the necessary minimal state bureaucracy; they all depended on foreign advisors and agencies to perform state functions. The advisors could and did use their fellow national commercial concessionaires as substitutes for the absent offical provincial networks. This opened wide the doorway to corruption. The onus of each baldfaced excess perpetrated by foreigners and their immunity from legal redress (they had extraterritorial status) were additional grievances held against the royal government.

Aside from the Gendarmarie, there were only two combat-capable military units at the time of Reza Kahn's revolt. The first, which he himself commanded, was the Persian Cossacks Brigade, and the other was the British-officered South Persia Rifles. Together these comprised about 14,000 effectives; they were scarcely capable of resisting a major enemy incursion. It was obviously necessary for Reza Kahn, as he acquired dictatorial powers, to increase the numbers of dependable troops and to develop a native officer corps.

Before WWI, Iran was a net exporter of foodstuffs - rice, wheat, dried fruits - and opium. For many years after the war's disruption, Iran was forced to import grain and other foods to feed its population. During the hundred odd years of Qajar rule, the administrative elite and some government supporting clerics had acquired extensive holdings of agricultural lands. For the most part they behaved as absentee landlords, the farms being worked by sharecroppers, who constituted the major portion of the agricultural workforce. Peasant owners of land frequently held only small plots, some of them smaller than the minimum area necessary for subsistence agriculture.

The 'ulama' (those clerics accorded by their fellows the title of mujtahid) had grown more powerful during the previous century. They developed a loosely autonomous organization, a letter-based communication system and a strong leadership. They enjoyed wide popular support as a result of their activities as administrators of religious trust funds, charities, and as local justices. They also officiated at ceremonial occasions such as births and marriages. They acquired the image of opponents of the upper classes and of the Shah and his involvement with foreign advisors and concessionaires. Their effective unity of interest with the middle class bazarri cemented their essentially anti-royalist position,especially in the towns. In the provinces, the Shi'ite clergy preached a form of populism, directed against the local magnates The inescapable response for the royal government was either to compromise with or disable the `ulama'. The choice for disabling was already a poor prospect indeed because Shi'ite Iranians had already been convinced that it was their religious obligation to accept the most learned of the `ulama' as their absolute spiritual guides. Little effort was required for the more political of the `ulama' to blur the boundary between the spiritual and the socio-economic requirements of the masses.The consequence was that, during all the Pahlevi years (1925-1978), there was the steady growth of clerical support by all the populace, except for the highest levels. And clerical support could be easily converted into opposition to the government.

Oil was discovered in Iran in 1908. In less than a year, the Ango-Iranian oil company was formed and by 1914 the British government had acquired a controlling interest. Of course, the company, as Reza Kahn found it in 1921, was firmly in control of the oil royalty schedules - which scarcely favored Iran. Anglo-Iranian's senior staff was without Iranian personnel. Extensive concessions for future exploration had already been granted to Anglo-Iranian. This would place the government at a severe disadvantage in future negotiations. The Soviets had already deviated from professed Leninist theory by attempts to extend their oil empire far south of Baku into the Iranian sub-Caspian provinces, but they were in retreat even as Reza Khan entered Teheran. If oil revenues were to fund Reza Kahn's planned nationalist modernization program there would have to be changes in Iran's arrangements with Anglo-Iranian.

Reza Khan Mir Pan brought an end to the period of "sturm und drang" in 1921. Following the Constitutional Revolution and WWI the Qajars were nominally still the heads of state. Reza Khan had risen from a simple cadet, at the turn of the century, to become commander of the Russian sponsored Persian Cossack division. The declared purpose of his coup d'etat was protest against the Soviet occupation of the Iranian Gilan province, an excuse that few believed. He led his troops into Teheran, forced the resignation of the government and assumed the title of "military commander." In actuality he soon became, effectively, a dictator, acquiring each necessary element of power in a stepwise sequence using the military as his base. In 1923, he forced the last Qajar Shah to appoint him prime minister, following which, the shah was persuaded to leave, permanently,for Europe. In 1925 the Majlis was induced to vote Reza Khan the crown as ShahandShah (King of Kings). He took the name of Reza Shah Pahlavi.[9]

Once again, as had often happened in the previous 300 years, under the drive of the extremely nationalistic and now openly anti-clerical Reza Shah, Iran was started on a program of administrative reform, the building of an economic infrastructure and an assertion of independence of foreign domination.

Early on, there was an effective declaration of war on the `ulama'. The Shah instituted a civil law code which was, perforce, interpreted by a secular judiciary. The role of Islamic law in day to day business was thereby diminished and the income of the `ulama' reduced. Many of the former areas of clerical jurisdiction were secularized. The state became involved in managing religious endowments. The Shah's creation of systems of primary and secondary schools were necessary not only to provide homegrown eventual recruits for the expanding bureaucracy but also were directed against the clerical education system - and, consequently, against the clerical power base. The most damaging confrontation between crown and clergy occurred in 1936 in the holy city of Qum. There the Shah's army violated the tomb of the eighth Imam's wife and killed dozens of religious protesters, who were demonstrating against the social reforms.

The Shah suppressed the power of tribal leaders, militarily or by arranged assassination. If anything the land problem worsened during his reign and the power of the Majlis was progressively curtailed. Several of his long term followers fell out of favor and were either executed or committed suicide. He favored the educated upper class, the source of his officer corps, while increasing the tax burden on the peasants. His cupidity, egocentricity and dictatorial nationalism provided a model which his son and successor not only followed but improved.

Reza Shah had very good reasons, both historical and from his own experience, to distrust the Russians and the British. During his reign, especially in the 1930s, there was growing French, but even more German, influence in Iranian affairs. German advisors and German traders became the predominant foreign influence. The Shah himself was believed by many to be a frank Nazi sympathizer. At the beginning of WWII, Iran declared its neutrality. In 1941, when German armies were deep in southern Russia, and the Afrika Corps was in Cyrenaica, the British and Russians invaded Iran. The Shah's army, the product of an estimated annual outlay of $150,000,000, could not put up anything more than a mere token resistance. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his twenty-two year old son, Mohammad Reza, He was exiled to South Africa, where he soon died.

At first Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was little more than a puppet of the occupying powers. Britain and Russia were joined as occupiers by the United States after Pearl Harbor. The strategic purpose was to supply the Soviets with war materiel overland through Iran. During the war years Iranian neutrality was converted first to allied cooperation. Then Iran joined the anti-nazi alliance in Sept 1943. As a result, Iran became one of the founding members of the United Nations. The upper classes, the privileged and educated, made a very good thing of the war, while the clerical, middle and peasant classes suffered from the rampant inflation and the shortage of food and imported goods. Freedom of press and other liberties, established during the occupation, allowed the re-emergence of non-government political parties. One of these was the Tudeh, the Iranian communist party, which called for social reform and tried to organize the Iranian industrial proletariat such as it was.

In Moslem Iran at that time, the mere presence of occupying troops furthered the development of xenophobia. Inevitably during the 5 years of the allied presence, "regrettable incidents" involving foreign soldiers and Iranian civilians occured to further the long-standing animosity to the aliens. "Necessary" restrictions on travel, fuel and all the other military essentials only added to the frustration of the unpriviledged portion of the population. Since the `ulama' suffered the same privations as the middle and lower classes, they helped stoke the fires of anti-foreign nationalism.

The great powers promises for postwar Iranian indepedence and economic support were quickly fulfilled by the British and the United States but not by the Russians. Even before the war was over, American oil companies were negotiating for concessions in Iran. Not to be outdone, the Russians requested a series of concessions in the northern provinces. A few months after the war's end, while British and American troops withdrew according to schedule, Soviet troops remained in the North west of Iran. The so-called Republic of Adzerbaijan was proclaimed under Soviet protection, as was a transitory Kurdish "Republic".

The Tudeh party both within the Majlis, and in the country at large, backed the Soviet demands for concessions. These demands were met temporarily. The Russians withdrew from Adzerbaijan under pressure from U.S., Britain and the United Nations. A new Majlis saw the emergence of the National Front party headed by Mohammad Mossadeq. He led the legislature in passing laws that limited the actual exploitation of newly proven oil resources to the government alone. Soon afterward, in 1947, the United States sent advisors and military aid for the training of the Iranian Army. The Shah's power grew slowly. He survived a Tudeh assassination plot, and immediately banned the Iranian Communist party.

By 1949, Iran could look forward to financing its development program from oil royalties, even though Britain and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company took the lion's share of the profits. Iranians began negotiations to bring profit sharing up to the 50-50 level. At the same time agitation for complete nationalization (effectively expropriation) of oil resources was growing at all levels of the Iranian populace.

In 1950, Mossadeq headed the Majlis committee that negotiated with Anglo-Iranian; the company kept refusing to meet the fifty-fifty share demand. A year later in 1951 the oil company came around to the equal share position, but by then it was too late - national sentiment for expropriation was too strong. Indeed when the Shah's prime minister, attempting to compromise, proposed that Iran accept a less than equal share, he was assassinated. Within the month the Shah gave in to the Majlis and popular pressure by making Mossadeq prime minister. Mossadeq was now unequivocally in favor of total state ownership of all Iranian natural resources. The oil industry was nationalized.

The response of the oil interests was swift. Anglo-Iranian shut down oil production and British personnel left the country. Soon thereafter Britain imposed an embargo on all Iranian oil. British banking froze Iranian assets. Iranian goods were embargoed from British Empire ports, Britain declared the oil expropriation illegal and appealed to the Hague International Court of Justice. Mossadeq defended Iran's case in person before the court and won. The Hague, ruling in favor of Iran and the nationalization.of its oil, did not stop England from maintaining multiple embargos. The Iranian economy continued to suffer.

The ground between the Shah and his prime minister widened. During the Adzerbaijan crisis, Mossadeq had apparently acted out of simple patriotism. This also seemed to be the case in 1946 when he helped reserve future oil development for the government. But now he seemed determined to take his own independent course to national leadership. He began by a direct attack on the Shah's center of power, demanding the right to appoint the war minister and thus control the armed forces. When the Shah refused, Mossadeq resigned. He brought his supporters into the streets of the cities. Several days of pro-Mossadeq street-rioting finally forced the Shah to reappoint him as head of government. Mossadeq then extorted dictatorial powers from the Majlis, but this last move lost him some significant parliamentary support. Mossadeq reacted by calling for a plebicite to grant him authority to dissolve the Majlis. Click here for more information on Mossadeq.

In June 1953 in the United States, the new Eisenhower foreign policy led by the strongly Anglophile Dulles brothers (John Foster Dulles at State and Allen Dulles at CIA) increasingly mirrored the views of the British Foreign Office. This applied particularly to Iran and the problem of prime minister Mossadeq, who had just disolved the Majlis, claiming overwhelming support from a plebiscite. The Shah of course was frightened of the possible usurper, already in an open power struggle with the throne. The Anglo-Iranian Oil company, the British foreign office and the American State Department saw a dangerous situation that demanded action: (1) Mossadeq's program of oil nationalization; (2) an increasingly likely Soviet influence in Iran as evidenced by Mossadeq's working with the Tudeh (Iranian Communist Party); and (3) Mossadeq's free use of street riots to enforce his demands.

The British suggestion that Mossadeq be overthrown by an American financed military coup was quickly accepted by Allen Dulles who dispatched Kermit Roosevelt, an alumnus of the wartime OSS and then head of the CIA Middle East division to make "arrangements" with the shah and his generals. Known as Operation Ajax, the Roosevelt methods included lavish corruption of police, officers, officials and some necessary preliminary "liquidation" of key Mossadeq supporters. In spite of the elaborate preparations, for 3 or 4 days in August the American-sponsored military response to the pro-Mossadeq rioting teetered on failure. The Shah fled the country. Fortunately for him, and unfortunatly for Iran, the American coup finally succeeded. Mohammad Reza Shah returned a few days later, expressing abject gratitude to Kermit Roosevelt for saving his crown.

Mossadeq was given only a 3 year sentence, presumably because of his advanced age and continued huge popularity. Most of his immediate supporters, including his Foreign Minister, were shot.

To many this episode marks the beginning of American presence in Iran and the concomitant partial subjection of the Iranian government to American economic and political influence. Both contributed to the growing anti-Americanism that would culminate in the 1979 revolution. (Of course this ignores the pervasive xenophobia generated in the previous centuries by Russian and British unconstrained exploitation and corruption of Iranian society.) It was American partipation in the 1941 coup that overthrew Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi, that initiated the substitution of the U.S. for Britain and led to the view of America as the Great Satan of the 1960-1970 Shi'ite Friday sermons.

The lesson of Operation Ajax was not lost on Shah Mohammad Reza. Grandiose plans for national development would have to be matched by concurrent changes to promote political stabilization. The United States was cooperative with an immediate 45 million dollar loan as interim aid, pending the restoration of oil income. This was assured by a series of concession agreements in the next year. Political stabilization from the Shah's viewpoint was furthered by the suppression of the National Front, but the party was not outlawed. The Tudeh was banned. The press was subjected to increasing censorship. Martial law, declared in 1953, was continued for four years. General Zahedi, the American choice for front man in Operation Ajax, was replaced as prime minister. Firm steps were taken to strengthen SAVAK - the secret police. SAVAK would be the Shah's most powerful - and most feared - tool for maintaining his regime.

The economic wounds left by Mossadeq's bid for power were deep and persistent, and were not healed by the new flood of oil money. Several large scale industrial projects were started, but did not lead to the expected improvement in the economy. Unemployment was widespread and government control of inflation was not effective. Subsurface political unrest continued. The Shah's government created a pair of synthetic official political parties to provide supposed representation. Their structure was rigged so that one would be in the majority while the minority party would play the role of opposition, the only one officially tolerated. No other parties were in the Majlis. These shams required fraudulent elections and, from the beginning, were ineffective even as "Potemkin parties."

By 1961, because of the still unstable political situation in Iran, the U.S. pressed for reform. The Shah's newly appointed prime minister responded by suspending the Majlis for six months and ruling by decree. As a concession to American pressure, Mossadeq's National Front party was allowed to resurface and a few allegedly corrupt officials were arrested. Some contraints on the press were loosened. Prime Minister Amini's most significant effort was a law governing land distribution. Amini's efforts met opposition from that portion of the Shi'ite clergy (`ulama') that was closely allied to the bazarri and middle class business communities. His efforts at land reform and to meet the budget deficit by containing military spending added to the number of his opponents among the higher officials and the educated elite. Finally, the loss of U.S.support led to his resignation.

The new government under the royal crony, Asadollah Alam, provided the platform from which the Shah would launch what he called his White Revolution. This consisted of 6 measures:

1. Land Reform
2. profit-sharing for industrial workers
3. nationalization of forests and pastureland
4. sale of government-owned factories to pay for land reform
5. Wider representation in supervisory councils
6. Literacy Corps as an alternative to military service

This radical program was submitted to a government-sponsored plebicite, which of course resulted in 99% approval. An additional calamity from the `ulama' viewpoint was granting the franchise to women.

During most of Mohammad Pahlevi's reign, the leading Shi'ia clergy, whatever their true feelings, had refrained from public condemnation of government policy. Until the mid-1960's, the highest levels of the `ulama', those that had attained the status of ayatollah, had been an uncomplaining and comfortable part of the national political elite. The Shah's progressively anti-religious policies and actions had displaced them from the inner circles of power. Even so, the majority of the upper levels of the urban clergy preferred the benefits of a politic silence to the risk of publically defending their religious principles.

A major exception was Ayatollah Ruhullah Musava Khomeini. During his 40 year long stay at Qum, he slowly progressed from student to ayatollah and finally to marja'-i taqlid[11]. Khomeini consistently adhered to the principle that it was permissible for only the highest of the clergy to openly protest royal acts and policies that were threats to Twelver Shi'ia. By 1963, the religious status of Qum had grown to a level even superior to Najgaf in Iraq. The leader of the Qum clergy was potentially the leader of all Shi'ites, worldwide. Click here for more information on Khomeini.

Khomeini's immediate predecessor as leader at Qum, Ayatollah Burujirdi, had been so restrained a critic of the regime that it was suspected that he had made explicit agreements with the Shah to cooperate. Khomeini had been Brujirdi's loyal accolyte for many years but as soon as he became leader, he proclaimed open resistence to the White Revolution. He very cleverly channeled clerical opposition to concentrate on the issue of women suffrage, avoiding the trap inherent in the existence of large landholders who just happened to be prominent clerics.

In the meantime, the practical deficiencies in the land reform program were becoming a basis for popular agitation. Both before and after reform, land ownership for the most part was controlled by a small number of families, many of them absentee landlords. The Shah's lack of real contact with the people was evident in this portion of the White Revolution program, which further favored the upper classes, particularly his intimates. The plight of the smallholders and the sharecroppers was for the most part ignored. Lapidus sums up the results of the totally misdirected program of agriculture and animal husbandry.

It took 16 years to combine and bring into play the necessary and sufficient anti-government forces to produce the revolution. While about 90% of Iranians were officially Shi'ites, significant numbers of them were only nominally so. These held a variety of ideologies - Socialist, Marxist, Maoist - all of them on paper revolutionary, but each group was ineffective and closely watched by the authorities. Of course, as good leftists, interparty cooperation was not possible.

In contrast, the Shi'ia clergy possessed the organization, communications, and nationwide local community esteem necessary for a revolutionary organization. However, in 1963, the `ulama' was deeply divided - the majority probably opposed to any anti-government action at all. A few felt that in the future, clerical influence on royal policy was necessary, but they were not very clear about how to accomplish this. Only a very few really agreed with Khomeini that the rule of the Shah was contrary to Islamic law. The problem for Khomeini and the clerical revolutionaries was two-fold: first to encourage the open expression of popular discontent so that the Shah's position became untenable; and second, to sequence successive events so that at the actual time of the revolt, the clerical-led revolutionaries would be in the majority of all the revolutionary forces. Under Khomeini's unswerving leadership, both objectives were met

The government side seemed to hold all the advantages. The warnings of various assassinations, attempted and accomplished, were not ignored, but at the beginning, the Shah was probably correct in assigning them to insignificant dissident groups or individual religious fanatics. In the 1960's his main attention was directed toward nation-building. Industrial growth and modernization with foreign aid and direction was impatiently pursued. But yearly the underground rumbles of discontent increased in volume. This led to some ill-considered moves toward a deliberate totalitarianism and imposition of the internal terror of SAVAK, the secret police.

The effect of each royal confrontation with Khomeini and the militant segment of the Twelver clergy was worsened by the drift of the Shah away from the Iranian middle and upper classes. His grandiose, almost egomaniacal, estimate of his own importance in the scheme of things led to outrageous, non-productive, lavish expenditures. As the LOC notes:

Successive ministries in the 50's and early 60's were unable to balance their budgets despite the huge oil revenues and outright multimillion dollar bonuses from the United States for further oil concessions. In the 70's, especially after the embargo following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, there was an incredible influx of oil money. For the most part this ended in two major sinks: the pockets of a small number of upper class intimates and favorites of the shah and the purchase of advanced techological military equipment in quantities far in excess of the armed forces capacity to assimilate them. Finally the Nixon Doctrine, calling for the removal of U.S. combat forces in the region, placed the burden of its immediate defence on Iran itself. The result was an even greater increase in the effectively undigestible mass of purchased armaments. The American attaches and advisors, overt and covert, remained. Their not always discreet presence continued to irritate the large majority of Iranians.

When, in January 1963, the Shah announced his White Revolution. Khomeini urged his colleagues in Qum to oppose the program. His position was adopted - and not just by the clerics. Qum was at the apex of the religious hierarchy and its non-clerical community was dependent on the Shrine (the tomb of the wife of the eigth Imam) and the madrassas (religious schools) for its economy. The Qum `ulama' was joined by the bazaaris.

When the Shah came to Qum, he was boycotted and ignored by all officials. He responded to the insult with a condemnation of the `ulama'.

At the end of the month, a rigged plebiscite overwhelmingly favored the White Revolution. Khomeini's riposte was a proposal that the government be removed and replaced by one that adhered to Islam. The Shah in turn sent a paratroop detachment to Qum. They savaged the madrassa and killed several students in the process.

Open insurrection was deferred until the annual time of mourning for Ali, when Khomeini in his public address compared the Shah to the Caliph Yazid, the enemy of the first Imam. Khomeini was arrested. Street demonstrations in Qum, Tehran and other major cities exploded in response. These were suppresed after 6 days of bloody fighting; peasants and middle class Iranians fought against troops and tanks. This uprising is known as 15 Khordad[12], the day it started, a day since then regarded as the true start of the revolution. After a short prison stay followed by almost a year of house arrest, Khomeini was released. He announced continuation of the 15 Khordad movement and was now supported by all his clerical colleagues in their declarations on the movement's first anniversary.

Khomeini's response to the Shah's Sept 1964 Status of Forces agreement with the United States - which gave Iranian-based American personnel a form of extraterritorial status - was to denounce it as a surrender of sovreignty. Supporters of the agreement in the Majlis were called traitors. His very vocal and widely broadcast opposition brought about his arrest. This time he was banished to Turkey.

After the year Khomeini spent in Turkey, the Shah made a fundamental error, one that was critical for the future of the revolution. He had Khomeini transferred to the holy city of An Najaf in Iraq, where the tomb of the first Imam, Ali, is located. There, in the premier Shi'ite madrassa outside of Iran, Khomeini resumed teaching. His book "Vilayat-i Faqih ya Hukmat-i Islami" is a version of his 1970 lectures on the theory of Islamic government. Not only is a Shah illegal but the rulership can only be that of an Allah-inspired Fiqih (a competent jurisconsult) or a group of 3 or 5 of them.

Khomeini steadfastly resisted efforts by the Iraqis to use him in their designs against Iran. He made full use of the semi-clandestine communication lines linking the Shi'ia communities around the world, including of course Qum and the other Iranian cities. His fatwas and proclamations were smuggled into Iran.

Each of his classes were attended by hundreds of students. An Najaf became more than a pilgimage site; it was the nodal point of the growing future staff and leaders of the revolution. Numbers of senior clerics were among those who visited him in Najaf. Others had been his classmates or students during his many years at Qum. Many were to return to underground activities while others cultivated anti-Shah activities in both the West and in the wider Moslem world. Additional recruits were gathered from his new students who came from all the Middle Eastern Shi'ia communities.

Khomeini encountered strong opposition from those of the `ulama' who denied his concept of a political role for the clergy. He condemned their position as illegal in Islamic law, long before the start of the revolution itself. His influence in the Moslem world and the Post-Colonial world in general was increasingly felt.

Khomeini did not limit himself to teaching, writing and preaching. One of his former students, Ali Akbar Hashami Rafsanjani (a future president of the Iranian Republic), was a member of the four man hit team that was given the mission of assassinating the Iranian prime minister, Hasan Ali Mansur. One of the killers was executed. Rafsanjani was released after a few months in jail. He remained a part of the Islamic underground, an organizer of many of the mass demonstrations that culminated in the revolution of 1979.[13]

Khomeini remained in immediate contact with events in Iran and continued to condemn the actions of the Shah and his supporters. Prudently, none of his associates was specifically designated as his Iranian representative, but the Shi'ia communities understood that Ayatollahs such as Mutahhari, Beheshti and Mantezzari on occasion would speak for him.

Over the years, despite increasing Iraqi government discomfort, Khomeini issued declarations condemning everything from the Shah's festival of 2500 years of Iranian monarchy to Israel's self defence during the Six Day War. His anti-Israel position - typical of Twelver Shi'ite clerics - led to a novel interpretation of Islamic law. Hamid Algar's biography notes

There were anti-Shah forces working independently of Khomeini during the 70's including those influenced by Ali Shari'ati. His open mixture of Marxism and Islamic theory appealed to many of the more intellecual Iranians, especially students. Some of them later played a significant role in the actual revolt. Some of them even survived to become pillars of the clerical regime.

The anniversary of 15 Khordad continued to be a special time for Islamic student demonstrations. The commemorative marches in Qum in 1975 were supported for the first time by large numbers of the local general population. Their suppression after 3 days reguired Army and Air force intervention, resulting in numerous fatalities.

During this period, the effort of the Shah and his successive ministers was to construct an organization (now preferably a single party) that would be loyal and gain the support of the non-clerical educated classes plus the technocratic elite. The efforts to build top-down support was not very successful. A final attempt to create broad support was made when the Shah decreed a single party - the Rastakhiz - to which all Iranian citizens were to belong (Shevlin, 1999). Those who refused were told they could have their passports. Thousands of the upper and middle class left for overseas. Individuals in open opposition to the regime, both at home and abroad, increasingly came to the attention of SAVAK.[14]

The prelude to the year of revolution, 1978, was the murder of Hajj Sayid Mustafa Khomeini, the Ayatollah's oldest son (in An Najaf, Iraq, in October, 1977). Most Iranians believed that the culprit was SAVAK and, therefore, the Shah was guilty. Marches, protests and violent demonstrations were held in cities nationwide and these continued for several days. The assassination was regarded as a turning point in the struggle, even by Khomeini himself. He is quoted in Hamid Algar's biography as considering it "...one of the hidden favors of God..."

In the late 70's the Iranian economy was overheated, particularly in areas stimulated by the rapid military build-up. This only profited some relatively few in the upper classes. Government attempts to control the economy resulted in a general increase in unemployment and economic hardship for the middle and bazaari classes - which added significantly to the anti-government discontent.

1978 began with an ill-considered attempt to discredit Khomeini. An article in the semi-official journal Ittla'at proclaimed him to be not only a traitor but an agent of foreign powers. The people of Qum responded with violent protests which were repressed by security forces with many casualties and a reported 100 fatalities. The 40th day following the Qum massacre was marked by even bloodier incidents in many of the cities and particularly in Tabriz.

The cycle of violent protest met in turn by ruthless suppression increased to a crescendo on Sept 9, (Black Friday} when following a declaration of martial law, a massive protest was put down at the expense of a reputed 2000 fatalities in Teheran's Jaleh square.[15]

At this point, for radicals, clergy, middle class, and even many of the military, it became certain that the end could only come with the departure of the Shah.

In a futile attempt to undercut Khomeini's political power, the government induced the Iraqis to expel him. He made several unsucessful attempts to find a new base. Khomeini's final choice of refuge, France, was almost a last resort, but the use he made of his new home revealed his outstanding skill as a general staff chief of the revolution and a peerless propagandist. A wealthy Shi'ite adherent set up a headquarters for him at Neauphle-le-Chateau, close to Paris. With the aid of the enthusiastic media, always eager for front page news, he rapidly became a center of world-wide attention. Communications to Iran from France, including direct telephone was much easier. As was the case in Najaf, visitors were numerous and included leaders of groups such as the National Front, which was once again active. But now they were committed to an Islamic government.

He rapidly assembled a staff of associates and proceded to effectively direct events in Iran. It is likely that he directed some non-Islamic groups in calling the strikes which became more numerous in the fall of 1978. By November, strikes had closed down most private sector industries and the strikers were openly demanding abdication of the Shah.

The Shah, in desperation, appointed his Imperial Guard Commander as Prime Minister. He attempted to placate resistance by broadcast pleas for order, a series of symbolic arrests of more than 100 officials including a former SAVAK chief, and finally, the release of a large number of political prisoners. He tried to negotiate with moderate groups such as the National Front, but was unsuccessful, until, in December, a new leader, Shapour Bakhtiar, emerged. Bakhtiar agreed to form a new government but only on condition that the Shah agree to take what was termed "a vacation" outside of Iran.

The Bakhtiar cabinet took office on Jan 3, 1979. The Shah departed Iran on the 16th. On February 1. Khomeini returned from Paris to be greeted by cheering millions in Tehran. There he would lead phase 2 of the revolution in person.

By Feb 5, Khomeini was able proclaim his provisional goverment. It was headed by Mehdi Bazargan. The "Imam's committee" was the first channel for disseminating Khomeini's orders. Progress in setting up local komitehs in the larger cities was rapid. These functioned as revolutionary communes. They undertook functions that were similar to those of the workers and soldiers soviets in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Also in February several of Khomeini's former students organized the Islamic Republican Party(IRP).[16] At the same time Khomeini began his campaign to win over the military.

The loyalty of the rank and file to Bakhtiar and the Shah was problematic even well before the Ayatollah's arrival. The attempt to gain the adherence of the officers to the Islamic Republican cause was in fact aided by the U.S. ambassador, who arranged contacts between Khomeini supporters and senior officers. The ambassador was of course aware that Jimmy Carter's special envoy, General Huyser, had already concluded that the Shah's case was hopeless - this even before Khomeini's return.

It was the Iranian Air Force that undermined the apparent resistence of the military to Khomeini. A mutiny at an airbase near Tehran was followed by distribution of arms to demonstrators in the vicinity. Armed, the opposition could then ignore the government curfew. Finally, a meeting of military commanders on Feb 11 declared that the armed forces would be neutral in any conflict between the protesters and the government. Prime Mininster Bakhtiar, along with some remaining open Pahlahvi supporters, fled the country.

Remarkably, Khomeini accomplished in 1 year what Lenin needed 4 years to attain. By the end of 1979, Khomeini was in as complete control of Iran as Lenin was in the Russia of the 1920s New Economic Policy period. A referendum with only the single choice of establishing an Islamic republic (more than 98% voted yes) was followed the next day by Khomeini's call for a draft constitution. This first version was comparatively liberal but as Neil Shevlin in his doctor of Laws dissertation shows:

In effect, the conservative elements in revising the draft constitution made a preemptive strike against potential reformist power.

The resultant clerically dominated Assembly of Experts (more than 2/3 of its membership was of the conservative `ulema') produced a Constitution for Iran which in its Article 5 mandated the rule of a single faqih. (The faqih is the competent jurisprudent who in Khomeini's theory of Islamic government was the only possible legitimate ruler of an Islamic state.) The constitution went on to specify the powers of the faqih (art.110) to appoint and remove heads of the armed forces and most judicial officials, as well as 6 of the 12 members of the Guardianship Council. The Council was, debatably, the only real check on his rule. Significantly, there was no provision in the Constitution for removal of the faqih. The legislative role of the Majlis was subordinated to the Guardians, who were to review all of its acts for conformity with Shari'a. The President and Prime Minister were granted relatively minor powers; it would be impossible for either to effectively oppose the wishes of the entrenched clergy.

During 1979 after the Ayatollah's return, there were really two governments simultaneously operative in the country. There was the provisional government headed by Prime Minister Mahdi Bazargan, primarily concerned with keeping day to day affairs going toward "normalization." Then there was the Council of the Islamic Revolution, acting as the executive of the IRP (Islamic Republican Party) which was much more concerned with consolidating the revolution as an Islamic one, and punishing members of the former regime. The revolutionary courts were in action early, passing death sentences on more than 500 individuals by November. The list of executions included former Pahlahvi prime minister, Hoveyda.

By mid-year Khomeini had established the paramilitary Pasdaran made up of volunteers who were charged with guardianship of the Revolution; it was originally intended as insurance against a still incompletely committed military. Its growing importance was indicated by the new Constitution explicitly naming Khomeini as its commander.

In October, when the full significance of the new constitutional provisions was fully realized, Shahariatmadri's opposition party (IPRP) organized protest demonstrations. They got as far as taking control of the Tabriz radio station. The possibility of a more popular based, less Islamic counterrevolution collapsed when Shahariatmadari waffled in supporting the protesters who were then overwhelmed by pro-Khomeini counterprotesters. This was so destructive that the IPRP dissolved itself at the end of the year

It is not clear whether the November marches in protest of the Shah's taking sanctuary in the United States and also of Bazargan's meeting with Zbigniew Brezinski were Khomeini-directed or not. However 3 days later he was certainly approving of those who occupied the U.S. Embassy taking 63 hostages. They claimed to be "students of the Imam's line." (How reminiscent of Mao Tse Tung!) At first the official government line was that the students were acting independently. The Ayatollah's praise of the students as perpetrators of a "second more important revolution" formally kept to that position, but deceived no one but the diplomats. In the face of the Imam's real position, Prime Minister Bazargan resigned. His functions were assumed by his antagonist, the Revolutionary Council. This began the 444 day hostage crisis that Khomeini used intermittently in maneuverings to obtain various advantages including arms and concessions from America.

A second referrendum in December 1979 approved the revised Constitution by once again a majority of yeas (in excess of 98%). By this time it was clear that the forces behind Khomeini's Revolutionary Council - particularly their ability to bring the people out into the street - were in control. This mob-on-demand power coupled with the effectively unlimited lifetime power bestowed on him by the new Constitution established Khomeini as the ruler of a theocratic dictatorship in whose grip Iran would remain for the forseeable future.

None of the events of 1980 inhibited the growth of Khomeini's power or that of the Revolutionary Council. The new president, Bani Sadr, faced the same sort of opposition to his programs as had Bazargan. For example, the president's attempts to reduce the size of the Pasdaran were opposed by Rafsanjani, who was now speaker of the newly elected Majlis. A Revolutionary Council choice for prime minister, Mohammad Rajai, was forced upon Bani Sadr and for a while his further resistance to the Council prevented completion of the cabinet. Khomeni had the power to resolve the issue with a simple statement. He remained silent.

Of course, in the Majlis, the Iranian Revolutionary party (IRP) had a clear majority. Whether due to fraud or intimmidation, several leftist former support groups were without Majlis seats at all - e.g., the Mojahedin and Fayadan - who were already disillusioned as to the real objectives of Khomeini and his faction. The Mojahedin would soon be forced underground or overseas as the Ayatollah tightened the reins.

The socialist and radical forces continued to cooperate with the clerics for only a short time. As early as mid 1979, many on the left perceived that their dream of a "true" revolution was rapidly receding in the face of the growing consolidation of power of the IRP. Not only had the new constitution conferred almost limitless power on the government that confronted the would-be left revolutionaries, but Khomeini had already established the system of his personnal representative in each of the 60-odd administrative districts, representatives who reported directly to him and to him only. Also at the government's disposal, in fact a part of it, was the Pasdaran, the para-military force, that was rapidly being furnished heavy equipment including armor.

The spearhead of any counter-government revolt would have to be the Mojahedin. Some of the leadership had gone underground in 1979, but by 1981 the party could count on more than 100,000 supporters. Of the other pre-revolutionary parties, fragments of the Fadayan and the Paykar could be counted on, but the Soviet sponsored Tudeh and a minor part of the Fadayan declared support for the clerical government.

The leftist threat was not the only one faced by the government. The Kurds in the westen provinces begun a revolt in 1979 and stubornly persisted during the leftist revolt and the Iran-Iraq war. The left, partially because of Marxist theory, could not bring itself to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist movement. The Kurds finally were forced out of Iran into northern Iraq by Army and Pasdaran forces.

President Bani Sadr's long power struggle with the IRP ended in his dismissal in June 1981. He was impeached, went into hiding and later escaped to France. At this point the Mojahedin rebellion flared, marked by a series of terrorist attacks. Assassination of key officials was topped by the bombing of IRP headquarters. At least 70 were killed, including the secretary-general of the party, Ayatollah Behesti, and the head of the Supreme Court. Other bombings killed the new president, Rajai, and former Khomeini student, Ayatollah Bahonar. The government's response was direct, merciless and effective.

Iran was ill-prepared for Saddam Hussein's autumn 1980 invasion, which started the nearly 8 year Iran-Iraq war. Broad staff changes were too recent to effect needed changes at lower echelons of command. The supply services in particular were functionally deficient. Saddam's attempt to re-implement Israeli airforce tactics, which had clinched the Six Day War, did not succeed in destroying the Iranian Airforce. His ground offensive was more successful, occupying large stretches of western Iran and surrounding but not completely capturing the refinery city of Abadan; the place was destroyed in the process of its defense.

Iran was saved from immediate defeat by the Pasdaran and by the recall of imprisoned air force and army officers, released in spite of their suspected persistent loyalty to the Shah. It is also likely that the Iraqis were disappointed in their expectation of support by ethnic Arabs in Iran's western provinces.

Blitzkriegs that fizzle out are frequently followed by wars of attrition. By the end of 1980, the Iranians had stopped the Iraqi advance. The opposing forces were engaged in the bloodiest form of military conflict, trench warfare. It took nearly a year for Iran to learn how to integrate the raw manpower of the Pasdaran with the only somewhat more competent military. Then Iran gained the initiative and began to force an Iraqi retreat, but only by sacrificing tens of thousands of Basij[17] volunteers in each major attack. Many of these, kowing in advance of their doom but rejoicing in the prospect of martyrdom, wore their own burial shrouds when attacking fortified Iraqi positions.

In 1982 when Iran entered Iraqi territory and besieged the port of Basra, the Iranian command, now predominantly clerical, continued the use of human suicide waves as the major weapon against Iraqi artillery - even though ample Iranian artillery was within range to attack the fortifications. Neither side used anything beyond the most primitive armored corps tactics; tanks were dug in and used as artillery and thus became sitting ducks. Throughout the war Iran suffered most significantly from supply problems, particularly spare parts for its initially superior air force.

From 1982 to 1986 the war was effectively a stalemate. Repeated attempts by Saddam Hussein to reach a cease fire were rejected, most firmly and persistently, by Khomeini.

Iraq was dependent on arms from the Soviets and France, the latter providing the Mirage fighters and missles used against Persian Gulf shipping. The United States see-sawed in its support first of Iran (providing arms as a consequence of the hostage episode) but later leaning toward Iraq, in some naive diplomatic effort to maintain a status quo ante. A particular American fear seemed to be that if Basra finally fell there was then a possible "Anschluss" of predominantly Shi'ia southern Iraq with Iran.

Great power concern about the war grew intense when the targets of both Iraq and Iran in the smoldering "tanker war" widened to include ships of all nationalities, but especially those of Kuwait. Finally a Soviet tanker and a United States destoyer were damaged in the Persian Gulf. Mounting international pressure for a ceasefire convinced all except Khomeini that hostilities must end. It is said that he was finally convinced by the combined urgings of Khamenei and Rasfanjani. The war had cost between 750,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities The numbers of wounded incapacitated were likely several times larger.

Elimination of opposition parties was a major objective of the theocratic government in its first years. The Mojahedin episode rid the Khomeini faction of most of its non-clerical opposition. There remained the Soviet-backed Tudeh party. Iran-Russian tension led to the proscription of Tudeh. Its leader, in a show trial, confessed to "espionage, deceit, and treason." Rumored Soviet intervention on behalf of the party higher ups saved them from the excution that was meted out to the proles. Only Bazargan's IMF party remained, permitted a docile activity by the clerical hierarchy

Once Iran had assumed the initiative in the Iraqi war, the internal politics of the regime took front and center and assumed an evermore byzantine complexity. Any mutually agreed upon goal almost immediately produced splits in the various groups within the regime. For example there was the major objective of the revolution to export itself to other countries, both Moslem and even third world non-Moslem states. The chaos of the 1979 Iranian economy made proposals for material/personnel support for such adventures impractical.

The majority of the regime somewhat naively opted for the position that since Iran had made its revolution on its own, why could other states not do the same? Nothing more than moral support and anti-establishment propaganda should be offered.

There were however, dedicated followers of Khomeini's doctrine who said that the spread of revolution was not only inevitable but should be actively aided. In the first half of 1979, Mohammad Montazeri and Mehdi Hashemi, two Qum classmates of the future President Khatami, formed Satja, an organization devoted to active export of the revolution beyond the borders of Iran. Their contacts and activities in other Muslim countries rapidly came in conflict with Iranian Foreign Ministry policy and Satja was soon forcibly disbanded.

Undaunted,Montazeri and Hashemi continued their struggle to spread the revolution. They joined the Pasdaran militia and set up a Liberation Movements Office within its extensive organization. Mohammad Montazeri was killed in the bombing of the Iranian Revolutionary Party headquarters in 1981, leaving Hashemi as sole leader of the Liberation Movement. Hashemi continued to propagate revolution in some countries without regard to the Foreign ministry programs for normalization of relations with the very same nations. It was only in 1984 that the Pasdaran submitted in the internicene struggle between its Liberation Office and the foreign ministry. Liberation Movements was made a part of the ministry.

Hashemi resigned and went to Qum, and for a while was supported by Montazeri's father, Ayatolla Husain Ali Montazeri,(Khomeini's designated successor). Hashemi exploited his knack for his peculiar form of political parasitization by setting up, within the Ayatollah's organization, an Office for Global Revolution. From this semi-cover he pursued his goal of exporting revolution outside of Iran. This time, within a year, the Foreign Ministry not only closed the Office, but procured his trial and execution for the crime of "deviating from Islam."[18] Ayatollah Montazeri's standing was predictably injured.

Hizbollah was not built to export revolution. It was a particularly anti-Israel, anti-Semitic tool, reflecting Khomeini's extreme hatred of Jews. It started up in June 1982, in the Lebanon, and has grown into a world wide subversive organization [Lipkin 2003, "Hizbollah Internationsl", http://think-israel.org/lipkin.hizbollah.html] Hizbollah, based in Syria and Lebanon, is a most serious threat to Israel. It is almost certain that it is under the orders of the Iranian Supreme Leader, just as the Hizbollah leader Nasrallah declared while Khomeini was alive. Officially, the U.S. Government considers Hizbollah to be a terrorist organization, but usually urges Israeli restraint when its airforce responds to Hizbollah missile attacks on Israel's northern towns.

Once the Iran-Iraqi war entered its stalemate stage, sufficient official attention could be diverted to the problem of Khomeini's successor. The Ayatollah already had had one heart attack and his designated successor, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, openly spoke of his positions on a variety of subjects that made many conservative clerics uncomfortable. Specifically, his pronouncements were close to those of the dissident clergy of Shariatmadari's ilk. Montazeri believed that the Faqih should not be a single all-powerful leader but, rather, one who, in making important decisions, consults with experts and the learned to ensure that his decisions are beneficial to society as a whole and that they do not incur irreparable damage to the social fabric of Muslim nations.

The Majlis speaker, Rafsanjani and the then President Khamenei, used this as an opening wedge to undermine Montazeri with Khomeini. At first Montazeri's status was reduced to "conditional" successor, and later he was debarred completely by a letter from the Supreme Leader which did not nominate a replacement. However, Montaseri remained a prominent and much admired cleric. Click here for English translation of the letter of dismissal.

That was a continuing problem for Khamenei, whose major source of power along with Rafsanjani was their long time association with the Supreme Leader, the Faqih. They were very well aware that under the 1979 constitution, at his death, Khomeini's office would be filled by the Assembly of Experts. The assembly would elect a Leadership Council of 3 or 5 faqihs, chosen for their Islamic legal eminence. Montazeri was sure to be a Leadership member. Their own Islamic learning was nowhere in that ballpark. While Khomeini lived, some constitutional changes had to be made.

The Constitution, was revised. The Reconsideration Council, packed with adherents of the Khomeini line, changed the rules for the succession to the office of Faqih. The new version of Art. 111, effectively made Khaminei a shoo-in. His deficiencies as a scholar was adjusted for by some additional new specifications. In particular Art 109 changed the scholarly requirements for the Faqih. He no longer had to be a marja i-taqlid (an expositor of Islamic law whose decisions should be followed without question). Not even the formal support of the majority of the people was required - they would not have to vote yes in a rigged poll. He only had to be "well-informed about fiqh or socio-political problems" and of course he had to be "just and pious."

To be on the safe side, the Reconsideration Council wss induced to augment the powers of the Fiqh even beyond those held by Khomeini himself. For example,

Khamenei became the new Faqih after Khomeini's death in 1989. A yes outcome of the national referendum established the new constitution. The power of the Supreme Leader to determine the internal fate of Iran and Iranians was set in constitutional concrete that makes prospects for a non-violent change in government unlikely. Click here for more information on the Ayatollah Khamenei.

In the 16 years since Khomeini's death, the power structure has become even more rigid; the Supreme Leader can exercise total power and his image is protected by layers of insulation; and the onus of failures is placed on disposable underlings.

A prudent Khamenei has maintained a relative silence on most matters. He has little reason to do otherwise. For example, he has, in President Khatami, what is effectively a front man. Khatami's surprise election and reelection to a second four year term was in many ways a gift to the "hardliners" who back Khamenei. Where else would you find a spokesman who responds with promises to molify protesting radicals and revisionists, promises you, Khamenei, can allow to be fullfiled, ignored or openly rejected with complete impunity?

Khatami, in order to remain in the Presidency, had to publicly acknowledge Khamanei as his leader. Even Montazeri, in a letter congratulating the new President, seemed unaware of the poor prospects for promoting significant reformist change. Khatami's undeniable abilities should not blind one to the weakness of his political position. Foreign leaders and diplomats, who should know the real score, attach weight to his positive pronouncements and hope in his leadership.

In a way, the failure to rig Majlis elections prior to the most recent one was also of unanticipated benefit to the conservatives. For eight years a liberal majority was unable to dent the rigid front of the Khananei supporters. How encouraging this must have been for the provincial conservatives, the Pasdaran and the Basij. Majlis laws that did not please the true rulers, were declared illegal by the Guardianship Council without even bothering the Faqih.

The economy and social structure remain chaotic. A change since Khomeini's death is that the division between reformist and conservative clerics in the `ulama' has become deeper with the years of Khamenei's rule. The reformer program now includes open demands for land reform, a reform that is widely acknowledged to adversely effect landowners who are members of the higher clergy. The student protests which have been put down violently, largely by the Basij, are directed against the widespread corruption (also said to involve elite members of the conservative clergy}. They demand that government corrects the persistent unemployment, inflation and the bungling management of the oil resources.[19]

The reformers point to beginning attempts to develop the incredibly large natural gas fields. The process has begun what looks like a repeat of an old story. Iranian technical incapacity has been the pretext for a contract with a Japanese consortium to manage natural gas development. It is clear that the mismanaged agricultural sector has been unable to adequately feed the growing Iranian populace (grain which used to be an export is now imported in large quantities) and in general, the non-oil economy seems to be going nowhere. In a modern state in which women vote, the governmental anti-feminist stance should bring most younger women and girls flocking to the reformist ranks. The Orwellian newspeak-like praises of the advantages of an Islamic state for women mouthed by the old men of the Khamanei faction seem unconvincing.

The protesters surfaced openly in the summer of 1999 and have re-erupted yearly, only to be put down by force with significant numbers of casualties. To date the reformers have failed to render their protests effective. One theory attributes their inability to obtain results to a failure of leadership, specifically by Khatami. An alternate explanation is Khatami's constitutionally imposed political impotence - one maintained at the pleasure of the Faqih.

In addition, the hard liners have reacted by accusing the United States of fomenting the protests, once again raising the bogey-man of nefarious foreign influence. In the same vein they have complained to the world about the effects of Radio Free Europe's Middle Eastern Service, which frankly is not impartial, but certainly is not openly subversive

Within Iran, Khamenei's minions have closed down opposition newspapers and harassed reporters, recalling the best Pahlavi tradition, imprisoning some, and using torture in selected cases. The recent case (2003) in which the government was finally compelled to admit to the murder of a Canadian/Iranian photographer underlines the risks of journalism in Iran. After her arrest, which was just for photographing the outside of Ervin prison, she was imprisoned for weeks. Her interrogation was forceful enough to require her hospitalization. She died of her wounds the next day.

What looks like a slight failure of will (not power) is Khamenei's retreat from the plan to try Ayatollah Montazeri (now the sole legitimate marja e-taqlid in Iran) for treason. Montazeri was recently released from house arrest and immediately voiced open criticism of the regime. The general opposition has grown so that even Khomeini's grandson has taken the reformist tack and is joined by many former militants.

The most recent Majlis elections mark the end of the almost riskless, 8 year experiment that tolerated a reformist parliamentary majority which had power only if exercised in clerically approved directions. In preparation for the most recent elections, the Guardianship council went along with the disqualification for election of more than 2000 candidates out of the total 11,000 applicants. Included in the list of the judicially-excluded were about 100 current Majlis members who normally would be valid candidates for another term. President Khatamai protested loudly and often. Khamenei, in the end, did not interfere and the exclusion remained in effect. To draw world attention to this exercise of bald power, the reformist leadership proclaimed a boycott of the election, hoping that a low turn-out at the polls in Feb 2004 would indicate their popular support. Whatever the record low voter totals indicated, it certainly resulted in a overwhelmingly conservative majority in the new Majlis. Khatami's successor in the presidency will be separately elected early next year. With this, the hard liners are in control of all aspects of government.

Coincidently, Feb 2004 was the 25th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In a Special Policy Forum Report to celebrate this event, Shaul Bakhash,(an authority on Iran and its politics, and a professor at George Mason University) noted the firm hold of the regime on the country

Purely from the view of "Welt-Politik," Iran is the most significant political entity between Constantinople and Bombay. A changed American policy which acommodates to Iranian interests and influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the Persian Gulf, improbable and dangerous as it may seem, is worth examining.

Other Middle Eastern Islamic States (Egypt excepted) are recent national artefacts, the creation of abitrary map drawing on the remains of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI. The British parcelled out some largely empty wastelands as rewards for wartime Arab retainers. They supported their nominal kingships but retained actual political and economic control. Before WWII, the French tended to exercise more direct control of their more populous Great War prizes, Syria and Lebanon.

In contrast, Iran boasts a multi-millenial history, a largely indigenous non-Arab, Shi'ite population that has as its first language, Farsi, a tongue that is only less ancient than the country itself. Its troubled history has left a legacy of two major obstacles that stand in the way of a restructured Iranian-American relationship. The first is xenophobia, at first due to British and Russian activities, but since the 2nd Pahlavi, heaped onto American shoulders. The second is the product of the Khomeini-led 1979 revolution: a uniquely Islamic government that exaggerates both the insulation and untrammeled power of the Supreme Leader, Khamenai, even beyond the dictates of Khommeini's Hukumat -i Islami.

At this writing (May 2004) the United States cannot reasonably support an immediate change in the government of Iran. It is true that both doctrinal and political differences exist between the Shi'ia of Iraqi Najuf and those of Qum. But the United States cannot ignore the influence that the Iranian Shi'ia establishment - the conservatives now in power - could exercise on Ayatollah Sistani, the foremost of the Iraqi Shi'ia leaders.

The major internal opposition - the counterrevolutionary reformist leaders who might replace the Khamenei government in Iran - would have their own overfull plate of domestic difficulties. They could scarcely be counted on to effectively continue any sub-rosa pro-U.S. influence on Sistani. Thus, American hopes for relative restraint on Iraqi Shi'ite opposition would make a near term, e.g., within the year, Iranian counterrevolution an almost worst case scenario. Once the position of America in Iraq is stabilized, the U.S. interest in a change of Iranian government must be reevaluated. For now, however, Iranian help is necessary to avoid an indefinitely prolonged bloody continuation of the Iraqi war.

Even the most superficial scan of Iranian history would suggest that the United States avoid participation in schemes by the various in-exile groups to overthrow the present government. For example, mustering a gaggle of exiled opposition groups (their objectives except for attaining power seem to have little in common) and backing the ill-assorted conglomerate by a Bay-of-Pigs-like operation would obviously be sheer folly. Incidently , one would hope that the dinosaurs in the State department and the CIA are now convinced that such groups are not even good intelligence sources about Iran.

A full scale invasion of Iran similar to that of Iraq is not an option, certainly while American will is at such a low ebb. Energetic financial and training support to a particular group (such as the CIA gives to Palestinian "police"} would seem most likely to damage the prospects of any future Iranian-American cooperation no matter what form the future government may take.

U.S. planning built around likely successors to Khamenai should have already begun. The Supreme Leader is about 75 years old, and his power may not persist as long as his life. The present constitution does not provide for removal of the Faqih under any circumstances. His death in office should open up a plethora of candidate successors, but none now seem preeminent. If still alive, Rafsanjani would be the major political force in the choice and subsequent support of the new Supreme Leader.

Finally, a successful revisionist-led internal counterrevolution seems progressively less likely with the passage of time. Western optimists have made much of the demographic anomaly of the hugely predominant youth cohort in Iran, as if it almost guaranteed the outbreak and success of a counterrevolution. A realistic rejoinder might note that the ranks of the Basij are made up of the age contemporaries of the revisionist protesters. The response to chronic unemployment may generate a "street goon" as easily as an anti-clerical liberal. Education is not a one-sided selector either; history has shown that, just as in Hitler's Germany, the "armed intellectual" may either embrace the Left or become an enthusiastic tool of Facist State repression. The Basij are the contemporary middle-eastern analog of the Sturm Abteilung.

Thus far, since 1999, the yearly renewed revisionist efforts have failed to obtain significant concessions, much less to effect changes in government. Crucially, they have not brought serious numbers of the middle class into the streets to battle in their support. The Basij, or what the journalists term "street thugs," continue their successful record of bloody repression. Further, at this writing, the revisionist protestors' immediate objectives seem to be more the modification of clerical rule rather the complete overthrow of the government. A successful modification seems even more unlikely than before in view of the numerically overwhelming conservative triumph in last February's Majlis elections - a victory that completes clerical control of ALL phases of government. For at least the next 4 years, the revisionists will not have even the partial support of a straw-man president, since Khatami is ineligible for a third term.

In sum, the road to a Middle Eastern modus vivendi between the U.S. and Iran is as far from clear and open as it is possible to be. It rather resembles a mine-field, one which, regrettably, we have helped to lay. Planning based on real knowledge of Iran and Iranians, planning that gives high priority to good intelligence and flexibility in the face of temporary reverses seems the best hope to turn the key of the Middle East.

[9.] The word Pahlavi is the name of a language, the Middle Iranian, from which Farsi, the principle language of present day Iran, is descended.

[10.] Further citations from the Library of Congress, Country Studies, Iran will be abbreviated as LOC.

[11.] marja'-i taqlid roughly, "the authority to be followed." One of the highest (world wide) one or two judicial authorities among the Twelver Shi'ia. The title is given to an Ayatollah by general recognition and the consensus of his peers.

[12.] Since the Iranian calendar is a solar one (at least as accurate as the Gregorian), Khordad always corresponds to a time between May and June. The Islamic (lunar) calendar in Iran is used to mark religious holidays, any one of which can occur at any time of year.

[14.] SAVAK was formed in 1957 with American assistance, at first as a weapon against the Tudeh. With time, it became more than a full-scale intelligence agency. Like the Russian KGB, it had its own prisons, and acquired the right to arrest and indefinitely imprison (and torture) any person in the country. Its activities abroad, for example in the United States, were well known even to the U.S. Government. The Shah was never very comfortable with SAVAK. He probably ordered the murder of its first director, and was openly distrustful of the successors - always fearing them as possible king-makers or usurpers. A possibe counterweight, the Special Intelligence Bureau, totally independent of SAVAK, was based in his palace.

[15.] The Shah's government official body count was a ridiculously low total of 87. On the other hand the 2000 estimate of the republican forces is certainly overinflated.

[16.] Khomeini was never a member, since as the Fiqih he had to appear to be above transient party concerns. Nonetheless, the party leaders were his close associates and their positions were usually to be taken as de facto his. This is another example of Khomeini's policy of increasing his real power while at the same time increasing the insulating distance between himself and the actual executors.

[17.] The Basij survived their use as human waves. Today there are hundreds of thousands - if not a million - of them, most in their teens and twenties and dedicated to the cause of Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. Day to day, they serve as the morality police, monitoring the clothes, music and prayer attendance of city people. They are also the street fighters who so far have successfully suppressed the demonstrations of the youthful agitators for reform of the theocracy.

[18.] During his televised show trial, Hashemi "confessed" to ordering many murders. He claimed to have cached weapons in secret places throughout the country. Some government circles in Iran believe that his unapprehended aasociates are responsible for occasional crimes such as assassination of officials. In the controlled press, the survivors are referred to as the "Hashemi gang."

[19.] Total oil income since the revolution, is said to top $300 Billion but per capita income in 2003 was 30% of the pre-revolution level. Inflation hovers somewhere around 14-15%/annum, and the black market value of the rial is about 8600 to $1 (U.S.).

Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism; Essays on the Islamic Republic, http://texts.cdlib.org/dynaxml/servlet/dynaXML?docId=ft6c6006wp&chunk.id=d0e37.

Bakhash, Saul, POLICYWATCH - Number 838, SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy February 27, 2004, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch2004/838.htm.

The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php.

Ernst,Carl W., The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997, http://www.shambhala.com.

Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi, Islamic Government, (original title: Hukumat -i Islami, Hamid Agar, translator), http://www.wandea.org.pl.

Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi, Last Will & Testament, The Virtual Vendee, http://www.wandea.org.pl.

Lapidus, Ira M., A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Lewis, Bernard, What Went Wrong? - Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Library of Congress - Country Studies - Iran (1988), (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ir0158)).

Lipkin, Lewis, Hizbollah Internationsl, http://think-israel.org/lipkin.hizbollah.html.

Pahlavi, Reza, Winds of Change: The Future of Democracy in Iran., New York: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2002.

Seton-Watson,Hugh,The Russian Empire: 1801-1917, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

Shevlin, Niel, Velayat-E Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: The Implementation of Theocracy., Dissertation, J.D., University of Pennsylvania 1999. Reproduced in http://www.gongfa.com/yilangxianfa.htm.

Woodward, E.L. and Butler,Rohan (Eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series Volume IV, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952, Serial 114911/150/34 August 1919.

Zadeh, Karem Ghazi, General Principles of Imam Khomeini's Political Thought, The Virtual Vendee, http://www.wandea.org.pl.

Shi'ite Encyclopedia-Chapter_1a_Part03. http://www.islamic-paths.org/Home/English/Sects/Shiite/Encyclopedia/ Chapter_1a_Part03.htm.

The Origin of Shi'ite Islam and Its Principles, http://home.swipnet.se/islam/shia-origin.htm

Shi'ite Encyclopedia, Chapter 9, Section 1, Outline of Differences, http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter9/1.html.

Lewis Lipkin is a member of the staff of Think-Israel. He writes on Israel's neighbors and historical events.

Mossadeq

Present day political romanticism presents Mohammad Mossadeq as a stalwart anti-imperialist. His long career extending from 1914 to the reign of the 2nd Pahlahvi is marked by a persistent leftist nationalism that usually found him in opposition to the policies of the crown, even while in ministerial office. The National Front party of which he was a founder agitated in favor of oil nationalization. The most generous view is that Mossadeq and his party would make use of communist support (e.g., the Tudeh party} but would keep their independence of action.
A less sanguine view was held by the Anglo-Saxon power structure in the early days of the Cold War. Lack of Soviet restraint during the Adzerbaijan episode underlined the danger of the close juxtaposition of the northern Iranian oil provinces and the Russian presence south of the Caucasus; especially when the prime minister was so seeming left-leaning. Further, was his increasing opposition to the Shah based on announced objectives, or was his personal aggrandizement - to become the ruler of the Iranian state - his real goal?
Detailed information concerning Mossadeq's political position is not easily available particularly for the time he led the Majlis in rejecting concessions to the Russians promised them in return for evacuating Adzerbaijan. The following account from the Library of Congress Country Studies is about as detailed as any immediately available in English.
"Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam had to persuade Stalin to withdraw his troops by agreeing to submit a Soviet oil concession to the Majlis and to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Azarbaijan crisis with the Pishevari government. In April the government signed an oil agreement with the Soviet Union; in May, partly as a result of United States, British, and UN pressure, Soviet troops withdrew from Iranian territory. Qavam took three Tudeh members into his cabinet. Qavam was able to reclaim his concessions to the Soviet Union, however. A tribal revolt in the south, partly to protest communist influence, provided an opportunity to dismiss the Tudeh cabinet officers. In December, ostensibly in preparation for new Majlis elections, he sent the Iranian army into Adzerbaijan. Without Soviet backing, the Pishevari government collapsed, and Pishevari himself fled to the Soviet Union. A similar fate befell the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In the new Majlis, a strong bloc of deputies, organized in the National Front and led by Mohammad Mossadeq, helped defeat the Soviet oil concession agreement by 102 votes to 2. The Majlis also passed a bill forbidding any further foreign oil concessions and requiring the government to exploit oil resources directly." http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ir0024)]

The situation that developed in 1951-52, from the time of the request to control the army was viewed by the Western governments as an open attempt to replace the Shah. It was certainly a perspective which does not fit Mossadeq as a paragon of anti-imperialism and international virtue. Branches of the National Front in the United States still exist and still commemorate and memorialize their founder.
What is clear, is that even after a couple of centuries of Western imperialism we have not developed new terms or learned to use existing ones to characterize the political stance of an Islamic statesman.

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Khomeini

FAMILY AND EARLY YEARS
Ruhullah Musava Khomeini's life (20 Jan 1902 - 3 June 1989) spanned almost the whole of the 20th century which he so significantly affected. He was a youngster at the outbreak of World War I and in his last year, the Soviet Empire was in the process of dissolution.
His family had long traditions of Islamic scholarship. One ancestor was said to be Imam Musa al-Kazim, the seventh Imam of the Twelver Shi'ia. His grandfather, a mujtahid, had been invited to Khomein to be the instructor, religious guide and Shar'ia judge to the Sh'ia of the town. Khomeini's father, Sayid Mustaffa, another accomplished Islamic scholar and moderately prosperous landowner, continued in this populist-clerical role. He was murdered when Khomeini was only 5 months old. The motive was attributed to Sayid Mustaffa's efforts in favor of impoverished peasants and in their defence against oppressive landlords and officials. Khomeini's mother and aunt spent the rest of their lives in pursuit of justice - to obtain the public execution of the murderer. With their deaths (1918) this overriding family goal was taken up by an elder brother and finally attained in 1925. Khomeini, by then a promising theological student at Qum, was a witness to the execution in Tehran.
Khomeini, had begun serious studies in nearby Arak. These were not always uninterrupted, since occasionally it was necessary during the WWI and early Reza Shah years to defend the family property against still unsettled tribesmen. While in Arak, he came under the influence of a prominent scholar, Ayatollah Ha'iri, and followed him to the holy city of Qum in 1923. Khomeini was to remain in Qum for 40 years, progressing from student to mujtahid, to Ayatollah to the highest attainable level of recognition of Shi'ite Islamic scholarship, marja al-Taqlid (Authority to be followed). It was during those years also, that the reputation of Qum regained its ascendancy over Iragi centers such as Njaf.
THE YEARS AT QUM
He married at age 30, and fathered 2 sons and 3 daughters.
In the early years at Qum, Khomeini's principle interests were in Islamic ethics and especially gnosticism. It was in these areas that he gave his first popular lectures. His later preeminence in the area of fiqh never replaced his original interests. It is said by Moslem scholars that his political thought is interwoven with gnostic ideas. In addition to Islamic studies, he also pursued aspects of Western science, e.g., astronomy as well as philosophy and European history.
Abrahamian says that the teacher at Qum who had the most influence on Khomeini was Mizra Muhammad Ali Shahabadi. Among other subjects, Shahabadi taught a form of esoteric study based on the work of a 13th century mystic, Ibn Arabi. Khomeini later wrote that he reverenced him as a master. Abrahamian also suggests that Shahabadi was a source of the fusion of the strains of gnostic and Islamic politics in Khomeini's thinking. When Shahabadi left the Fayziya madrassa at Qum, he turned over his course on ethics to Khomeini.
During the 1930's, Ha'iri, the leading cleric in Qum, was politicaly uncritical. He refused to openly criticize Reza Shah, and his secular-nationalistic policies which were so widely at variance with Twelver Shi'ia doctrine. Khomeini's belief that clerical political leadership should only be exercised by the most accomplished Shiite scholars led him to accede to Ha'iri's political passivity, a position with which he did not agree. After Ha'iri's death and toward the end of WWII, Khomeini did issue a proclamation calling on the entire Islamic world to act against the domination of foreign powers, but this was not specifically directed against the Pahlavi government.
His first widely circulated writings were a defense of some Shi'ia customs that were condemned by the Sunni Islamic majority and particularly by its Wahhabi sect. He wrote in support of such characteristics of Shi'ia Islam as the 10 day period of demonstrative public mourning for Ali at the beginning of the month of Muharram and the practice of pilgrimage to the tombs of the Imams. He believed the atmosphere generated by Reza Shah's anti-religious policies was destructive and proceded to condemn them. He went so far as to suggest that the solution to the problem of legal legitimacy might be the Shah's replacement by a just ruler selected by a group of competent clergy.
In 1946 Khomeini played a role in the selection of Ayatollah Burujirdi as the formost Shi'ia leader. He soon regretted the choice because Burujirdi was soon cooperating with the Shah's government. Khomeini remained unprotesting but continued to write extensively and to teach. His class in fiqh was soon attended by hundreds among whom were the future Ayatollahs Mutahhari and Montazeri (the former was a martyr in a 1980 bombing while Montazeri for a while was Khomeini's designated successor). In 1962 after Burujirdi's death, Khomeini was recognized as marja'-i taqlid, providing, just in time, the exalted status which made his leadership possible in the 16 year struggle for an Islamic state.
SHI'ITE ISLAMIC LAW AND KHOMEINI'S INNOVATION
In Orthodox Judaism, the scope of the Law is quite wide, but its pronouncement on many aspects of interpersonal relations (e.g., divorce, marriage, contracts etc.) are coordinated with the law of whatever land in which the Rabbonim and the people find themselves. Even in a Jewish State, it is not expected, for example, that the law of contract has to be pure unmodified halacha. But, because of the inherent humanity and justice of halacha, its principles are widely adopted in Israeli and Western law in general.
Gibb, writing for English readers, and an authority in the field introduces the place of Shar'ia in Islam as follows:
"Law in the eyes of the Muslim scholars was not in fact an independent or empirical study. It was the practical aspect of the religious and social doctrine preached by Mohammed. For the early Muslims there was little or no distinction between 'legal' and 'religious'. In the Koran the two aspects are found side by side, or rather interwoven one with the other, and so likewise in the Hadith. The study and interpretation of the Koran involved sometimes the one and sometimes the other, and nearly a century elapsed before scholars began to specialize in one or the other aspect. Ultimately they were distinguished by relative terms: 'ilm - 'positive knowledge', denoting theology (though not excluding law), and fiqh, 'understanding', denoting law (based on theology). Only at a much later date was Greek word 'canon' (qanun) adopted to denote administrative rule as distinct from revealed law. (Thus 'canon law' in Arabic should mean the exact opposite of canon in European usage.)" [Extract from The Shari'a by Sir H.A.R.Gibb http://answering-islam.org.uk/Books/Gibb/sharia.htm]

In Muslim law, particularly in Shi'ite postrevolutionary Iran, the separation between religious and secular law is non existent, because secular law does not effectively exist as a separate entity. It is the Quran and and the Sunnah (the examples of Mohammud's behavior and decisions during his life as recorded in the hadith) which are both basis and vade mecum for family, business, international and religious law: in short for ALL GOVERNANCE AT ALL LEVELS.
"The Imamiyah [Twelver] Shi'as believe that an ordinance or order of the Islamic code exists for EVERY [emphasis added] matter of life... There is no action of a "mukallaf" (a sane, adult person) which does not come under the scope of the following definitions: "wajib" (compulsory); "haram" (unlawful); mustahabb (desirable); makruh (undesirable) and mubah (lawful)" ["The Origin of Shi'ite Islam and Its Principles," http://home.swipnet.se/islam/shia-origin.htm].

For the Shi'ia, the simple existence of such ordinances is not sufficient for a reign of Islamic law. In novel cases, applicability of the proper ordinance to the situation was only for the Imam of the Alul Bayit - the line of Ali - or his specified agent to decide. With the Greater Occultation of the twelfh Imam, no competent juristic authority was possible. At first there was speculation that the Mahdi would soon return, but this expectation soon faded. Accordingly the Shi'ia were compelled to live under governments which did not fully conform. Mostly conservative 'ulama` held that no matter how learned, a mujtahid should not make novel rulings. Gradually in the 18th and 19th centuries a minority view that idjtihad (implies exerting oneself to form an opinion in a legal matter) was not only valid but mandatory. Finally Khomeini expounded his extreme view that non-clerics were illegitmate rulers of Moslems and that only competent clerics could administer as well as interpret Islamic law and thus only a competent jurisconsult(s) could be the ruler of an Islamic state.
The thesis was fully developed in his book "Hukumat-i-islami".(Islamic Government).He asserts not only that the Shar'ia is sufficient for government, but that it makes for the only kind of just government. Finally a competent jurisconsult is the necessary instrument to bring this paradise on earth to fruition. A contemporary competent jurisconsult obtains his authority (without any laying on of hands) from the Prophet and Imams of the line of Ali. He is recognized as a world-class expert on fiqh by his colleagues. Beyond his technical expertise, however, the same infallibility that graced the ancient Imams has now been bestowed upon the Fiqh by Allah, transmitted to him in an esoteric manner through Ali and the line of the Imams. Khomeini's long-term involvement in gnostic thought is reflected in some of his statements quoted here by Zadeh concerning the Imamate and the Islamic State
"..only the infallible Imams and their appointees are entitled to take the helm of political affairs. In their absence, their representatives, i.e., qualified jurisconsults, are responsible for running the political affairs [sic]... In the absence of the guardianship of a jurisconsult (Wilayat-e faqih) and Divine order, the taqut [inherently unjust order] will prevail. If [the] president is not appointed by a jurisconsult, he would be illegitimate. An illegitmate president is tantamount to a taquti Tagut would be finally destroyed when a just ruler is appointed with the grace of God. (Kazen Ghazi Zahdeh)

Abstract conditions such as Tagut are, in a manner unclear to prosaic minds, rendered almost material by an evil lack of legitimacy and like concrete objects are destroyed by the grace that descends upon the environment in which the just ruler dwells.
The active politics of Khomeini's life in exile and his last decade in power are treated in the main section of Iranian history.
He left a will addressed to the people of Iran in which he combined his concern for them as their Imam with admonitions to protect and continue the revolution. He is buried near the holy city of Qum, which he said he considered his home.

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Khomeini's Letter of Dismissal to Ayatolla Montazeri

TRANSLATION OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI LETTER DISMISSING MONTAZERI
The text of Ayatollah Khomeini's historic letter was recently printed in the Tehran Abrar.
Tehran ABRAR 22 Nov 1997, page 2.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
To Mr. Montazeri.
My heart is broken and filled with blood now that I am writing a few words to you. Perhaps one day the people will realize the facts by reading this letter.
In your recent letter to me, you said that, in accordance with the Shari'ah, you give priority to my views over your own. I consider God my witness when I point out the following issues:
Since it has become clear that after me you are going to hand over this country, our dear Islamic revolution, and the Muslim people of Iran to the liberals, and through that channel to the hypocrites [Mojahedin-e Khalq], you are no longer eligible to succeed me as the legitimate leader of the state. You, in most of your letters, speeches and stances, have shown that you believe the liberals and hypocrites should rule in this country. It is so clear that your remarks have been dictated by the hypocrites that I did not see any point in sending a reply. For instance, thanks to your speeches and written work, the hypocrites took advantage of your stance in defense of their ilk to promote a number of their comrades - who had been condemned to death on charges of waging an armed struggle against Islam and the revolution - to positions of authority. Can you see what valuable services you have offered to arrogance? On the issue of the murderer Mahdi Hashemi [a supporter and relative of Ayatollah Montazeri, who was later executed], you considered him to be the most religious person on earth. Despite the fact that it was proved to you that he was a murderer, you kept sending messages to me to spare his life. There are so many other examples, similar to that of Mahdi Hashemi, that I cannot be bothered to mention them all.
You no longer have the power of attorney on my behalf. Tell the people who bring you gold and money to take them to Mr. Pasandideh's [Khomeyni's elder brother] residence in Qom or to me in Jamaran. Praise be to God, you yourself will not have any financial commitments from this date.
If, in accordance with the Shari'ah, you do consider my views to be superior to yours (which certainly the hypocrites will advise you that it is against your interests to do so; and no doubt you will become busy writing things which will further deteriorate your future), then you should listen to the following words of advice I am giving you. It breaks my heart and my chest is full of agonizing pain when I see that you, the fruit of my life's labor, are so ungrateful. However, by relying on Almighty God, I give you the following words of advice, and it will be up to you whether you make a note of them or not:
One: Try to change the members of your bureau so as to avoid feeding the hypocrites, Mahdi Hashemi's clique, and the liberals from the sacred charity funds donated to the Imam.
Two: Since you are a gullible [sadeh lowh] person and are provoked easily, do not interfere in political matters, and maybe then God will forgive you for your sins.
Three: Do not write to me ever again, and do not allow the hypocrites to pass state secrets to foreign radio stations. Four: Since you became a mouthpice of the hypocrites and your speeches have conveyed their wishes and letters to the people via the mass media, you have inflicted heavy blows on Islam and the revolution. This is a great act of treason against the unknown soldiers of the Lord of the Age, may our souls be sacrificed for him, and against the sacrifices made by the illustrious martyrs of Islam and the revolution. If you wish to save yourself from hell fire, you had better confess to all your sins and mistakes and maybe then God will help you.
I swear to God that from the start I was against choosing you as my successor, but at the time I did not realize you were so gullible. To me you were not a resourceful manager but an educated person who could benefit the religious seminaries. If you continue your deeds I will definitely be obliged to do something about you. And you know me, I never neglect my obligation.
I swear to God that I was against appointing Mahdi Bazargan as the first prime minister, too, but I considered him to be a decent person. I also swear to God that I did not vote for Bani-Sadr, as the president either. On all these occasions I submitted to the advice of my friends. In the midst of my pain and suffering, I wish to address our dear people from the bottom of my broken heart:
I have made a pledge with my God not to forgive evil individuals ever, if I am not obliged to do so. I have made a pledge with my God that pleasing Him [God] is much greater priority than pleasing my friends and other people. If the entire world were to rise against me, I would never abandon justice and the truth. I do not care about history and current developments. I am only interested in performing my religious duties. In addition to my pledge with God, I have promised the decent, noble, and honest people to inform them of the facts when the time is appropriate. Islam's history is full of instances of treason by its prominent figures against Islam. Try to make sure that you are not influenced by the lies broadcast by foreign radio stations. These radio stations dictate their lies with so much joy and enthusiasm these days. I beseech Almighty God to grant patience and tolerance to this old father of the dear Iranian people. I beseech God to forgive me and to take me away from this world so that I no longer have to experience the bitter taste of my friends' treachery. We all submit to God's will. We have no power without God's will. Everything comes from Him.
Wishing you peace: Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeyni;
dated: Sunday 6 Farvardin 1368.
(www.irvl.net/Translation%20of%20Ayatollah%20Khomeini's%20Letter%20Dismissing%20M)

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Khamenei

The present Supreme Leader of Iran was born in 1939 to a poor but religious family in Mashad. His prerevolutionary career was intellectually undistinguished, but while at Qum, he and Rafsanjani were favorites of Khomeini. In the years between 1963 and 1978 they were both active in underground anti-government agitation. He was arrested and imprisoned by SAVAK on as many as six occasions and in his official autobiography, complains about being tortured. He, along with Ayatollah Behesti, was a founder of the Islamic Republic Party.
On Khomeini's return to Iran in Feb 1979, he was appointed to the Revolutionary Council, which was the Islamic counterweight to the secular revolutionary elements in the government of Mehdi Bazargan. During that critical year, Khamenei held several posts in the Defense establishment including first commander of the Pasdaran (Islamic Revolutionary Guards). His eloquence as a preacher, rather than his theological attainments, led to his appointment as leader of the Friday prayers in Tehran. The prayer leader functioned as the loudspeaker for the governments weekly ration of "agit-prop."
The 1979 Iranian constitution had defined the office of President to be in fact a post very subordinate to the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council and even in some respects, to the Majlis. Khamenei was appointed to the presidency when the incumbent, Mohammad Rajaee, was assassinated in 1981. Both Khamenei and Rafsanjani were threatened by the prospect of Khomeini's then designated successor, Ayatolla Husain Ali Montazeri, attaining the supreme leadership. They combined efforts first to undermine Montazeri's standing and then to produce changes in the new constitution which would make the, at best, mediocre theologian Khanenei the Fiqih when Khomeini died.
"... Indeed, Khamenei's theological qualifications were rather slim compared to many of his counterparts in the clergy. Were it not for the concern surrounding the viability of the Islamic Republic in the immediate aftermath of Khomeini's death, it is entirely possible that Khamenei's appointment as Supreme Religious Guide would have been met with howls of protest from the clergy. Those howls came when Khamenei was appointed Grand Ayatollah, joining the other elite members of the clergy at the apogee of the priestly hierarchy. The appointment came some years after Khamenei succeeded Khomeini as the Supreme Religious Guide, and since there weren't the same concerns about the viability of the regime that there were at the time of Khomeini's death, the clergy attacked Khamenei's elevation to the position of Grand Ayatollah as a sham. Khamenei was criticized as lacking the scholarly credentials necessary to be a Grand Ayatollah, and, in a move that would have been unthinkable in Khomeini's heyday, Khamenei's opponents suggested that his elevation to the position of Supreme Religious Guide invalidated any argument that the Supreme Religious Guide should be considered infallible, as Khomeini was when leading the Islamic Republic. Indeed, as Michael Ledeen points out, Khamenei's lack of theological standing prompted one dissident to refer to him as "hojat al-Islam." A hojat al-Islam is a cleric of middling rank in the Shi'ite hierarchy, and the reference, when applied to Khamenei, constitutes an insult considering the fact that Khamenei is a Grand Ayatollah, and the Supreme Religious Guide..." [Pejman Yousefzadeh http://www.pejmanesque.com/archives/006524.html]

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